Urban Transportation Problem by Verbit, Gilbert Paul
THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM
GILBERT PAUL VERBITt
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................
II. THREE VIEWS OF THE PROBLEM ................................
A. The Transportation Disadvantaged ........................
1. The Young ....................................................
2. The Elderly ...................................................
3. The Handicapped ........................................
4." The Poor .......................................................
5. Summary .......................................................
B. Congestion ............................................................
C. The Automobile Commuter ....................................
III. SYSTEM COSTS OF AUTOMOBILE COMMUTING ............
A. The Automobile as an Energy Water .....................
B. The Automobile as a Polluter ................................
C. The Automobile as a Tortfeasor .............................
D. The Automobile as a Space Waster ........................
IV. THE URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1964 ..
A. The Act's Preference for Rail Rapid Transit ..........
B. The Basis for the Act's Preference for Rail Rapid
Transit .................................................................
1. Potential Benefits Examined ........................
a. Cost ............................................................
b. Speed ..........................................................
c. Labor Savings .............................................
d. Diversion of Automobile Traffic ...................
2. The Argument for Rail Rapid Transit Re-
butted ............................................................
V. W HY COMMUTERS DRIVE ...........................................
VI. LIMITING AUTOMOBILE COMMUTING .........................
A. Traffic Restraint ..................................................
B. Traffic Restriction ................................................
369
372
372
373
373
377
378
388
388
390
392
392
394
397
398
401
401
412
413
413
414
416
417
418
425
431
433
438
t Professor of Law, Boston University. B.S. 1957, University of Pennsylvania;
LL.B. 1960, Yale University. Member, District of Columbia and Massachusetts Bars.
THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM
VII. STREET USE PLANNING .............................................. 445
A. The Power to Restructure Street Use ...................... 446
1. Delegation of Authority from State to Mu-
nicipality ........................................................ 446
2. The Validity of Restructuring Street Use ... 449
B. The Abutter's Rights ............................................. 454
1. The Right of Access and Compensation ..... 456
2. Abutters' Rights and Street Use Planning-
Special Problem s ........................................... 468
a. The "Piazza" Principle ................................ 468
b. "Squeezing". ............................................... 470
c. Leveling ...................................................... 470
C . Vacation ............................................................... 472
1. Vacation Defined .......................................... 473
2. Procedural Problems .................................... 475
3. Problems of Reversion and Compensation . 479
D . Special Benefits .................................................... 482
V III. CONCLUSION ............................................................... 487
I. INTRODUCTION
The Urban Mass Transportation Act of 19641 is the
framework of the legislatively determined solution to the urban
transportation problem. In accordance with that solution, billions
of dollars of public money have been expended and billions
more will be.2 The purpose of this Article is to examine the Act
and the solution embodied therein critically.
The analysis will begin with an attempt to identify the prob-
lem, which is by no means self-evident. In particular, discussion
will focus on the three aspects of the problem embodied in the
Act. The first of these is the plight of the "transportation
disadvantaged"-those who lack access to an automobile in an
age when such access is a prerequisite to minimum mobility. The
second facet of the urban transportation problem to be discussed
is "congestion." Astronomic sums have been expended to relieve
traffic congestion in urban areas but the solution continues to
elude us. Champions of the Act believe strongly that it will at
long last lead to elimination of the congestion problem. Finally,
1 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-12 (1970).
2 See text accompanying notes 158-180 infra.
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we shall examine the automobile 'journey to work" as an urban
transportation problem. The analysis will lead to the conclusion
that the journey to work is the urban transportation problem.
Upon examination, the issue of the "transportation disadvan-
taged" shrinks to a size that is virtually de minimus and even this
residuum appears to present an issue of public transportation
though not of mass transportation. And "congestion" will be seen
to be more a solution than a problem.
The automobile journey to work is the urban mass transpor-
tation problem because it is the only category of transportation
for which mass transportation is a viable alternative. Before dis-
cussing how drivers and passengers might be shifted from au-
tomobiles to mass transportation vehicles, however, it is neces-
sary to examine why this need be done. Thus the Article will
analyze the social costs of automobile commuting and, in particu-
lar, the social evils of pollution, energy waste, accidents, and
misallocation of urban land. Although the verdict here will be
"not proven," the Article will proceed on the generally accepted
assumption that society will benefit from the diversion of traffic
from automobiles to mass transportation. The issue, then, is how
to achieve this end.
The heart of the Urban Mass Transportation Act and the
channel into which most of its vast resources have been poured is
the idea that a sufficient number of commuters will be lured
from their automobiles by the improvement of existing mass
transportation systems and the construction of new systems. It
will be argued that this thesis is at best wishful thinking and that
it is destined to fail in terms of its stated goal.
The Act will be examined a priori in the light of studies
indicating why commuters prefer automobiles to mass transit
vehicles. The negative conclusions about the Act that flow from
this analysis will be bolstered by data indicating exceedingly low
diversion figures, and even lower figures for the decline in au-
tomobile trips to work, when commuters are offered modern
mass transportation. It will be concluded that the Act fundamen-
tally misconceives the urban transportation problem as a tech-
nological one when in fact the problem is behavioral.
Assuming that the urban transportation problem is one of
commuter behavior, various systems that purport to affect com-
muter behavior will be explored. Systems that attempt to induce
commuters to use mass transportation will be disposed of quickly
and discussion will focus on barriers to automobile commuting,
THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM
which are grouped into traffic restraint and traffic restriction
systems. While some of these systems are effective in discourag-
ing automobile commuting, they share with the Act a common
defect: Like the Act they treat transportation as an end in itself
instead of as a means of moving between two fixed points. In
particular, neither the solutions encompassed by the Act nor
systems that discourage automobile commuting improve the at-
tractiveness of the urban area as a workplace. In fact, the mass
transportation "improvements" envisaged by the Act may affect
the urban environment as negatively as the now-rejected urban
highways. The auto commuter may love his car more than his
job; if so, the trend toward living and working in the suburbs will
accelerate.
The optimal solution to the urban transportation problem,
therefore, would discourage automobile commuting and would
act to improve the attractiveness of the urban area. Such a solu-
tion can be found if one reconceives the urban transportation
problem as a land planning problem. Present planning has allo-
cated up to twenty-five percent of all urban land for use as a
"street,' '3 without making any more sophisticated judgments
about a street's use. Streets are subject to the demands of a
variety of competing uses just as is the land abutting those
streets. While use categorization for the latter areas began with
the classic triumvirate-industrial, commercial, and residential
-and has since been refined ad infinitum, streets have, with rare
exceptions, remained streets. The failure to recognize the possi-
bility of competing street uses has permitted the bad mode of
transportation (private automobiles) to drive the good mode
(mass transportation) from the streets.
The present task, then, is to right the balance by adopting a
system of zoning streets for particular categories of use with a
view toward discouraging automobile commuting and improving
the attractiveness of the urban area. Implementing this solution
will require mastery of a complex body of real property law. The
legal principles involved will be examined in Part VII of this
Article. This Article thus represents an attempt to accept the
invitations extended by planners such as Jane Jacobs, Victor
3See J. MEYER, J. KAIN & M. WOHL, THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM 311
(1965) [hereinafter cited as MEYER]. See also W. OWEN, THE ACCESSIBLE CITY 95 (1972):
"The space devoted to streets usually represents the largest portion of publicly owned
urban land."
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Gruen, and John Meyer, all of whom have indicated that the
ultimate solution to the urban transportation problem lies at
least partially within the expertise of lawyers.4
II. THREE VIEWS OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Transportation Disadvantaged
In arguing for passage of the Act, then Secretary of Hous-
ing and Urban Development Weaver noted that
there is a tremendous number of our population that
cannot avail themselves of automobiles. I speak of the
aged; I speak of those who are incapacitated, either per-
manently or temporarily; I speak of the young people
who are too young to drive; and I speak of those who
cannot afford and do not afford an automobile .... 5
Although not identified in the legislation, this constituency has
been labeled by administrative practice as the "transportation
disadvantaged. ' 6 Persons who "cannot avail themselves of au-
tomobiles" are estimated to be 15% of the residents of each
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).7 In absolute
4 It has been suggested, e.g., MEYER, supra note 3, at 331-32, that "adaptation" of
"cities and CBD's [central business districts] to transportation technology ... may be the
only satisfactory solution" and that "the challenges of reorganizing CBD's in this way (to
achieve 'appropriate' urban land use) may be as much legal and institutional as tech-
nological." See also Meyer, Urban Transportation, in THE METROPOLITAN ENIGMA 57 (J.
Wilson ed. 1970). "A better longer-term solution may be, however, in adjusting the
physical layouts of those older business areas to modern technological circumstances...
[via] urban renewal." Id. 66. The connection between land use, transportation controls,
and environmental quality has been identified in § I 10(a)(2)(B) of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (1970).
3 Hearings on Urban Mass Transportation Act Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1963).
6 URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,
EXTERNAL OPERATING MANUAL IIA-2 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL]. See also
Villarreal, Meeting the Needs of the Transit Dependent, HIGHWAY & URBAN MASS TRANSP. 32
(1972); C. Villarreal, Opportunities for the Transit Dependent, Conference on Transpor-
tation and Human Needs in the '70's (Am. U.), June 19, 1972, at 50, 54-55. More
recently, the Department of Transportation extended the definition of the "transporta-
tion poor" to include "in some circumstances even the one-car family." U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSPORTATION, STATE-OF-THE-ART OVERVIEW, DEMAND-REsPONSE TRANSPORTATION 1
(1974). See also Editorial, METROPOLITAN, Jan.-Feb., 1975, at 14.
For another definition, see Kinley, Resource Paper on the Transportation Disadvantaged,
in URBAN TRAVEL DEMAND FORECASTING 121, 123 (Highway Research Bd. Special Rep.
No. 143, 1973): "An individual (or group) is transportation disadvantaged ... if he takes
significantly fewer trips, for any purpose, or has significantly longer travel times than
would be expected for his income."
7 See Kinley, supra note 6, at 124.
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numbers, estimates range from 50 million to 103.9 million.a
While the definition of "availability" inevitably leaves some un-
certainty in determining the size of the relevant population, a
somewhat more accurate figure hinting at similar dimensions of
the problem is the percentage of households not owning an au-
tomobile. For the major SMSA's, the 1970 census figure was
20.4%. For Los Angeles the figure was 17.2%; Philadelphia,
27%; and Chicago, 28.3%. 9
1. The Young
The largest group of the transportation disadvantaged is the
young-the 38% of the population under twenty years old. Since
only 4% of this group are licensed drivers, the young are iden-
tified as transportation disadvantaged. Yet persons under twenty
account for only 7% of all transit passengers. This would seem to
indicate that (a) the young make fewer trips than the population
in general, (b) more of their trips are made by walking or cy-
cling, and/or (c) considering that 20% of American families own
two cars, most of the transportation needs of the young are
satisfied by parents' chauffeuring. 10 All three conclusions are
probably valid. In addition, estimates indicate that more than
half the trips made by persons under sixteen are to and from
school, and these trips are generally satisfied by school bus
service."
2. The Elderly
The next largest group included in the transportation dis-
advantaged category is the elderly, those over sixty-five years of
8 Compare Villarreal, supra note 6, at 32, with J. Crain, Transportation Problems of
Transit Dependent Persons-A Status Report, Conference on Transportation and
Human Needs in the '70's (Am. U.), June 19, 1972, at 3-4.
If one includes persons in households with one car, which is used for journey to
work, the total number of persons who "have no immediate access to a car" is
132,800,000, or 65% of the American population. Paaswell & Recker, Location of the
Carless, in TRANSPORTATION FOR THE POOR, THE ELDERLY, AND THE DISADVANTAGED 11, 13
(Transp. Research Record No. 516, 1974) [hereinafter cited as TRANSPORTATION FOR THE
POOR].
9 See OFFICE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS & INFORMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 1-5
(1972) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS].
10 M. Wohl, Users of Urban Transportation Services and Their Income Circum-
stances, Conference on Poverty and Transportation (Am. Academy of Arts & Sciences),
June 7, 1968, at 7.
ii See Curry, Providing Transportation for Persons with Limited Mobility in Suburban Areas,
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age. This group comprises roughly 10% of the population 12 and
in 1970 had a median age of seventy-three.' 3 Like the young, the
elderly as a group contains a disproportionately small number of
licensed drivers and automobile owners.' 4 Unlike the case of the
young, however, it is difficult to assume that the elderly are
members of households that own automobiles to which they have
access as drivers or passengers. They are more clearly transpor-
tation disadvantaged within the meaning of the definition. In
thinking about how their situation might be improved, however,
the inadequacy of the definition becomes clear: If being trans-
portation disadvantaged means lacking access to an automobile,
the availability of an alternative transportation mode cannot
change that status. Only providing access to an automobile could
do that. It becomes necessary to add an additional element to the
definition of transportation disadvantaged-Secretary Weaver's
lack of automobile availability plus some loss associated with this
lack. If the elderly have a transportation problem, it is not only
that they lack access to an automobile but that this lack of access
deprives them of the opportunity to do something they want or
need to do.'
5
Studies of the mobility patterns of older people in San An-
tonio and New York have indicated a generally low frequency of
in TRANSIT FOR THE POOR, THE AGED, AND THE DISADVANTAGED 47 (Highway Research
Record No. 403, 1972) [hereinafter cited as TRANSIT FOR THE POOR].
12 URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,
THE HANDICAPPED AND ELDERLY MARKET FOR URBAN MASS TRANSIT 5, 9 (1973) (9.3% of
urban 1970 census) [hereinafter cited as UMTA]. See also Kinley, supra note 6, at 125
(12.8 million persons in SMSA's over 65 according to 1970 census).
13 Brotman, The Elderly As A Significant Population Group, in TRANSPORTATION AND
AGING 10, 11 (E. Cantilli & J. Shmelzer eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as TRANSPORTATION
AND AGING].
14 Only 56% of households headed by an elderly person own an automobile, com-
pared with a national average of 80%. Carp, The Mobility of Retired People, in
TRANSPORTATION AND AGING, supra note 13, at 23, 24 (citing Brotman, supra note 15).
Census figures for Chicago in 1960 indicated an average auto availability of 60.1% of all
occupied housing units versus 23.4% for the elderly. Shmelzer, Elderly Ridership and
Reduced Transit Fares: The Chicago Experience, in TRANSPORTATION AND AGING, supra note
13, at 123, 128. Moreover only 24% of the elderly are licensed drivers, compared with a
figure of 54% for the total population sixteen and over. Markovitz, The Transportation
Needs of the Elderly, in TRANSPORTATION AND AGING, supra note 13, at 67, 68.
15 In the transportation field the term "latent demand" is sometimes used to "iden-
tify those trips which the population needs to take or would like to take, but which are
presently not taken because the service is not available or accessible." This definition
assumes a readiness to pay the price for such service-an assumption not clearly justified
in the case of the aging. Thus it is probably more useful to talk about "unfulfilled needs."
Kinley, Latent Travel Demand of the Aging and Handicapped and Barriers to Travel, in
TRANSPORTATION AND AGING, supra note 13, at 52.
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trips made by the elderly. 16 The lower trip rates for the elderly
in the San Antonio and New York studies could be a function of
the aging process or could be evidence of a lack of available
transportation. While neither study collected data directly on
point, it is interesting to note that at the highest income stratum
of the New York study (household income of $10,000 and above,
where one can safely surmise adequate access to some form of
public or private transportation), the daily trip rate for the el-
derly, excluding trips to and from work, was .44 while the aver-
age for the entire population at that income level was .83.17
These figures suggest that the elderly travel less partly because
their needs are fewer and their desire to travel is less.
The elderly may travel less because they constitute a sig-
nificant portion of two other groups who travel less-the poor
and the handicapped.' 8 The transportation problems of the
poor' 9 apply equally to the elderly poor. Moreover, because the
process of aging involves physical deterioration, the elderly
would seem to be deprived of transportation not so much be-
cause of age but because of the physical handicaps associated
with age. This raises the general question whether age really is a
relevant category or whether it is a surrogate for other factors
affecting travel.
20
16 In the San Antonio study, median responses for the following types of trips were:
to visit friends, once a month; to visit children, once a year; to visit relatives, once a year;
to visit the doctor, several times a year; grocery shopping, weekly; other shopping,
several times a year; church, 2-3 times a month. Carp, supra note 14, at 35. This "home-
boundness" was also manifested in a study in the Tri-State Region (New York Metropoli-
tan area) where at all income and density levels the daily trip rate per person, excluding
trips to and from work, was .59, while the trip rate for the elderly was only .32. Mar-
kovitz, supra note 14, at 71.
17 Markovitz, supra note 14, at 71.
"8 See generally Libow, Older People's Medical and Physiological Characteristics: Some Im-
plications for Transportation, in TRANSPORTATION AND AGING, supra note 13, at 14, 16. The
elderly comprise 10% of the general population but 18% of households with incomes
below the poverty line. Looked at in another way, only 11% of the general population are
poor, while 25% of the elderly are poor. Brotman, supra note 13. But see UMTA, supra
note 12, at 10 (1970 census indicates per capita income of persons over 65 higher than
under 65). Relying again on the Tri-State Transportation Commission data, the trip rate
for the elderly in households with a 1963 income of $0-2,999 was .24, while the figure
for the $10,000-and-above income level was .44. Markovitz, supra note 14, at 71.
19 See generally text accompanying notes 33-71 infra.
20 For the "surrogate" view, see Garrison, Limitations and Constraints of Existing Trans-
portation Systems as Applied to the Elderly, in TRANSPORTATION AND AGING, supra note 13, at
100, 103. But f. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING 1969, S.
REP. No. 875, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 91, 101 (1970). See also Older Americans Comprehen-
sive Services Amendments of 1973, § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 3035a (Supp. 1973). The Ad-
ministration did not request funding for this provision in its fiscal 1974 budget. See
Hearings Before Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1974).
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A current program illustrating this confusion of categories
and goals is the reduced transit fare for "senior citizens" during
off-peak hours. On July 1, 1969, New York City initiated a plan
whereby senior citizens could use public transit at half fare from
10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to midnight, as well
as all day on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays. Of the total
population estimated to be eligible, almost 60% registered for
their "New York City Reduced Fare Card. ' 21 A similar half fare
plan was instituted in Chicago on April 20, 1969.22 These pro-
grams could increase transit opportunities for the elderly only
through the lower cost23 -an appeal directed not to the elderly
but to the elderly poor. One must therefore ask whether the
programs would not be more rational if they offered decreased
fares to the poor.24 Moreover, a significant percentage of the
21 Surveys taken one year after the program was initiated (and compared with simi-
lar pre-program surveys) indicate an increase of 26.7% elderly riders between 10:00 a.m.
and 4:00 p.m. Because the largest increment occurred between 12:00 p.m. and 2:00
p.m., it has been suggested that the increment represents a genuine increase in traffic as
opposed to a shift from peak to non-peak travel. Cantor, The Reduced Fare Program for Older
New Yorkers: Some Effects and Implications of the First Year of Operations, in TRANSPORTATION
AND AGING, supra note 13, at 114, 117-22.
22 A before-and-after study was completed in January 1970. The study consisted of
three parts. A sample of elderly "trip diaries" during the periods March 22-April 4
(pre-experiment) and August 4-17, 1969, indicated an increase of 86% in the number of
Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) trips taken by senior citizens during the plan hours of
9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. A second part of the data collection consisted of a sub-sample of
the larger group who reported both "Before and After." Here again a 62% increase in
ridership on CTA modes was evidenced, against a general decline in all modes. Finally,
On-Board-Bus ridership surveys were conducted during the weeks of April 1-7, 1969,
August 5-11, 1969, and January 20-26, 1970. Because only three bus routes remained the
same over time, the results were insufficient for aggregation. As to the routes themselves,
the first showed an increase of 36.8% in the number of senior citizen riders from April to
August, the second an increase of 34.2%, and the third an increase of 43.1%. The period
from August to January, however, evidenced substantial declines in usage so that the
overall increases from April to January were a more modest 9.1%, 17.8%, and - 1.96%,
respectively. Presumably, similar declines would have been evidenced in the samples
under parts one and two if they had been carried on until January. Moreover, percen-
tages on small bases tend to be misleading. The 9.1% increase for the first line rep-
resented an increase in the number of senior citizen passengers from 17.4 to 19 per
hour. The 17.8% increase represented an increase of less than one senior citizen pas-
senger per hour. These modest results are strengthened, however, by "some evidence to
indicate that general passenger revenues had been declining for a part of the period
during which this study was underway." Shmelzer, supra note 14, at 123, 128-31.
23 The irony of these programs is that "transit fares are more important in mode
choice for the work trip than for other purposes .. " McGillivray, Binary Choice of Urban
Transport Mode in the San Francisco Bay Region, 40 ECONOMETRICA 827, 847-48 (1972).
24 In a survey to determine the transportation needs and desires of the elderly in
Champaign, Illinois, not one respondent in over two hundred elderly interviewees men-
tioned cost as a reason for not using the bus. Weaver & Herrin, Transportation Needs and
Desires of the Elderly Residing in a Medium-Sized City, in TRANSPORTATION FOR THE POOR,
supra note 8, at 28, 32.
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increased elderly traffic during off-peak hours may have been
diverted from peak hour travel and thus may not represent an
increase in transit opportunities for the elderly.2 5 These pro-
grams seem designed less to solve the transportation problems of
the elderly than to assist the transit authorities in leveling out
demand for transit facilities. Given the infrequent service charac-
teristic of non-peak periods, the elderly may be worse off under
these programs because their trips may now take longer. Al-
though travel time is a critical factor in urban transportation
trips, it is least critical for the elderly.
2 6
3. The Handicapped
The Department of Transportation has indicated that for
present purposes, "a handicap is an inability to perform one or
more of the actions required by existing transportation systems
at a comfortable level of proficiency. ' 27 A 1973 Department of
Transportation (DOT) study estimated the number of transit
handicapped at 13,390,000.28 Of this number it was estimated
that 38% (5,088,200) live in "transit-oriented" urban areas.
29
Another 41% (5,489,900) live in auto-oriented urban areas and
21% (2,811,900) reside in rural areas.30 Of the total handi-
capped, 6,990,000 are sixty-five or older and 6,400,000 are
under sixty-five. 31
In considering the problems of the transportation hand-
icapped, a shifting of definitional criteria becomes apparent.
While Secretary Weaver described the problem of the transpor-
25 A Pittsburgh study indicated that a reduced fare program increased monthly
round trips by elderly riders 10.5% in Allegheny County. There was also a diversion of
34.3% from peak to off-peak periods. See Hoel & Roszner, Impact of Reduced Transit Fares
for the Elderly, 26 TRAFFIC Q. 341, 352, 356 (1972).
26 See generally Carp, supra note 14, at 28; Golob, Canty, Gufstafson & Vitt, An
Analysis of Consumer Preferences for a Public Transportation System, 6 TRANSP. RESEARCH 81,
91, 98 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Golob].
Despite the questionable benefit of nonpeak half-fare plans, their adoption for the
elderly has become a condition of federal assistance. National Mass Transportation Assis-
tance Act of 1974, § 5(m), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1604(m) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
27 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, TRAVEL BARRIERS 4-5
(1970) [hereinafter cited as TRAVEL BARRIERS].
28 See UMTA, supra note 12, at 7. M. Biaggi, Legislation for Transit Dependent
Groups, Conference on Transportation and Human Needs in the '70's (Am. U.), June
19, 1972, at 152, 155, estimates the number to be "forty million."
29 Transit-oriented areas are characterized by more than 8% transit usage for work
trips. There are 43 such areas, including 87% of American transit usage. See UMTA,
supra note 12, at 7.
30 Id.
31 1d. 8.
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tation disadvantaged as lack of automobile availability, the
criteria for inclusion among the transportation handicapped fail
to mention automobiles. Although it could be argued that the
phrase "existing transportation systems" includes automobile
transportation, a subsequent DOT definition specifically defines
the type of handicap as an inability to "utilize mass transporta-
tion facilities and services. ' 32 As in the case of the elderly, one
must ask why this is a problem. Specifically, the inability to utilize
mass transportation facilities because of a physical handicap is a
problem only if alternative modes of transportation such as au-
tomobiles are not available and this unavailability prevents the
handicapped from making trips they need or want to make. But
even the sketchy data on trip frequencies and auto availability
for the elderly are lacking for the handicapped. The DOT defin-
ition evidences less concern for the transportation problems of
the handicapped than an institutional concern for mass trans-
portation.
4. The Poor
Because the elderly are generally beyond the years of
gainful employment and because the handicapped are disad-
vantaged in employment, both form large subgroups of the
broader category of the poor. Again, if to be transportation
disadvantaged is to be without access to an automobile, the
poor constitute the largest identifiable group of transportation
disadvantaged.
33
32 43 U.S.C. § 16(d) (1970); UMTA, supra note 12, at 2: "[A] transit-relevant, 'physi-
cally handicapped' person is any individual who, by reason of illness, injury, age, congen-
ital malfunction, or other permanent or temporary incapacity or disability, is unable
without special facilities or special planning or design to utilize mass transportation
facilities and services as effectively as persons who are not so affected." The average
percentage of non-institutionalized handicapped persons aged sixteen to sixty-four in
urban areas, according to the 1970 census, was 5.5. Id. 5.
33 An estimated 80% of all households own an automobile. The ownership figures
for low income groups are as follows: $2,000-$2,999 pre-tax income, 52%;
$1,000-$1,999, 38%; below $1,000, 25%. J. Meyer & J. Kain, Interrelationships of
Transportation and Poverty: Summary of Conference on Transportation and Poverty
(Am. Academy of Arts & Sciences), June 7, 1968, at 5 (citing MOTOR VEHICLE
MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, 1968 AUTOMOBILE FACTS AND FIGURES 44). The lowest
income breakdown in MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, 1975 AUTOMOBILE
FACTS AND FIGURES 32, is "under $3000." In that category, 45.3% of households were
owners.
A 1968 survey in Watts indicated that only 246 of 530 males seeking employment
had "access" to an automobile. Only 200 of these automobiles were safe for use on
freeways, and only 153 were insured. T. Floyd, Using Transportation to Alleviate Pov-
erty: A Progress Report on Experiments Under the Urban Mass Transportation Act,
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Assuming the general validity of the data, does the lack of
availability of automobile transportation prevent the poor from
taking trips? The poor appear to make fewer trips than the gen-
eral population,34 though travel studies do not generally include
trips made by walking except for walk-to-work trips. It may well
be that the poor do take as many trips but in traveling for shop-
ping or social purposes walk more than the general population. 35
Moreover, the fact that the poor take fewer vehicular trips could
be the result of relative ignorance about the availability of
transit,36 a lack of knowledge of opportunities 3 7 or a lack of the
wherewithal to spend at a trip site.3 8 (One does not travel to the
cinema, for example, if one hasn't the price of a ticket.) On the
other hand, the relative lack of mobility of the poor may be
because they ,are "transportation disadvantaged."
Lack of access to suburban job opportunities is alleged to be
the principal transportation disadvantage of the poor.39 That
new employment opportunities are developing more rapidly in
the suburbs than in the central cities is established. 40 Nor is there
much argument about the fact that existing systems of public
Conference on Poverty and Transportation (Am. Academy of Arts & Sciences), June 7,
1968, at 9.
34 A study using data from the 1963-1965 Boston Regional Planning Project indi-
cated that the deficit exists chiefly with regard to work trips. See P. Herr & A. Fleisher,
The Mobility of the Poor, Conference on Poverty and Transportation (Am. Academy of
Arts & Sciences), June 7, 1968, at 11. In the $0-3999 income bracket work trips were
11.7% of all trips for the non-auto owner, 12.6% of all trips for the owner, and 12.3% for
all respondents in this bracket. The average for all respondents was 18.4%. See id.
(Table 2).
35 Transcript, First Session, Conference on Poverty and Transportation (Am.
Academy of Arts & Sciences), June 7, 1968, at 13 (remarks of Kain) [hereinafter cited as
Transcript, 1st Sess.]; Falcocchio, Pignataro & Cantilli, Modal Choices and Travel Attri-
butes of Inner-City Poor, in TRANSIT FOR THE POOR, supra note 11, at 6, 11.
36 See, e.g., Transcript, Second Session, Conference on Poverty and Transportation
(Am. Academy of Arts & Sciences), June 7, 1968, at 37-38 (remarks of Brandwein)
[hereinafter cited as Transcript, 2d Sess.].
37 P. Herr & A. Fleisher, supra note 34, at 11.
3 8 Id.
39 See, e.g., J. Crain, supra note 8, at 6.
40 In 1960 the job location split for the fifteen largest metropolitan areas was two-
thirds in the central business districts and one-third in the suburbs. By 1970 the number
of jobs in the suburbs had increased by 44% while the number in the central cities had
decreased by 7%. Thus in 1970 the central cities had only 52% of total metropolitan area
jobs. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, GENERAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, 1970
CENSUS OF POPULATION.
The center city is "tending more and more to specialize in control, consultation, and
communication functions-in activities that require chiefly professional, technical, and
highly trained clerical workers." E. Kalachek, Ghetto Dwellers, Transportation and Em-
ployment, Conference on Poverty and Transportation (Am. Academy of Arts & Sci-
ences), June 7, 1968, at 3.
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transportation developed according to a radial trip pattern,
oriented toward bringing the suburban resident to his central
city workplace. The urban ghetto dweller needs what has been
termed an inside-out system which would move him from his
central city residence to his suburban workplace. 4' Note that this
is not "reverse commutation": existing transit facilities serve
mainly suburban residential areas and do not provide access to
job sites in the suburbs. That these intuitive observations reflect
reality received support in the statement of the McCone Com-
mission Report on the 1965 Watts riots:
Our investigation has brought into clear focus the
fact that the inadequate and costly public transportation
currently existing throughout the Los Angeles area
seriously restricts the residents of the disadvantaged
areas such as south central Los Angeles. This lack of
adequate transportation handicaps them in seeking and
holding jobs, attending schools, shopping and fulfilling
other needs.
42
The difficulty with the existing data is that it may not be
relevant to the problem under consideration. The expense in
time and money of traveling from the central city to the suburbs
is relevant only if suburban jobs are part of the job market for
city residents. To take an absurd example for purposes of illust-
ration, if one is a resident of New York possessing skills for
41 See Meyer, supra note 4, at 72.
42 GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES RIOTS, VIOLENCE IN THE CITY-AN
END OR A BEGINNING 65 (1965). See Haar, Transportation and Economic Opportunity, 21
TRAFFic Q. 521, 522 (1967).
Specifically, for a Watts resident to travel the seventeen miles to a job at Douglas
Aircraft in Santa Monica required five vehicle changes, cost 83e, and consumed an hour
and thirty-eight minutes each way. The nine-mile trip from Watts to jobs at the Harbor
General Hospital required an hour and cost 75e each way. Moreover, there was no bus
service between 11:15 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. A similar situation was documented in St.
Louis, where a central city resident had to spend one to two hours and a minimum of 75
each way to reach the Hazelwood Industrial area.
A related but more general argument utilizing the same facts runs as follows: The
emphasis on road construction in the 1950's and 1960's encouraged, indeed caused,
decentralization of the central city population and particularly employment. Adequate
public transit, it is argued, would reverse this trend. Figures plotting percentage changes
in central city employment and population against transit use indicate, however, that the
decline in employment and population was greatest in cities where the percentage of
central city workers who used public transit was highest. Center city decline was closely
correlated with the age of the city (a figure that coincided with highest transit use) and
the consequent unavailability of vacant land. While not negating transit as a factor in land
use, the figures seem to refute claims that transit is decisive. MEYER, supra note 3, at
44-47.
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which there is no demand in New York but a great demand in
Chicago, and prefers to remain a resident of New York, is he
transportation disadvantaged because air service between New
York and Chicago is so infrequent or expensive that it is not
possible for him to commute to Chicago on a daily basis? In
short, what is the relevant job market for this person and for the
city resident? The usual definition of the job market is based on
some tolerable commuting time; the generally accepted norm in
the United States is about a half hour. If we depart from this
usual definition and redefine the relevant job market to be any
area in which there are attractive jobs for which one is qualified,
we have created a transportation problem by definition.
The way out of this circularity is to identify the relevant job
market as an area whose perimeter can be reached by normally
available means of transportation within some agreed-upon time,
"normally available" referring to technology as opposed to
availability in fact. This definition is useful in illustrating the real
nature of the transportation barrier to employment that may be
faced by the poor. A study of job opportunities for low-income
workers based on 1963-65 data in Boston indicated that a
forty-minute transit trip from Boston's South End provided ac-
cess to 159,500 moderate income jobs while commuting by auto
for forty minutes opened up 272,700 jobs. 43 The object is, there-
fore, incremental improvement by increasing the number of jobs
available by transportation improvements within an acceptable
time frame.
This analysis implies that if job opportunities exist only
beyond the perimeter set by a reasonable time frame and
reasonable transportation improvements, the problem is not one
of transportation at all. In illustrating the definition of the rele-
vant job market, we considered the case of a resident of New
York wishing to commute to Chicago. Except in unusual circum-
stances, such a situation is unrealistic. Usually, employees move
to where the jobs are. The Watts resident who could endure the
arduous trip to Douglas Aircraft, if he survived the probationary
period, might reasonably be expected to find a residence nearer
his work site. If he were white he could and would. A study of
mobility patterns of the low-income white worker in New York,
for example, indicates that he "invariably is able to move his
43 P. Herr & A. Fleisher, supra note 34, at 26 (Table 10).
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residence to be near his job. ' 44 The black may lack that mobility.
The transportation problem of the urban ghetto dweller may
thus be intensified by the fact that it is more difficult for him
than for his white co-worker to move near the job site.
Transportation from ghetto to job site is thus needed to
offset the effects of residential segregation on work oppor-
tunities for blacks. Note, however, that as a conscious policy, this
would tend to relieve the pressure for desegregation of subur-
ban residential areas. Viewing the issue as one of transportation
policy presumes a choice with regard to a much broader social
question-whether policy should be directed toward "breaking
up the ghetto" by encouraging workers to move closer to subur-
ban job sites or whether policy should aim toward "gilding" the
ghetto by upgrading the socioeconomic status of ghetto res-
idents. 45 Resolution of this issue is far beyond the scope of this
Article. For present purposes we shall assume the adoption of a
policy of gilding the ghetto and, more generally, of increasing
the mobility of the poor.
The Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA),
recognizing that a mass transportation experiment would be jus-
tified in Watts, provided a grant to establish a bus line that
would take Watts residents to job sites in the Los Angeles Inter-
national Airport industrial area in about a half hour.46 The ser-
vice was subsidized: Revenues covered only 41.7% of total costs
and 61.5% of variable costs, the subsidy amounting to fifty-five
cents per passenger trip. After two years of operation, the line
had an average weekday ridership of 2,841, 47 of whom an aver-
age of 58.9% were on work trips.48 As one worker makes two
work trips per day, the line carried a daily average of 838 work-
ers. Because only half of the passengers "at most" were Watts
residents, 49 however, it can be assumed that the average number
of Watts residents for whom the bus provided transportation to
work was no greater than 419. Some of this number had ap-
44 Transcript, 2d Sess., supra note 36, at 33 (remarks of Kain); see J. Mayer & J. Kain,
supra note 33, at 3: "In particular, blue-collar or less skilled job opportunities have
decentralized more quickly than minority group residential opportunities."
15 See Transcript-Third Session, Conference on Poverty and Transportation (Am.
Academy of Arts & Sciences), June 7, 1968, at 2 (remarks of Meyer) [hereinafter cited as
Transcript, 3d Sess.]. Note that dispersion could be only partially successful, leading to a
ghetto "brain drain."
46 See generally T. Floyd, supra note 33, at 4-5.
4 Id. 15 (Table 3).
48 Id. 27 (Table 5). See also Haar, supra note 42, at 524.
19 M. Wohl, supra note 10, at 4.
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parently endured less convenient or more expensive transit
modes prior to the establishment of the Century Boulevard line,
because an on-bus survey found that only 220 Watts residents
obtained jobs because of the service.
50
The failure of the Century Boulevard bus line to attract
more work trips indicates that unemployment in Watts may be
traced more directly to causes other than a lack of adequate
transportation. 51 A job demonstration program established in
Watts by the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
in conjunction with the establishment of the Century Boulevard
line, resulted in non-referral of 85% of the 9,383 residents of
Watts who applied for the kinds of jobs available in the Airport
area, because they lacked the necessary skills. 52 Data collected at
Watts indicated that some employers were using the transporta-
tion barrier as a convenient excuse for not hiring for other
reasons.5 3 "Once transportation was provided the job dis-
50 T. Floyd, supra note 33, at 28. A similar experience is reported for Nassau and
Suffolk counties in New York. See TRI-STATE REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N, PEOPLE,
TRANSPORTATION, JOBS 8 (1973). Of twenty-two new bus routes started to transport
urban unemployed to job sites, six survived. The average subsidy was $1.03 per pas-
senger. On the average, fares were 20.4% of operating expenses.
"Generally, these busing-to-work programs were not successful." Notes, Travel in the
Black Ghetto, in TRANSIT FOR THE POOR, supra note 11, at 49. See also Goerig & Kalachek,
Public Transportation and Black Unemployment, SocIETY, July-Aug., 1973, at 39, 42 ("a
dismal disappointment"). The Urban Employment Survey (July 1968-June 1970) "does
not answer the essential public policy question of whether investment in a transportation
system that enhances reverse commutation can increase suburban jobholding by inner-
city residents ...." McKay, Commuting Patterns ofInner-City Residents, 96 MONTHLY LABOR
REv., Nov., 1973, at 43, 47.
For a "successful" project, see BALTIMORE DEP'T OF TRANSIT & TRAFFIC, FINAL
REPORT, JOB EXPRESS TRANSPORTATION (UMTA Project No. MD-MTD-3, 1971). In this
case, "success" meant the decision of the Metropolitan Transit Authority (M.T.A.) "to
take over all of the existing JET [Job Express Transportation] routes on a permanent
basis. These routes had developed to a level where the M.T.A. felt they would be a
profitable permanent operation." Id. 2. Some doubts about the true "feelings" of the
M.T.A. directors are cast by the facts that the JET staff organized a letter-writing cam-
paign to "urge" the M.T.A. to take over the JET lines and that, at a meeting between JET
representatives and the mayor of Baltimore, the mayor was asked "to use his influence to
expedite M.T.A.'s 'final' decision." Id. 46-48.
51 A similar experiment in Boston, in which an employer ran a bus from Roxbury to
a suburban plant, was dubbed the "Black Congo Express" and "was not viewed entirely
with favor by the community." Transcript, 1st Sess., supra note 35, at 30 (remarks of
Doeringer). In the early days of the Century Boulevard line, though, Watts residents
considered it "their own" line. This proprietary attitude was evidenced by a low rate of
vandalism and the absence of robberies or muggings. See Transcript, Ist Sess., supra note
35, at 8 (remarks of Meyer). The forcefulness of this observation was somewhat undercut
by the "rapidly rising crescendo of robberies which eventually reached one per day
during November (1967)." Id. (remarks of Floyd).
52 See T. Floyd, supra note 33, at 5.
'3See Transcript, 3d Sess., supra note 45, at 40-41 (remarks of Floyd). See also
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appeared. '54 Finally, the jobs in the suburban-ring factories were
generally in the $4,000-$5,000 (1968) per year range, and once a
ghetto resident became permanently employed at that level he
usually acquired an automobile. 55 Thus the real transportation
handicap suffered by the ghetto dweller was the lack of trans-
portation for job hunting.
56
The deprivation caused by lack of access to an automobile is
alleviated most directly by providing access to an automobile.
57
To argue that mass transportation systems can provide the
needed transportation is to ignore the implications of the word
"mass." Moreover, it is to ignore an already existing transporta-
tion system which presently satisfies all the requisites of a trans-
portation system for the poor and the handicapped save one
-cost. That system is the taxi.
Mooney, Housing Segregation, Negro Employment and Metropolitan Decentralization: An Alter-
native Perspective, 83 Q. J. EcoN. 299, 309 (1969) (separation of residence and suburban
job locations does not play major role in determination of male nonwhite employment).
54 Transcript, 3d Sess., supra note 45, at 41 (remarks of Floyd).
55 See E. Kalacheck, supra note 40, at 8. In New York, workers frequently switched
from buses to carpools soon after starting work, TRI-STATE REGIONAL PLANNING COMfM'N,
supra note 50, at 4.
A study undertaken in New Jersey indicated that suburban employers offering an
average wage of $1.85 per hour had vacancies and the employers cited the lack of
adequate public transportation as one of the main reasons why these jobs could not be
filled. When employers offered jobs that paid $2.50-$2.60 per hour, there was no evi-
dence of transportation difficulties. Transcript, 2d Sess., supra note 36, at 43 (remarks of
Hein); see Floyd, supra note 33, at 17. See also Transcript, 2d Sess., supra, at 41 (remarks of
Floyd). A study of unemployment and transportation in Nassau and Suffolk counties in
New York also produced the observation that the "[p]ressure for new bus services often
came from industries having low pay scales and, hence, more jobs available." TRl-STATE
REGIONAL PLANNING COMM'N, supra, at 3. See also Transcript, 3d Sess., supra note 45, at 18
(remarks of Meyer). An alternative possibility is joining a carpool. See Kinley, supra note
6, at 122.
A "job jitney" experiment was instituted in Watts along with the Century Boulevard
bus line. Unlike the usual jitney service, it was intended that "there would be big car
pools with the driver driving the bus and working in the plant or at the same complex
.... Transcript, 3d Sess., supra, at 40 (remarks of Floyd). In effect the job jitney
program was a formalized carpool. The routes were subsidized with costs averaging 6%
per mile and fares running about 2.5-3e per mile. See Floyd, supra, at 18. The results
were disappointing as the lines "attracted almost no patronage." Transcript, 3d Sess.,
supra, at 40-41 (remarks of Floyd). The failure is attributed to the factors that led to
similar results on the Century Boulevard line.
56 See, e.g., Transcript, 2d Sess., supra note 36, at 30 (remarks of Kraft). But see Lee &
Covault, Model Cities Transportation Study: Determining the Needs and Desires of Low-Income
People in Atlanta, Georgia, 26 TRAFFIC Q. 441, 457 (1972) ("surprisingly few residents have
problems with transportation (with regard to 'holding or applying for a job']").
'7 See S. Myers, Personal Transportation for the Poor, Conference on Poverty and
Transportation (Am. Academy of Arts & Sciences), June 7, 1968, at 16. The Regional
Plan Association in New York City "proposed such measures as a subsidy for down-
payments on small cars, a reduction in auto-insurance costs for low-income people, in-
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Taxicabs are the major form of urban public transportation,
traveling almost twice the number of revenue miles as bus and
fixed rail systems and garnering about sixty percent of all in-
traurban transit revenues.58 There is some evidence that the
poor already are disproportionately large users of taxicabs. 59 A
number of plausible explanations have been offered for this
creased parking space in low-income areas and a re-evaluation of policies that have 'led to
a virtual moratorium on new expressway construction in the city'" to increase job oppor-
tunities. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1973, at 1, col. 5. The city's Environmental Protection
Administration "'dissociated' itself from the report." Id. 37, col. 7.
The greater number of jobs available to auto passengers than to transit users is a
familiar phenomenon. See, e.g., B. HUTCHINSON, PRINCIPLES OF URBAN TRANSPORT
SYSTEMS PLANNING 5 (1974):
Accessibility to jobs from a low-income area in Nashville
Travel Percent jobs Percent jobs
time (min) available by available by
car transit
0-10 50.4 2.6
10-20 30.3 7.0
20-30 13.2 14.0
30-40 6.1 34.7
50-60 0 6.6
Inaccessible 0 26.4
Road and transit travel times for suburban zone
in Toronto, Ontario.
600
400 -
200-
0 20 40 60
TRAVEL TIME (minutes)
The greater job accessibility is a function of the greater distance that can be traversed by
automobile in a given time and the flexibility provided by the automobile's ability to
reach points falling between transit routes.
58 See R. KIRBY, PARA-TRANSIT: A SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF EXPERIENCE AND
POTENTIAL (1974).59 See S. Myers, supra note 57, at 23 (average income of taxi riders in surveys in
Columbia, South Carolina, was S4,800 per year). See also R. KIRBY, PARA-TRANSIT:
eI Z jI
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paradox, such as that the poor view more events in their lives as
emergencies60 or that the transportation expenses of the work-
ing poor, particularly domestics, are subsidized by their em-
ployers. An intriguing theory of "compensatory consumption"
hypothesizes that poor people pick one or two items like a televi-
sion set or taxicab or something else with which they will indulge
themselves as a way of compensating for other things they want
but cannot have.61 It may be that higher taxicab use is simply a
function of the absolute lack of alternative transportation modes.
The manifest difficulty with the present taxi system is its
cost to the user. A not insignificant component of this cost re-
sults from the absolute limitation by law of the number of taxi-
cabs in most major urban areas.62 The demand for taxi service is
such that taxi operators are able to obtain monopoly rent which
is reflected in the high cost of taxi "medallions," ranging from
$7,500 per medallion in Detroit to $30,000 in Boston. The
medallion system also makes taxi owners monopsonists in em-
ploying drivers, and they exercise this power to keep wages at a
level of $100 to $125 for a fifty-to-sixty-hour week.63 The effect
of permitting free entry into the taxicab market can be estimated
by the experience in Washington, D.C. In Washington there are
13.3 taxicabs per thousand population, most drivers are self-
employed, their taxis are family cars, 64 and over 75% work part-
time. If the Washington experience were duplicated in currently
NEGLECTED OPTIONS FOR URBAN MOBILITY 166 (1974); Transcript, 1st Sess., supra note
35, at 18 (remarks of Schneider). But see Lee, Falcocchio, & Cantilli, Taxicab Usage in
New York City Poverty Areas, in TRANSIT FOR THE POOR, supra note 11, at 1.
60 See Transcript, Ist Sess., supra note 35, at 22 (remarks of Fellman).
6 1 Id. 21.
62 "[O]bsolete franchise limitations and market-entry barriers for taxicabs and jit-
neys, restricts the efficient operation of the urban transportation system." U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSPORTATION, 1972 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION REPORT xvi, cited in Roth, Regulation
of Buses in Cities, in PRICE-SUBSIDY ISSUES IN URBAN TRANSPORTATION 21 (Highway Re-
search Record No. 476, 1973) [hereinafter cited as PRICE-SuBsIDY ISSUES].
The New York City Traffic and Limousine Commission has limited the number in
that city to 11,787 by not reissuing the nearly 1,800 medallions surrendured since 1937.
See R. KIRBY, supra note 59, at 89 n.9. There were 1.5 taxis per 1,000 population in New
York, 1.4 in Chicago, 0.9 in Detroit, and 2.5 in Boston in 1970. Id. 104 (Table 7.3). In the
absence of these limitations, the "taxi industry would approximate the characteristics of
perfect competition." Beesley, Regulation of Taxis, 83 ECON. J. 150, 151 n.2 (1973).
63 S. Rosenbloom, Taxis, Jitneys and Poverty, Conference on Poverty and Transpor-
tation (Am. Academy of Arts & Sciences), June 7, 1968, at 18. See also R. KIRBY, supra
note 59, at 123 (1970 study of twenty-seven fleets indicates median wage of $1.85 per
hour plus tips and fringe benefits).
64 "It has always been recognized that one advantage of the London 'free entry'
conditions is that drivers entering the trade could realistically look forward to becoming
proprietors themselves." Beesley, supra note 62, at 170.
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regulated cities, there would be an estimated 250% increase in
drivers' jobs65 and a huge increase in ghetto mobility, because
the costs of owning a private vehicle would be offset by devoting
it to part-time taxi service.
Deregulation would also bring the social benefit of decreas-
ing racial discrimination in the provision of taxi service: In the
present oligopoly market with unsatisfied demand, drivers can
afford to discriminate, but such discrimination would be
economically inefficient in a deregulated market.66 A deregu-
lated taxi system would not only go far to alleviate the transpor-
tation problems of the poor but would also provide more
economical and frequent service for all taxi users. The major
cost involved would be compensation for present medallion
owners. Even if they were compensated at prevailing market
prices, however, the costs would appear insignificant beside
those of transit programs currently being planned in major
urban areas. 67 In the event that the removal of barriers to entry
did not lower taxi fares to a level considered "socially desirable"
for the poor and the handicapped, coupons could be provided to
members of these groups for use in payment of taxi fares.6 8 It
has been estimated that 1.2 million handicapped could be served
by taxis at a cost of $250 per person per year or a total cost of
$300 million.6 9 This cost could be reduced if only part of the
fare were subsidized. It has been estimated that this service
would enable 200,000 of the chronically handicapped to enter
the work force,70 thereby adding $800 million to the Gross Na-
tional Product.
71
65 See D. Gurin & J. Wofford, Implications of Dial-A-Ride for the Poor, Mar., 1971,
at 3-2 (employing the poor as drivers, mechanics, and so on, "in the long run might be
the most significant contribution Dial-a-Ride could make to combatting poverty").
66 See S. Rosenbloom, supra note 63, at 26.
67 For New York City, for example, the cost has been estimated to range from $140
to $250 million. Amortized over 10 years at 6%, the annual tax burden would be $19 to
$34 million. R. KIRBY, supra note 59, at 404.
68 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 14, 1974, at 1, col. 4; Roth, supra note 62, at 25. Other
lessons to be learned from the Washington experience include the economic advantages
of a zone fare system over one based on mileage. Costs of taxi service could also be
lowered by allowing group riding and picking up passengers at more than one location.
69 See MANUAL, supra note 6, at 19. But see Schnell, Public Transportation and Transpor-
tation Needs of the Elderly and Handicapped, in TRANSPORTATION FOR THE POOR,
supra note 8, at 1, 6: "Not all cab drivers are young enough and strong enough to help a
handicapped person from the wheelchair and into the cab. Not all are good-natured
enough. Not all are willing to accept the responsibility."7 0 
See TRAVEL BARRIERS, supra note 27, at 19.
71Id.
It is interesting to note that "transit dependents" were the principal users of the San
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5. Summary
An attempt has been made to determine the extent to which
the urban transportation problem involves the "transportation
disadvantaged." Of the four groups comprising this category,
those under twenty seem not to be disadvantaged even within
the narrow definition of automobile availability. The elderly do
not form a relevant group for present purposes except to the
extent that they are either poor or handicapped. Of these latter
two groups, there is no evidence indicating that the handicapped
desire to travel during limited hours or to restricted destinations;
and the data indicate that the handicapped are scattered
throughout the general population in low densities ranging from
98 to 200 persons per square mile.7 2 The only group that might
present a case for mass transportation is the poor, because, as the
term implies, mass transportation is designed to move numbers
of people. The quantity of passengers needed to keep fares low
can only be generated by a concentration of demand on a geo-
graphic and temporal basis. Considering that the journey to
work is the mass transportation trip and that the problem of the
poor seems to be the lack of transportation facilities for the
journey to work, that problem is the only one that mass trans-
portation might be able to solve.
73
B. Congestion
In its statement of findings and purposes, Congress iden-
tified intensification of traffic congestion as a principal part of
the urban transportation problem.7 4 What is this "congestion"? A
lay response might be "too many cars." For the traffic planner
congestion is the average delay imposed by vehicles on each
other.75 The measure of congestion is therefore the difference
Jose "dial-a-ride" experiment. That system failed because of an excess of demand for
trips at 2 5 each. This resulted in long delays in service, and a labor dispute resulted in
an increase in costs so as to require estimated subsidies of as much as $4 per passenger
per trip. See N.Y. Times, May 13, 1975, at 15, col. 1.
72 UMTA, supra note 12, at 5 (Figure 3.1).
73 But see Kinley, supra note 6, at 121 (another reason for the failure of these pro-
grams was the erroneous premise that "the disadvantaged were concentrated in small,
residential 'pockets' ").
74 See C. Villarreal, supra note 6, at 50, 54-55; Hedges, Let's Attack The Real Urban
Transportation Problem, in PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION PLANNING ISSUES 10-11 (Transp. Re-
search Record No. 519, 1974). Congestion is not a new problem. The ancient Romans
attempted to deal with it by prohibiting wheeled vehicles from using the streets during
the daytime. See J. RAE, THE ROAD AND THE CAR IN AMERICAN LIFE 10 (1971).
,- See generally Meyer, supra note 4, at 48-50.
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between the speed at which a vehicle could move without delay
caused by other traffic and the actual average traffic speed.76
The planner uses the concept of "excessive congestion" to de-
scribe what most of us would consider simple congestion. "Exces-
sive congestion" is the difference between the economic speed
-that is, the point at which further increments in traffic are not
worth the delays to the existing traffic stream-and the actual
average speed.7 7 While this definition is more satisfying, and lies
at the heart of the analysis usually relied upon to justify expan-
sions of highway capacity, it appears not to be the one used by
Congress to support the mass transit program.
Congress seems instead to have had in mind a conception of
congestion that is best described as a "failure of anticipations.1
7 8
In short, "the trip is taking too long." Objectively, for the work
trip at least, this is not the case. The time from home to work
and vice-versa has been reduced over the past twenty years from
an average of twenty-five minutes to an average of twenty
minutes. 7 9 Moreover, street patterns in the central business dis-
tricts rarely were planned to accommodate motor vehicle
traffic.8 0 The "failure of anticipations" cannot therefore be at-
76J. THOMSON, METHODS OF TRAFFIC LIMITATION IN URBAN AREAS 29 (1972). The
amount of congestion is the difference between free speed (at which a vehicle can move
without delays due to traffic) and actual (average traffic) speed.
77 Id. 30.
78 Meyer, supra note 4, at 49-50.
79 "For people who lived 3 miles from the heart of the city in 1890, from 30 to 45
minutes was required to get downtown by a streetcar." Bostick, The Automobile in American
Daily Life, 32 PUB. ROADS 241 (1963).
so See generally J. RAE, supra note 74, at 299-300. Jane Jacobs notes that city streets
were not adequate even for horse traffic. See J. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT
AMERICAN CITIES 341 (1961).
It is obvious that few streets in CBD's were laid out with motor vehicles in mind; it
may be of passing interest to know what the planners did have in mind. In Cincinnati, for
example, most street rights of way were laid out in the nineteenth century at sixty-six feet
wide, with forty-foot roadways and thirteen-foot sidewalks. The reason for the sixty-foot
width was that this was the length of a Gunter's chain, utilized by surveyors to subdivide
acreage. See Bird, How to Plan for the Pedestrian, 84 AM. CITY, July, 1969, at 76, 77. The
rectangular grid pattern of Philadelphia's streets was designed to facilitate the establish-
ment of orderly property lines. J. RAE, supra note 74, at 198.
Washington's broad avenues were intended "partly for beautification, partly for
prestige and quite largely to facilitate the suppression of revolts." Id. The same is true in
Europe, where the streets of Essen, for example, were laid out in the ninth century.
OFFICE OF INT'L AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, HUD
INTERNATIONAL BRIEF No. 16, at 14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HUD BRIEF]. Rouen's
downtown streets follow the moats which encompassed the city's walls in the sixteenth
century. The street pattern of the Norwich central city was established by the eleventh
century. Even Manhattan's streets, which were laid out in the early nineteenth century
with some consideration given to traffic, were designed on the assumption that most
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tributable to expectations about movement on the street network
of most central business districts.
The most plausible explanation attributes the failure to the
widening gap between speeds attainable on limited-access high-
ways during off-peak hours and those attainable on urban por-
tions of such highways during peak commuting hours. If this
perception lies at the root of the "congestion problem," there
seems to be little that can be done about it. A massive education
program to make people realize that they cannot expect to drive
as quickly during the rush hour as during the off-peak hours
would be a non-starter. Moreover, planners have learned to their
dismay that a Parkinson's law of traffic operates to fill every
newly constructed road without significantly relieving traffic
volume on the previously existing routes.81 The only way to
eliminate the traffic planners' "excessive congestion" and the
frustrated commuter's perception of congestion is to limit the
number of vehicles on the road. But it is congestion that dis-
courages the additional driver from using his car and that places
the ultimate limit on vehicular traffic. The planner or policy
maker who wants to decrease vehicular traffic thus should rec-
ognize that congestion will occur at any feasible level of highway
construction.
82
C. The Automobile Commuter
In its administrative interpretation of the Urban Mass
Transportation Act of 1964, the Department of Transportation
notes that the program "recognizes that use of the private au-
tomobile for the peak-hour work trip is often contradictory of
such other community objectives as pure air, quiet and privacy,
socially-desirable land use, efficient concentration of economic
activity without undue congestion and enhanced quality of the
urban environment"; the goal of the program therefore is "to
reinvigorate public transportation in order to provide service
traffic would go by water. See generally E. Parker & K. Kamrass, Center City Transpor-
tation Needs of Transit-Oriented Cities (Summary of the National Urban Coalition
Seminar), Apr. 1-2, 1970, at 8.
81 At one time it was predicted that the automobile would relieve urban street con-
gestion, by moving more people faster than they could travel on foot. See R. CARO, THE
POWER BROKER 910-13 (1974); Mohr, Some Fallacies in Urban Goods Movement, in URBAN
GOODS MOVEMENT 105, 107 (Transp. Research Record No. 496, 1974) [hereinafter cited
as URBAN GOODS MOVEMENT]; Rae, The Mythology of Urban Transportation, 26 TRAFFIC Q.
85, 92 (1972).
82 See generally text accompanying notes 260-63 infra.
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that will attract new riders" and, in particular, "to attract the
auto commuter on his journey to and from work.
8 3
The journey to and from work by the automobile commuter
lies at the heart of the urban transportation problem for three
reasons.8 4 First, work trips are the largest single category of
home-based auto trips.8 5 Second, work trips are crammed within
a limited time.8 6 Third, work trips follow a radial pattern: to-
ward the central business district in the morning and out from
the center in the evening.8 7 Because work trips occur in large
volume, during a limited time, in the same general direction,
along narrow traffic corridors, they are the trips for which mass
transportation can be employed to best advantage in competition
with the automobile. An examination of the program incorpo-
rated in the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 indicates
83 MANUAL, supra note 6, at IIB-16 (1972). See McManus, Financing Public Transpor-
tation, in ISSUES IN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION 30, 34 (Transp. Research Bd. Special Rep.
No. 144, 1974); J. Volpe, Transportation and Human Needs in the 1970's, Conference,
Conference on Transportation and Human Needs in the 70's (Am. U.), June 20, 1972, at
184, 185 ("Our most compelling task is to revitalize urban transportation-to release the
stranglehold the automobile has on our cities.").
4 See Kain & Beesley, Forecasting Car Ownership and Use, 2 URBAN STUDIES 163, 171
(1965): "[T]he work-trip ... made during peak hours... is the principal component of
the peaking .... [which is in turn] the principal problem with which urban transporta-
tion policy has to deal .... See also GREAT BRITAIN MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT, STEERING
GROUP REPORT, TRAFFIC IN TOWNS 25 (1963) [hereinafter cited as TRAFFIC IN TOWNS]
("The car-commuter, the worker who uses his car to travel between home and work, is
the heart of the urban traffic problem . ); L. FITCH, URBAN TRANSPORTATION AND
PUBLIC POLICY 9 (1964).
85 A twelve-city study indicated that 34% of all home-based trips are journey-to-work
trips. (The next largest category was "social-recreational" at 21%.) A more recent Atlanta
study indicated that 27% of all weekday trips were trips between home and work. See L.
FITCH, supra note 84, at 33; Tarpley & Dake, The Timing of Urban Transport Decision, in
NEw PERSPECTIVES IN URBAN TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH 246 (A. Catanese ed. 1972);
MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, 1973-74 AUTOMOBILE FACTS AND
FIGURES 37 (32.2% of all passenger car trips are to and from work). During the peak, the
number of work-related trips is much higher. A survey in Washington, D.C., showed
work trips to be the purpose of 62% of auto drivers, 78% of auto passengers, and 67% of
transit riders. L. FITCH, supra, at 33. 1963 Boston figures indicate that 66% of all auto
trips during the morning peak and 40% in the evening peak are work trips. See G. Kraft
& T. Domencich, Free Transit, Conference on Poverty and Transportation (Am.
Academy of Arts & Sciences), June 7, 1968, at 27. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam, in the
Netherlands, the journey to work is the largest share of peak hour capacity. See F. DE
DONNEA, THE DETERMINANTS OF TRANSPORT MODE CHOICE IN DUTCH CITIES 202 (1971).
On the other hand, "most urban travel demand is other than downtown-oriented. In
many large cities, less than 10 per cent of total person trips begin or end in the CBD."
Washington ranks highest with 35%; Pittsburgh lowest, with only 7%. S. Myers, supra
note 57, at 3.
16 See Tarpley & Dake, supra note 85, at 246.
17 journeys to work are also the most "rational" of all auto trips from the point of
view of consideration of alternatives, see id.; and the automobile occupancy rate is lower
for work trips than for trips of other kinds, see Bostick, supra note 79, at 243.
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that Congress also perceived the automobile journey to work as
the urban transportation problem. Before examining the Act,
however, it would be well to look more closely at the "community
objectives" with which use of the automobile conflicts.
III. SYSTEM COSTS OF AUTOMOBILE COMMUTING 8 8
A. The Automobile as an Energy Waster
Fifty percent of United States crude oil consumption is in
the form of fuels for motor vehicles, 89 with automobiles account-
ing for 71% of this total. 90 Automobiles consumed 16.1% of the
nation's total Net Energy Input in 1969. 91 In 1972 the average
automobile in the United States consumed 735 gallons of
gasoline.92 While these figures show the automobile to be a large
consumer of petroleum products, they tell us nothing about "in-
efficient" use or "waste" of resources.
Relative figures are needed to make such judgments. Au-
tomobiles are used for 29% of all commercial passenger trans-
portation, but they consume 65.5% of all the fuel used for that
purpose. Their "normalized efficiency," the quotient of these
two figures, is thus .44. Buses and trains, with a normalized
efficiency of 1.33, are approximately three times as efficient
as automobiles. 93 Another statistic indicating the relative in-
efficiency of private autos as compared to mass transit is the
"net propulsion efficiency" (NPE), or average passenger-miles
per gallon of gasoline (or 130,000 BTU equivalent). The most
efficient vehicle, based on this widely used measurement, is a
Volkswagen microbus carrying seven passengers (NPE ap-
proximately 350). A rush hour rail rapid transit system has an
NPE of 120, as does a small car with four passengers. Less effi-
cient are the evening rush hour bus (NPE 92), the noon rapid
transit (NPE 60), the small car with two passengers (NPE 60), the
noon city bus (NPE 40), and the ordinary sized car with two
passengers (NPE 36). As might be expected, the large car with
88 Motorist-imposed costs on "highway authorities, other road users or society at
large" are termed "system costs." J. THOMSON supra note 76, at 3.
89 G. LEACH, THE MOTOR CAR AND NATURAL RESOURCES 1 (1973).
90 Id. 15.
91Id. If one includes the energy consumed in producing vehicles, roads, and so on,
the figure rises to about 40%. Id. 13.
92 MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, 1972 AUTOMOBILE FACTS AND
FIGURES 52.
93 G. LEACH, supra note 89, at 35 (Figure 6).
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one passenger is the least efficient vehicle (NPE 8). Considering
that the average occupancy rate of automobiles used in work
trips is 1.3, clear savings in energy could be made by shifting
commuters to mass transportation.
94
Moving automobile commuters to mass transit is not, how-
ever, the only way to decrease automobile energy consumption.
The average consumption of gasoline per automobile in Europe
is only half the rate in the United States. 95 Because average
mileage traveled is approximately the same, the difference must
be attributable primarily to engine size and auto weight. Thus if
a trend toward compact cars were to develop, American oil con-
sumption for auto fuel could be cut in half and total American
oil consumption cut by seventeen percent. 96 Consumer prefer-
ences aside, however, a cost exists in moving to smaller cars. Sta-
tistics indicate that they offer less protection in the event of
accidents than do full-sized models. Extrapolations from existing
data indicate that a move toward smaller cars would be paral-
leled by an increase in personal injuries and fatalities result-
ing from automobile accidents.9 7 But because the fuel savings
associated with smaller sedans are a function not of size but
of weight, even if Americans refused to give up large cars, sig-
nificant energy savings could be obtained by substituting alu-
minum and magnesium for steel and copper in present-day
automobiles. 98
The author is aware of no cost-benefit analysis comparing
the relative feasibility of energy conservation by reducing au-
tomobile weight instead of automobile use. The explanation for
the paucity of literature undoubtedly lies in the facts that no
extant mass transportation system is attractive enough to lure the
94 Id. 32 (Figure 5). See generally Orski, The Potentialfor Fuel Conservation: The Case of
the Automobile, 8 TRANSP. RESEARCH 247, 251 (1974): "Greater use of mass transit un-
doubtedly forms the single most important element of any long-range strategy for con-
serving energy in transportation." A more immediate and less capital-intensive means of
energy conservation would, of course, be to raise the occupancy rate on auto trips. Such
an effort would involve "carpooling." For the spectacular effects of increased occupancy
on energy consumption and pollution, see, e.g., Pratsch, Carpools: The Underutilized
Resource, 44 CIVIL ENG'R, Jan., 1974, at 49.
95 G. LEACH, supra note 89, at 15. See Harris & Hille, Rail, Truck or Small Car-Which
is the Energy Saver?, 17 Bus. HoRIZONS 57, 63-64 (1974).
96 
G. LEACH, supra note 89, at 31.
97 Boston Globe, Jan. 13, 1974, at A-83, col. 2.
98 Aluminum in particular is being used increasingly for trim, radiator grilles, body
panels, gearbox casings, cylinder heads, and engine blocks, as well as entire engines. See
G. LEACH, supra note 89, at 47. It is estimated that new federal safety and pollution
standards will increase the weight of a "normal car" by 17%. Id.
19751
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:368
commuter from his automobile and that we do not know the cost
of constructing such a system. The very purpose of the Act is to
provide this knowledge. What we do know is that a significant
decrease in petroleum consumption would result if the commu-
ter could be induced to leave his automobile and take the bus,
streetcar, or subway.
B. The Automobile as a Polluter
The House Report accompanying the Act noted that the
"fumes from motor vehicles are contributing to smog problems
which have become so acute in some areas as to present a real
danger to the health of urban dwellers." 99 Of the approximately
208 million tons of contaminants added to the airspace of the
United States each year, roughly 105 million tons come from
transportation vehicles, an average of almost one ton per year
for each car, truck, or bus in the United States. 100 The principal
contaminants emitted by motor vehicles are nitrogen oxides,
hydrocarbons, and carbon monoxide.10 1 In addition to physical
99 HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ACT OF
1963, H.R. REP. No. 204, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1963) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 204].
100 MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, 1973-74 AUTOMOBILE FACTS
AND FIGURES 15-16. But see letter from Robert S. Krotschmar, Division Manager, Auto-
mobile Association of America, to John A.S. McGlennan, Administrator, Environmental
Protection Agency, quoted in part in AAA Newsletter, Massachusetts Division, Fall, 1973,
at 12: "[W]hen the weight of air pollutants emitted by all sources in the United States was
adjusted on the basis of toxicity, motor vehicles as a source of pollutants dropped from a
rating of 60 percent based on weight to a rating of 12 percent based on toxicity."
101 Motor vehicles emit 64.7% of all carbon monoxide, 45.7% of all hydrocarbons,
and 36.6% of nitrogen oxides. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DEVELOPMENT OF
SYSTEMS TO ATTAIN ESTABLISHED MOTOR VEHICLE AND ENGINE EMISSION STANDARDS 4-1
(1971), reprinted in ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTORATE, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF OPTIONS IN URBAN
MOBILITY 11-5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTORATE]. See Pennsyl-
vania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 1974).
For urban areas these figures are substantially higher. For the following OECD
Metropolitan Areas, the percentages of carbon monoxide emissions from motor vehicles
were as follows: New York City 97, Chicago 94, Los Angeles 98, Philadelphia 70,
Washington, D.C. 96, Pittsburgh 80, Madrid 95, Stockholm 99, Tokyo 99, Toronto 98.
With regard to hydrocarbons the figures are: New York City 63, Chicago 81, Los Angeles
66, Philadelphia 47, Washington, D.C. 86, Pittsburgh 70, Madrid 90, Stockholm 93,
Tokyo 95, Toronto 98. And in the case of nitrogen oxides, which are usually produced in
slightly greater numbers by stationary fuel ignition than by motor vehicles, this was not
the case in Los Angeles (72%), Washington (44%), and Stockholm (53%). ENVIRON-
MENTAL DIRECTORATE, supra, at 11-6.
Of the three, carbon monoxide emissions are the most dangerous because they can
lead to death by asphyxiation by combining with the hemoglobin in the blood more
readily than does oxygen. (The traditional theory has been challenged by research indi-
cating that "carbon monoxide poisons by disrupting the 'cytochrome system' of the body's
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injury it is estimated that air pollution generated by motor vehi-
cles causes $6.6 billion in property damage annually. If a sig-
nificant number of automobile commuters were diverted to mass
transit, CBD air pollution could be reduced. Vehicles used in
mass transit also pollute but on a proportionally lower basis.
10 2
The danger posed by automobile emissions has been recog-
nized by Congress in the Air Quality Act. 10 3 The approach taken
in the Act is to persuade the automobile manufacturers to rede-
tissue cells," that oxygen displacement is not the cause of death, and therefore that
carbon monoxide levels in the blood may not be sufficient indicators of the degree of
poisoning. See Boston Globe, Oct. 23, 1974, at 22, col. 1-2.) Exposure to levels of 30 ppm
(parts per million) for 8-12 hours can impair psychomotor performance and increase
physiological stress in patients with heart disease. ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTORATE, supra, at
11-2.
There is some dispute about acceptable levels of carbon monoxide. The standard set
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is 9 ppm, average maximum eight-hour
concentration. This is regarded as unduly stringent in Europe. See ROAD RESEARCH
GROUP, ORGANIZATION FOR EcoNOMIc COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, EFFECTS OF
TRAFFc AND ROADS ON THE ENVIRONMENT IN URBAN AREAS 29 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as OECD ROAD RESEARCH GROUP]. In France, for example, a range of 15-40 ppm has
been proposed with the upper limit to be exceeded not more than 1% of the time per
year and the lower range to be surpassed at least 15% of each eight-hour period. Id. 30.
New York State guidelines recommend that a level of 1.5 ppm not be exceeded more
than 15% of the time every eight hours. Measurements in midtown Manhattan indicate
that this level is consistently exceeded, with emissions reaching levels of 25-30 ppm
during rush hours and 100 ppm in the Lincoln Tunnel and at the approach to the
George Washington Bridge. See R. BUEL, DEAD END 64 (1972).
The standards of the Clean Air Act of 1971 are designed to keep blood carboxy-
hemoglobin (COHb) levels below the 1.5% saturation level. In a thirty-month study of
29,000 blood donors across the United States, "[f]orty-five percent of the nonsmoking
blood donors had COHb saturations in excess of 1.5%." Stewart et al., Carboxyhemoglobin
Levels in American Blood Donors, 229 J.A.M.A. 1187, 1193 (1974).
Nitrogen oxides and nitrogen dioxide in particular are associated with acute bron-
chitis in infants and school children and serious respiratory disease in adults. Incidence
of respiratory disease is increased when nitrogen dioxide levels average .06 ppm to .08
ppm over six-month periods. See ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTORATE, supra, at 11-3. The aver-
age level on "busy streets" is .2 ppm, see OECD ROAD RESEARCH GROUP, supra. The EPA
standard is .05 ppm annual arithmetic mean, 40 C.F.R. § 50.11 (1974).
Hydrocarbons under conditions of bright sunlight and still air produce smog, which
causes eye irritations and is injurious to plants. The EPA standard is .24 ppm, maximum
three-hour concentration. Id. § 50.10.
102 A 1970 study indicated that the average rapid transit system uses 5.5 KWH of
energy per car mile. See ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 9, at 2-9, 9-6. If the
power used was oil containing .5% sulfur, each 1000 car-miles caused the emission of
.015 lbs. of carbon monoxide, 1.2 lbs. of hydrocarbons, 41 lbs. of nitrogen oxides, and
15.4 lbs. of sulfur oxides. For the equivalent distance for one automobile complying with
1974 federal auto emission standards, the figures are 52 lbs. of carbon monoxide, 6 lbs.
of hydrocarbons, and 4.4 lbs. of nitrogen oxides (computed from data in Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 19 (1973)).
103 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857 (Supp. 1975). In particular, § 202 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1857f-1, requires that carbon monoxide and hydrocarbon emissions on 1977 automobiles
not exceed 10% of the 1970 level.
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sign automotive power plants so that emissions will not exceed
certain prescribed levels. In the early stages of the program quite
significant decreases in automobile emissions were achieved. The
current effort to achieve the final incremental declines in harm-
ful emissions, however, has proved technologically difficult. Now
incremental reductions in harmful emissions may prove so ex-
pensive that limiting such emissions by limiting automobile use
may be economically more efficient. Moreover, even if designs
could be altered to achieve prescribed minimum standards, it
may be difficult to insure that automobile owners will keep the
emission control systems in their cars working properly.
Although difficulties can be overcome with regard to the
expense and operation of periodic testing equipment, individual
automobile owners may subordinate interest in clean air to their
interest in better performance and fuel economy, both of which
are sacrificed by current emission control technology. The case
for diverting automobile commuters to mass transit for the sake
of cleaner air therefore becomes especially persuasive.' 0 4
The price of cleaner air may, however, be a loss of hearing.
Prolonged exposure to sound at a level of 100 decibels will cause
permanent loss of hearing. The New York City subway system
average in-car sound level is 95-100 decibels with a peak of
114.105 Even a twenty-minute ride on such a system may produce
a temporary loss of hearing lasting up to forty minutes after
departure from the system.10 6 Sound levels on the platforms
range from 93 to 101 decibels. In addition to damage to hearing,
104 "The Committee recognizes that during the next several years, the attainment of
required ambient air quality in many of the metropolitan regions of this country will be
impossible if the control of pollution from moving sources depends solely on emission
controls." SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY STANDARDS ACT OF
1970, S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970). On the other hand, although the
number of automobiles in the Los Angeles area increased by about 20% between 1966
and 1974, total carbon monoxide emissions have been reduced by 50% and hydrocarbon
emissions by more than 60%. N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1975, § 12, at 15, col. 1. In Manhattan
trucks are responsible for 50-65% of vehicle-produced pollutants. Arrow, Coyle &
Ketcham, Environmental Impact of Goods Movement Activity in New York City, in URBAN
GOODS MOVEMENT, supra note 81, at 80, 83.
105 N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1973, at 74, col. 1. See also NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, NEW YORK CAN QUIET ITS NOISY SUBWAYS 6 (1974). The average level of street
noise is 75 decibels. The difference, however, is substantial because decibels are mea-
sured on a logarithmic scale and a decrease of 10 decibels means a 50% decrease in the
noise level. All references to "decibels" are to "db(A)," that is, decibels as measured on
the "A" frequency scale of a sound pressure meter, the frequency closest to that of the
human ear.
106 N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1973, at 86, col. I (and "anyone who used the subways for
25 to 30 years suffered permanent impairment of hearing").
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this quantity of sound increases the risk of heart attack and
disrupts concentration, thereby increasing the risk of
accidents. 10 7 The solution to this rail transit problem is not
necessarily the replacement of steel with rubber wheels; the two
quietest subway systems in the world, in Hamburg and Berlin,
have steel wheels. The answer seems to be better maintenance,
10 8
but maintenance is so expensive that the New York City Transit
system was exempted from application of the City's 1972 Noise
Code because compliance might have necessitated a fare
increase. 109
Noise is unwanted sound that is below the level of sound
that causes physical impairment. Because the concept of noise
involves a subjective element, it is not possible to argue conclu-
sively about noise levels. 110 Nonetheless, it appears that noise is
one of the most annoying features of existing mass transit
systems."' The principal cost of substituting buses for au-
tomobiles as the primary vehicle for the journey to work would
be an increase in noise levels resulting from the increased use of
diesel engines.
1 12
C. The Automobile as a Tortfeasor
The House Report accompanying the Act noted that
"[p]ublic safety is another factor to be considered when review-
ing problems of traffic congestion.... Property damage caused
by motor vehicle accidents has reached such proportions that
insurance companies are continually forced to increase rates in
order to have adequate reserves to cover the cost of the
damage. ''i 3 The relevant figures for comparison of degree of
107 NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, supra note 105, at 13-20.
108
1d. 30, 38. See also J. URBAN TRANSPORT. CORP., PASSENGER PSYCHOLOGICAL
DYNAMICS 116 (UMTA Grant No. H-804, 1968) [hereinafter cited as PASSENGER PSYCHO-
LOGICAL DYNAMICS] (detailed statistics on subway noise levels).
109 N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1973, at 90, col. 2.
110 Moreover, there is some question about the decibel as an adequate measure of
sound. The decibel expresses a relationship between total sound pressure level and a
reference pressure. It does not, however, take "account of the ear's decreasing response
at low and high frequencies." OECD ROAD RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 101, at 13. In
any event, some scientists have speculated that constant exposure to noise may accelerate
the process of age-induced deafness (presbycosis). See ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTORATE,
supra note 101, at 11-14. Moreover, traffic noise can interfere with sleep, distract concen-
tration, interrupt conversation, and generally affect the quality of urban life. The Federal
Highway Administration has published regulations setting noise standards for all
federally-aided highways. See 23 C.F.R. § 772.1-.7 (1975).
111 See L. FITCH, supra note 84, at 194.
112 See OECD ROAD RESEARCH GROUP, supra note 101, at 26-27.
113 H.R. REP. No. 204, supra note 99, at 5.
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safety are accident rates of alternative urban transit modes. Such
information is rather sketchy, although in 1971 the American
Transit Association reported a passenger death rate of .05 per
100,000,000 passenger-miles for urban street car, trolly bus, and
bus lines. 1 4 This compares most favorably with the 1971 urban
motor vehicle death rate of 2.9 per 100,000,000 passenger-miles.
Data on nonfatal accidents is even harder to obtain. A 1968
study of major metropolitan bus lines indicated an accident rate
of 5.47 per million passenger trips. The same study gathered
data from the subway systems in New York, Boston, and
Philadelphia and revealed an accident rate of 7.40 per million
passenger trips. There are no comparable automobile figures in
existence. The 1968 study also provides accident rates per mil-
lion vehicle miles. The rate for subways was 32.5, the rate for
buses 77.68.115 The National Safety Council indicates that in
1971-73 the comparable rate for passenger cars was 8.32. This
figure, however, is based on the experience of fleet operators of
cars used for business purposes. 1 6 In the absence of more re-
fined figures, it is impossible to draw conclusions; but it is not
irrational to surmise that losses of life, limb, and property could
be reduced if commuters were diverted from the automobile to
the bus or subway.
D. The Automobile as a Space Waster
More than half of the land area in the central business dis-
tricts of Chicago, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles is devoted to
motor vehicle movement and storage.1 7 In Providence, 47% of
the CBD's 350-acre land area is devoted to similar uses, while
only 16 of those 350 acres are devoted to "publicly usable
urban greenspace." 118 Such statistics, however, tell us very little.
Streets existed in cities long before the automobile was invented
and the need for some form of streets would continue were the
automobile to disappear.
One means of restoring perspective to a discussion of the
amount of urban land devoted to the automobile is to break
114 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, 1974 ACCIDENT FACTS, at 75. Cf. ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 9, at 9-14 (passenger death rate of .001 per million
passenger-miles).
115 ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 9, at 9-17.
116 NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, supra note 114, at 64.
117 Hearings on S. 6 & S. 917 Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
I"
8 See RHODE ISLAND SCHOOL OF DESIGN, INTERFACE: PROVIDENCE 32, 33 (1974).
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down gross figures into those land areas devoted to streets and
those devoted to off-street parking. The latter type of land use is
particularly associated with the use of private automobiles for
urban transportation. Thus, although 49.5% of the land of
Detroit's central business district was devoted to streets and park-
ing in 1953, the parking share was only 11%. The core area of
Dallas' CBD had 52.6% of its land devoted to streets and park-
ing; the latter category was 18.1%. The extreme case is Los
Angeles, with 59% of its total CBD land devoted to streets and
parking, of which 23.2% consists of parking lots and .6% of
garages. Even here the figures are not as devastating as they first
appear. Although 23.2% of the total ground area of the Los
Angeles central business district is occupied by parking lots,
these lots occupy only 19.6% of the total area (that is, floor space
plus ground area) in use. 119 Even this lower figure may impress
most observers as excessive, particularly in comparison with CBD
land devoted to uses that are socially more desirable.
If the amount of land devoted to parking space is excessive,
eliminating use of the automobile for work trips seems the best
place to begin to restore the imbalance. Urban planners use the
rule of thumb that work trips require half a parking space per
vehicle while non-work trips require approximately one-seventh
of a space per trip because of more frequent turnover.120 This
means that elimination of one automobile formerly used as a
commutation vehicle would liberate approximately a hundred
square feet of CBD land for other uses. Alternatively, for each
automobile removed from work trip service, parking would be
provided for three-and-a-half trips.
That the automobile is a space waster can also be demon-
strated by reference to the Interstate Highway Program. In re-
sponse to the prevailing view of the 1960's, that the urban trans-
portation problem was "congestion," limited-access highways
were built into the heart of the cities "to relieve the pressure" on
the outmoded street system. Such investments were justified on
the basis of "savings in congestion costs"; it could be demon-
strated with almost mathematical precision that the monetary
value of the time saved by turnpike or thruway users justified
the most massive investments.' 2' But the voracious appetite of
119 J. RAE, supra note 74, at 219, 220.
120 W. SMITH & ASSOCIATES, PARKING IN THE CITY CENTER 22 (1965).
121 In 1965 the average cost of building an urban mile of four-lane interstate high-
way was $3.7 million, with the cost increasing astronomically to estimated costs of $50
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these highways for urban land gave rise to second thoughts
about the program in more than one metropolitan area. 122 Yet
from a land use point of view, these limited access highways
should have been preferable to the conventional street system.
When complete, for example, the Los Angeles freeway will oc-
cupy 2% of available land to carry 50-60% of all motor vehicle
traffic. The remaining traffic will be carried on local streets
which occupy ten times as much space. 123 In enacting the Urban
Mass Transportation Act, Congress rejected this "efficiency"
of the limited access highway because of its undesirable ex-
ternalities, 124 opting instead for a transportation mode more
efficient in land use terms and less provocative of opposition:
mass transit.'
25
Although the rational conclusion to be drawn from these
oft-quoted figures would appear inescapably to favor rail or bus
transit, it must be noted that the comparison is between respec-
tive capacities. While it is true that the average automobile occu-
pancy rate for work trips is below capacity at 1.3, it is also true
that rail transit systems rarely operate at 100% of capacity.'
26
Second, to the extent that the preferred mass transit system in-
volves the use of buses, its demands upon urban land may be as
million per mile for Boston's Central Artery and of more than $100 million per for the
Lower Manhattan Expressway. Tarpley & Dake, supra note 85, at 246.
122 See H.R. REP. No. 204, supra note 99, at 4.
12
3J. RAE, supra note 74, at 221.
124 On the externalities, see L. MUMFORD, THE HIGHWAY AND THE CITY 248-49
(1964).
115 The argument for mass transit in land use terms runs as follows: The area
needed to move one person one mile is I square foot by rail, 3 square feet for a
pedestrian, 10 square feet for bus travelers and 14-70 square feet for a private autoist.
Another formulation indicates that the average freeway land has a capacity of 1,500 cars
per hour. Even if every automobile contained five passengers, the maximum number of
persons that could be transported in that lane would be 7,500, compared with the
40-50,000 person capacity of a single rail rapid transit line. A single track of a rail system
can handle train headways of 1.5 minutes or 40 trains per hour. Assuming 10 cars per
train, the capacity of a single track is 48,000 passengers per hour (assuming 120 passen-
gers per car). The Sixth and Eighth Avenue subways in New York regularly carry peak
hour loads of 61,500. See Roess, Existing Technology in Mass Transportation, in TRANSPOR-
TATION AND AGING, supra note 13, at 93.
Bus rapid transit (exclusive right of way, not a reserved land, with 15-second head-
ways, 50-seat buses, and 25 standees per bus) produces a capacity of 18,000 per hour. It
is theoretically possible that capacity could be increased to 30,000 if stops were made out
of the travel lane. Id. 97. Note, however, that to attain a 30,000 capacity would require
400 buses and drivers as opposed to a rail system of 25 trains and a labor force of 50. See
also MEYER, supra note 3, at 206 n.4 (non-stop bus lanes could handle up to 720 buses per
hour).
'26 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TECHNIQUES
OF IMPROVING URBAN CONDITIONS BY RESTRAINT OF ROAD TRAFFIC 19 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as OECD].
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great if not greater than the status quo. Finally, it would do well
to keep in mind the negative externalities that led to the rejec-
tion of the urban portions of the interstate highway system. That
experience teaches that efficiency considerations should not
override our intuitive judgments about preserving green space,
attractive vistas, and cohesive neighborhoods. These "community
objectives" may be as threatened by mass transit as they were by
the highway program.1
2 7
IV. THE URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION
ACT OF 1964
A. The Act's Preference for Rail Rapid Transit
As has been noted, the primary focus of the federal mass
transportation program has been an attempt to divert the com-
muter from his automobile. To accomplish this worthy objective,
Congress has provided a program to "reinvigorate" mass transit
by providing funds "to assist States and local public bodies and
agencies thereof in financing (1) the acquisition, construction,
reconstruction, and improvement of facilities and equipment for
use ...in mass transportation service in urban areas and in
coordinating such service with highway and other transportation
in such areas."'1 28 Essentially, therefore, financing is made avail-
able for capital expenditures, a point made explicit in the defini-
tion of "eligible facilities and equipment" as "buses and other
127 Cf. Trustees of Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N.Y. 311 (1882), in which the
New York Court of Appeals relieved the defendant of the burden of a covenant restrict-
ing the use of his land to residential purposes. The court applied the doctrine of "change
in neighborhood conditions"-the "change" in this case being the construction of an
elevated street railway on Sixth Avenue in front of the premises in question. Undoubt-
edly, the street railway was hailed in its day as a technological break-through which would
put an end to "congestion" and "the urban transportation problem." The court found,
however, that the railway had so depreciated the property that no "quiet and orderly
people" would wish to reside in the neighborhood.
128 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 3(a), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1602 (Supp., Feb.
1975), amending 49 U.S.C. § 1602 (1970). The "mass transportation service" described in
the Act is defined by a number of authorities. Section 12(c)(5) of the Act defines mass
transportation as "transportation by bus, or rail or other conveyance, either publicly or
privately owned, which provides to the public general or special service ... on a regular
and continuing basis." Id. § 12(c)(5), 49 U.S.C. § 1608 (1970). See MANUAL, supra note 6,
at IIB-1-2. The original definition in the Act defined mass transportation as serving the
public "over prescribed routes." Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 9(d)(5), Pub.
L. No. 88-365, § 9(d)(5), 78 Stat. 302. This definition was believed to be "unduly re-
strictive" in light of changing technology. HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1968, H.R. REP. No. 1585, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 65-66 (1968) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1585].
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rolling stock and real property including land .... -129
Grant applications are placed in one of three groups de-
pending on the size of the urban area.1 30 In the large system
category, comprised of areas with 1,000,000 population and
over, a basic purpose is the diversion of the auto commuter to
mass transit so as to relieve "congestion."'131 Thereafter priority
is given to projects
designed to reduce traffic congestion by utilization of
UMTA capital grant funds in conjunction with the Fed-
eral Highway Administration's (FHWA) TOPICS (Traf-
fic Operations Program to Increase Capacity and
Safety) program and the Urban Corridor Demonstra-
tion Program, which is funded jointly by UMTA and
FHWA. Examples of such projects include the use of
exclusive or preferential streets, bus lanes, or express-
way ramps .... 132
Priority is also given to projects "which are part of programs
that demonstrate current use of, or proposed adoption of, non-
capital intensive means by which to reduce traffic congestion,"
such as staggering of work hours, car pooling, increasing bridge
and tunnel tolls, regulating parking, banning private au-
tomobiles from sections of the CBD during workdays, and in-
creasing the supply of taxicabs.' 33 The so-called priority for
129 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 3(a), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1602 (1970). On
the distorting effects of capital grants, see Schultze, Sorting Out the Social Grant Programs:
An Economist's Criteria, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 181, 186-87 (1973); Tye, The Capital Grant as a
Subsidy Device: The Case Study of Urban Mass Transportation, in JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS 796 (1973).
130 MANUAL, supra note 6, at IIB-17 to -18.
131 Id. IIB-18. See generally H.R. REP. No. 204, supra note 99, at 5-7.
As a precondition to federal funding, the applicant must indicate anticipated
changes in the following criteria of congestion: "(1) peak-hour travel speeds of 20 mph or
less, (2) service at level D or lower (per HRB Special Report 87, Highway Capacity
Manual, 1965), and (3) traffic volume-to-capacity ratio approaching one during a.m. and
p.m. peak travel hours." MANUAL, supra note 6, at IIB-27. Service "D" level traffic flow is
defined as an "unstable flow, with tolerable operating speeds being maintained though
considerably affected by changes in operating conditions .... Drivers have little freedom
to maneuver, and comfort and convenience are low, but conditions can be tolerated for
short periods of time." HIGHWAY RESEARCH BOARD, HIGHWAY CAPACITY MANUAL 81
(1965). For downtown streets "D" level service means traffic is moving at approximately
10 mph. Id. 334.
132 MANUAL, supra note 6, at IIB-23. See 23 U.S.C. § 135 (1970), as amended, (Supp.
III, 1973).
133 MANUAL, supra note 6, at IIB-28. That the guidelines are sometimes not
guidelines, and that the priority given to non-capital intensive measures is not always to
be followed, is evident from the following statement: "It is recognized that some of the
actions would be politically unacceptable without the precondition of improved transit.
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non-capital intensive means of reducing auto commuting,
though provided for in theory, is not carried out in practice.' 34
Should an applicant succeed in gaining a priority sufficient
to warrant access to funds, the federal program will provide 80%
(formerly 662/3%)135 of the "net project cost." The remainder is
For these reasons, this guideline is not a precondition to the selection of projects, but a
basis for giving priority to projects in areas showing attention to the subject." McManus,
supra note 83, at 35.
134 The relative value of projects in alleviating congestion is measured by indicators
such as the "daily passengers boarded per dollar of net project cost, daily passenger-miles
per dollar of NPC, increase in passenger-miles per man-year, increase in passenger-miles
per day." MANUAL, supra note 6, at IIB-23. To the extent that the use of these indicators
is "not practicable," the following is the order of priorities: (1) additions to existing car
fleet, (2) extension of existing lines, (3) construction of, and rolling stock for, new lines,
including stations and access thereto, (4) replacement of existing cars, (5) improvements
to existing stations. Id. IIB-29. These priorites, which are far simpler to apply, have
nothing to do with "congestion" or "non-capital intensive means," but are in fact the real
criteria by which decisions are made.
The elaborate controls over capital grants are resented by major transit-oriented
cities, who believe "they are capable of determining priorities and projects better than the
Federal Government .. " E. Parker & K. Kamrass, supra note 80, at 11.
On February 27, 1975, the author requested information from UMTA on the im-
plementation of this policy and, in particular, the identification of projects in which
"non-capital intensive means" were a significant feature. In its reply, UMTA noted that
[i]n reviewing applications for federal funding, consideration is given to those
applicants that have incorporated good planning and use of non-capital inten-
sive means to improve their systems. Funds are not made available solely be-
cause an applicant has instituted good management procedures. We agree, how-
ever, that perhaps greater recognition should be given to cities which institute
these non-capital intensive means of improving their local system.
Letter from Urban Mass Transportation Administration to the author, Mar. 21, 1975, on
file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. The only response to the request for
specifics was a press release summarizing projects for exclusive bus lanes.
On August 1, 1975, UMTA published a "Notice of Proposed Policy" on "Major
Urban Mass Transportation Investments." 40 Fed. Reg. 32546 (1975). The critical fea-
ture of the new policy is that "an analysis of transportation alternatives will be required as a
condition of eligibility for federal assistance .... " (emphasis in original). One of the categories
is "Improved Management of Existing Transportation System," in which "[a]ctions such
as preferential treatment of buses on freeways and city streets, ... parking management,
measures to reduce the use of automobiles in congested areas, . . . and other actions
designed to make more efficient use of existing transportation facilities, should be con-
sidered as alternatives and supplements to the construction of new capital facilities." Id.
32547.
The indicia of priorities promulgated by the Administration for the large system
category are similar to those for the medium system category. MANUAL, supra note 6, at
IIB-27. In the small system category, including cities with a population below 20,000, the
administrative guidelines emphasize making bus systems economical and responsive to
the needs of the transportation disadvantaged. Id. IIB-19.
135 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 4(a), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a) (Supp.,
Feb. 1975). The 80% figure was considered equitable because the Interstate Highway
Program provided 90% federal financing and other highway programs were 70% feder-
ally financed. See HOUSE CONI. ON PUBLIC WORKS, FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAY ACT OF 1973,
H.R. REP. No. 118, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1973) [hereinafter cited as H.R. RP.
No. 118].
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to be provided from local sources. The statute indicates that "net
project cost" is that "portion of the cost which cannot be reason-
ably financed from revenues.' 36 This provision leaves room for
considerable interpretation. An initial question is whether the
"revenues" referred to are revenues generated by existing fare
levels or whether it is open to the Administrator to contend that
an applicant could "reasonably finance" a good portion of the
total project cost if fares were raised. The statute prohibits the
Secretary from regulating
in any manner the mode of operation of any mass
transportation system with respect to which a grant is
made under section 3 or, after such grant is made, to
regulate the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, or other charges
fixed or prescribed for such system by any local public
or private transit agency .... 137
This section can be read to permit the Secretary to regulate fares
before a grant is made. This seems to have been the congres-
sional intent because the House Report notes in its discussion of
net project costs that "[i]n determining fares the locality would
be expected to establish reasonable rates which will attract suffi-
cient riders for the assisted project ... which will yield adequate
revenues."'
138
A second question is whether the applicant need consider
total system revenues or only revenues to be generated by the
proposed project. If the applicant is permitted to consider total
system revenues, the amount that may be financed from them
will normally be zero, because all major transit systems were
operating at increasing deficits at the time of the law's enactment
and still are. This was apparently the view of the Comptroller
General, who noted that "if the administration's concept is fully
implemented, most projects will receive Federal and non-Federal
grants equal to nearly 100 percent of a project cost.' 3
9
136 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 4(a), 49 U.C.S.A. § 1603(a) (Supp.,
Feb. 1975). The phrase "net project cost" was borrowed from the Urban Renewal Pro-
gram. See Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. § 1460(f) (1970).
137 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 12(e), 49 U.S.C. § 1608 (1970) (em-
phasis supplied).
131 H.R. REP. No. 204, supra note 99, at 13. Grant applicants must provide a financial
statement indicating, inter alia, "the means by which funds will be available to meet all
prospective operating deficits for at least five years." MANUAL, supra note 6, at IIB-20, 24,
27 (1972). Applicants are advised that "identifying alternate levels of service and fares
that would permit a break-even operation can be a useful analysis" in this regard. Id.
IIB-20.
139 Hearings, supra note 117, at 41.
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To consider total system revenues in deciding financing
capability would make nonsense of the limitation on federal
financing. Yet the House Report in support of the bill indicated
that in defining "net project cost," "the operating income of the
entire local transit system will always be used in determining
revenues and the need for Federal assistance."' 40 On the other
hand, in another section of the same report, the majority uses as
an illustration of the concept of net project cost the extension of
the rapid transit line from Camden to Kirkwood, New Jersey,
estimated to cost $50 million. "It expects ... half of this amount
from the fare box, and in such case the maximum Federal grant
could not exceed about $17 million (two thirds of the
remainder)."' 4 1 The Administration has followed the canon of
interpretation granting priority to the specific over the general
to construe the intent of the draftsmen to mean that "net project
cost" equals total project cost less "anticipated revenues" to be
generated by the project. 142 By the end of 1970, however, the
House noted that "the gap between 'gross project costs' and 'net
project costs' . . . is small and rapidly disappearing."' 43 By the
end of 1972, the Department noted that there is "usually little
difference between the gross and net project costs" and, in its
cumulative report on grants approved under the program, listed
projects in terms of their "gross" cost only, omitting the column
for "net project cost" for "the sake of simplicity.'
44
The interpretation of the local portion provision of the pro-
ject cost calculation has also had an interesting history. The stat-
140 H.R. REP. No. 204, supra note 99, at 13.
141 Id. 17. This calculation was obviously made considering only anticipated fares
from the new project. Of course the Camden (Lindenwold) line is the only one in its
system.
142 MANUAL, supra note 6, at IIB-2 to -3. But see id. App. 3, at 32 (sample format for
a grant application). In calculating project financing, applicants are instructed to
[e]stimate that portion of the Gross Project Cost which can be financed from
current revenues of the transit system. Please note that these estimates are to be
based on current revenues of the entire transit system, including charter and
incidental revenues, and not only that part to be assisted by this proposed
project.
Id. App. 3, at 28.
143 HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 1264, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as H.R. REP. No. 1264].
144 URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTA-
TION, APPROVALS OF CAPITAL GRANTS AND LOANS i (1973) [hereinafter cited as UMTA
APPROVALS]. The Department noted that a project usually generated revenues when it
sold equipment being replaced by the project. Id. This seems a good distance from the
original meaning of the concept.
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ute provides that the local portion shall be "in cash.' 1 45 The
purpose was to prevent local governments from meeting their
twenty percent share by "tax forgiveness."'146 One would have
thought the phrase "in cash" rather unambiguous, but this has
not been true in practice. The administrative rules provide that
"[t]he local contribution should be in cash, but may, however,
include the direct contribution to the project of labor, materials,
land which has not previously been used for transit purposes, or
other property of ascertainable value."'147 Such in-kind contribu-
tions must, of course, be "necessary and reasonable for proper
and efficient accomplishment of project objectives.' 148 The ex-
planation for the cash/goods paradox may lie in a cryptic sen-
tence in the House Report: "The committee wishes to point out
that while the local one-third contribution [now one-fifth] must
be met in cash, any public land or property or services necessary
for a project would be included in gross project cost and paid for
the same as private property.' 49 Presumably this means that the
local cash requirement can be met by simultaneous bookkeeping
entries.
The 1964 Act envisaged that the "cash" would come from
public bodies. Senator Williams expressed the view that the way
to get "state and local governments to come to grips with the
problem, financially and otherwise," was to require that local
costs be provided by public bodies. 150 The provision was not,
however, intended to exclude private transit bodies from par-
ticipation in the program. The public grant recipient could lease
facilities to a private operator or otherwise contract for such
services.' 51 The Act was amended in 1968 to include the provi-
sion that "[n]ot more than 50 percentum of such remainder [i.e.
the local or non federal portion of the project cost] may be pro-
145 49 U.S.C. § 1603 (1970), as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1603 (Supp., Feb. 1975).
146 H.R. REP. No. 204, supra note 99, at 12.
147 MANUAL, supra note 6, at IIB-2 (emphasis supplied).
148 Id. IIID-25.
149 H.R. REP. No. 204, supra note 99 at 13.
150 Testimony of Senator Williams before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, May, 1961, quoted in Kohl, The Federal Urban Transportation
Demonstration Program, 18 TAFFic Q. 301 (1964).
151 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 3(a), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1602 (Supp., Feb.
1975), amending 49 U.S.C. § 1602 (1970). See also H.R. REP. No. 204, supra note 99, at 12:
A grant would be made only to a public body which demonstrates that it has the
legal, financial, and technical capacity to carry out the proposed project. The
public body would not necessarily have to operate the transit facilities and
equipment itself. It could provide for their operation by lease or other arrange-
ment.
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vided from other than public sources .... ,152 The purpose of
the amendment was to clarify Congress' intention that the par-
ticipation of private enterprise be encouraged to "the maximum
extent feasible. ' 153 The amendment also provided for participa-
tion by private entities above the fifty percent level "in cases of
demonstrated fiscal inability of an applicant."'154 This latter pro-
vision was stricken in 1970 because of the obvious reluctance of
most communities to confess to "fiscal inability," a reluctance due
in no small part to the effect of such a confession on bond
ratings. 155 The 1970 amendments also provided that the local
contribution "may be provided in whole or in part from other
than public sources .... -156 The ostensible purpose was once
more to encourage private participation. The theory apparently
was that a 50-50 partnership did not appeal to private sources
whereas one hundred percent private capital in partnership with
the federal government would.
157
From the foregoing brief description, it is clear that the
Urban Mass Transportation Act is broad enough to authorize
remedial action for most conceptions of the urban transportation
problem. Experience with congressional activity cautions, how-
ever, that the nature of a program is best ascertained by examin-
ing the actual appropriation and disposition of funds. The re-
port of the Institute of Public Administration, which provided
much of the data on which the Act was based, projected a total
"needed" transit investment for the decade 1962-1971 at $9.8
billion.' 58 Of this total, the report estimated that federal assis-
152 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 704, 82
Stat. 476.
153 H.R. REP. No. 1585, supra note 128, at 67 (§ 704 referred to as § 604 in Report).
154 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 704, 82
Stat. 476. The amendment also indicated that to the extent the local share was provided
by public or private transit systems, those funds could be provided "solely from undistrib-
uted cash surpluses, replacement or depreciation funds or reserves available in cash, or
new capital. ... Id. The stated purpose of this section was to prevent the use of
revenues to cover local capital costs, especially new issues of revenue bonds. See H.R. REP.
No. 1585, supra note 128, at 67.
155 See generally H.R. REP. No. 1264, supra note 143, at 7.
156 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 4(a), 49 U.S.C. § 1603 (1970).
157 H.R. REP. No. 1264, supra note 143, at 7.
158 This total was broken down as follows: (1) estimated costs of new transit or
suburban rail systems in Atlanta, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Washington; estimated
costs of projected extensions of rail systems in Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, New York,
and Philadelphia; and estimated costs of -rehabilitating rights-of-way and structures of
grade-separated and suburban rail systems-S5.5 billion; (2) estimated costs of replace-
ment and additional rolling stock-S3.3 billion; and (3) provision for possible rail or bus
grade-separated facilities-$1.0 billion. L. FITCH, supra note 84, at 55-57.
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tance "might run to $2.5 to $3.5 billion."'5 9 Although Congress
was clearly aware of these figures it anticipated that "a large part
of the total capital cost can and will be met from the fare box."'
160
Whether Congress really believed in the vitality of the "net
project cost" concept and thus the viability of financing from the
fare box, or whether, more plausibly, it just chose to proceed
cautiously, the ensuing legislation authorized amounts of far
more modest proportions than the Institute of Public Adminis-
tration had proposed. The Act authorized $75 million for fiscal
year 1965, $150 million for fiscal year 1966, and $150 million
for fiscal year 1967.161 The appropriations were even
lower-$60 million in fiscal year 1965, $130 million in each of
fiscal years 1966 and 1967.162 Even at these low funding levels,
the program was slow in getting started. In fiscal year 1965 only
$50.7 million in projects were approved and in fiscal year 1966
only $106.1 million.' 63 In early 1966 a survey by a consultant to
the Department of Housing and Urban Development indicated
that the ten-year capital needs of mass transit systems for the
decade 1966-75 would be $10.9 billion. 164 Again Congress re-
sponded modestly. In 1966 the Act was amended and authorized
an additional $150 million each for fiscal years 1968 and 1969. A
later amendment authorized $190 million for fiscal 1970.165
On October 15, 1969, a new report was submitted by the
Institute of Public Administration projecting a capital investment
estimate of $41.6 billion for the period 1970-79 for the twenty-
nine largest urbanized areas.166 Congress did not back off in the
159 Id. 226. This estimate was based on a program of federal subsidization of interest
on locally issued transit authority bonds-a Public Housing Administration (PHA) type
program.
160 H.R. REP. No. 204, supra note 99, at 6.
161 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 4(b), Pub. L. No. 88-365, § 4(b), 78
Stat. 302, as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1603 (Supp., Feb. 1975).
162 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION
AMENDMENTS OF 1966, S. REP. No. 1436, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966).
163 Id. 4.
164 This figure represented the total of projections of $8.6 billion for eleven major
metropolitan rail transit systems, over $1 billion for possible future rail systems, and $1.3
billion to replace buses that were more than sixteen years old. Id. 2-3.
165 Act of Sept. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-562, § l(a), 80 Stat. 715, as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1970). Actual appropriations were $125 million in fiscal 1968, $175
million in fiscal 1969, and $175 million in fiscal 1970.
166 The total was broken down as follows: projected capital investment for planned
improvements in existing rail rapid transit in New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia,
and Cleveland-$5.14 billion; similar investments in suburban rail facilities-$2.28 bil-
lion; additions and replacements to the bus supply-S705 million; a busway in Bos-
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face of this staggering increase in projected needs. Instead it
interpreted the increases as evidence of "a marked increase of
interest among cities.., in improving urban mass transportation
facilities as the Federal assistance program begins to show
results." 167 In response Congress passed the Urban Mass Trans-
portation Assistance Act of 1970.168 The preamble contains the
congressional finding that "success will require a Federal com-
mitment for the expenditure of at least $10,000,000,000 over a
twelve-year period .... ,,169 To manifest the seriousness of its
intent, Congress authorized and made available for obligation a
total of $3.1 billion from the date of enactment.
170
ton-S150 million (total-S8.27 billion). Planned rail rapid transit systems in Washing-
ton, D.C., Los Angeles, Baltimore, Seattle, and Honolulu-S5.88 billion; planned
busway/guideway investments in Atlanta and Pittsburg-$1.29 billion; and planned ex-
penditures on the partially completed BART system in San Francisco-$1.2 billion
(total-S8.37 billion). To these contemplated expenditures were added "high likelihood"
expenditures on fixed rail systems in Detroit, Miami, and St. Louis of $5.5 billion;
"medium likelihood" expenditures for such systems in Cincinnati, Denver, and Buffalo,
totaling $2.14 billion; and "low likelihood" facilities in New Orleans and Sacramento at
$1.2 billion, for a total of $8.84 billion. In addition, the total included $5.2 billion for
possible expenditures on busway/guideway systems in eight cities. Other projected ex-
penditures on replacement or additional buses amounted to $2.9 billion. An inflation
factor of 25% brought the total to $41.9 billion. F. Graves & R. Rechel, Estimates of
Prospective Capital Investment in Urban Public Transportation, Oct. 15, 1969. But see
N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1974, at 58, col. 1 (St. Louis "scraps" 86-mile system which would
have cost $2 billion but "generated no public enthusiasm").
167 H.R. REP'. No. 1264, supra note 143, at 4.
168 Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-453, §§ 1-14, 84 Stat. 962, amending Urban
Mass Transportation Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-365, §§ 1-12, 78 Stat. 302 (codified at
49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-12 (1970)).
169 49 U.S.C. § 1601a (1970).
The considerations that went into determining the appropriate level of funding
appear to have been based principally on the financing of new rail transit systems and the
extension of existing systems. The 1970 House Report, H.R. REP. No. 1264, supra note
143, is ambiguous on the point. It first indicates that capital expenditures on rail systems
were projected at $10 billion for 1966-75. Thereafter the report notes that "cost escala-
tion" has required an upward adjustment of this figure to a total of $11.8 billion. In the
next paragraph, the report indicates that "more recent estimates . . .place 10-year
requirements at between $28 and $34 billion ...." Id. 4. It is unclear whether these
"more recent estimates" encompassed all mass transit needs or only those rail system
needs referred to in the two preceding paragraphs. The latter alternative makes more
sense grammatically. In the next paragraph the report notes that "[u]nless the Federal
Government is prepared to foreclose any support for the capital costs of fixed-rail sys-
tems, an estimate of about $15 billion in total capital requirements for urban public
transportation systems over the next decade would seem to be reasonable for policymak-
ing purposes." Id. In light of what had been said in the text preceding this sentence, it
seems likely that most, if not all, of the $10 billion provided for in the 1970 Act was
intended to pay for rail transit.
170 Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970, § 4(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1603(c)
(1970).
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As soon as funding had begun on the large scale mandated
by the 1970 Act, even higher projections were made. The Na-
tional Transportation Report published in 1972 estimated mass
transit needs for the period 1970-1990 at "about $63 billion"'
u7
and the Department of Transportation in 1973 estimated a need
for over $50 billion over the next ten years.' 72 As of February
28, 1975, $1.636 billion in capital grant funds had been
approved.
173
A provision of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 re-
quired the Department of Transportation to study future public
urban mass transportation needs and financing. 7 4 That study,
completed in the summer of 1974, projected a capital investment
program for the period 1972-1990 of $58.2 billion (1971 dollars)
'7' H.R. REP. No. 118, supra note 135, at 3.
"'See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Background Information on the Urban
Mass Transportation Administration (1973).
171 71 METROPOLITAN, Sept.-Oct. 1975, at 22. The effort to ensure that authorized
sums are made available has been directed at "tapping" the Highway Trust Fund. The
summer of 1973 saw the first marriage of the federal system for highways and the
Federal Mass Transportation Assistance Program. There are four federal aid systems
dealing with highways: the primary system, the urban system, the secondary system, and
the interstate system. 23 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1970). All of these systems are financed from
the Highway Trust Fund. Their relative importance is indicated by the following levels of
annual authorizations: interstate system, $3 billion; primary system, $700 million; secon-
dary system, $400 million; urban system, $700 million. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1973 provides that a state may use its pro rata share of the urban system funds for
purchase of buses, up to $200 million in fiscal 1975. 23 U.S.C.A. § 142(a)(2) (Supp., Feb.
1975), amending 23 U.S.C. § 142(a) (1970). The formula for the pro rata share in 23
U.S.C. § 104(b)(6) is the ratio of the population of the state to the population of the
urbanized areas of the United States.
Once divided up, the sums made available under the 1973 legislation are insignifi-
cant. Maximum estimates run as follows: California cities, $96 million; Illinois cities, $49
million; Massachusetts cities, $27 million. See Wall St. J., Aug. 7, 1973, at 14, col. 5-6. See
also remarks of Frank C. Herringer, UMTA Administrator, at the Fall Assembly of the
Southern California Association of Governments, Sept. 13, 1973 (California's share, $77
million; Los Angeles' share, $42 million). The significance of the 1973 Act, however, is
that funding comes from the Highway Trust Fund, whereas the UMTA appropriations
are charges on the general revenues.
The 1973 Act also permits a state to withdraw planned segments of interstate high-
way and substitute non-highway public transportation projects with 80% federal financial
participation. 23 U.S.C.A. §103(e)(4) (Supp., Feb. 1975).
In an interview in April, 1975, UMTA Administrator Herringer indicated that only
two grants, both for the purchase of buses, had been made under the provisions of the
1973 legislation. The two grants were about $33 million to New York City and $1.6
million to East St. Louis, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1975, at 48, col. 4. Only three other
applications, totaling $3.6 million, were pending at that time. Administrator Herringer
indicated that the causes of the "disappointing" results were the 30-70 state-federal
formula (as compared to the 20-80 formula under the UMTA grant program) and
"resistance from [state] highway authorities."
174 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, § 138, Pub. L. No. 93-87, 87 Stat. 270.
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for all urbanized areas. 175 The 1973 legislation also increased the
contract authority under the grant program from $3.1 to $6.1
billion. 176 The National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of
1974 increased this authority to $10.925 billion.'
77
That legislation also added a new dimension to the federal
program. Under the 1974 Act the Secretary has contract author-
ity up to $3.975 billion, to be expended on either construction
projects or deficit underwriting, on a scale beginning with a max-
imum of $300 million in fiscal 1975 and increasing to $900 mil-
lion by fiscal 1980.178 These funds are to be distributed among
the states in the following manner: half multiplied by the ratio of
the urbanized population of the state to the urbanized popula-
tion of the United States, and half multiplied by this ratio and
weighted according to the number of inhabitants per square
mile. 17 9 Funds so apportioned are then available for use for up
to eighty percent of construction costs or up to fifty percent of
the operating expenses of a public mass transportation system.
180
Our interest in these figures is twofold. First, they establish
that the federal commitment to urban mass transportation is
significant and increasing rapidly. Second, the figures reveal the
nature of the actual federal program as opposed to the wide
range of possible options offered by the 1964 Act and adminis-
trative information manuals. The figures show unequivocally
175 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, A STUDY OF URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION
NEEDS AND FINANCING 1-3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as STUDY].
A 1973 report for UMTA suggested the adoption of a long-range goal of a bus or
rail seat for every car commuter by the year 2000. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION,
INTEGRATION OF TRANSIT SYSTEMS ix (1973). The estimated capital cost would be $120
billion. Id. x. Of this amount $2.5 billion would be spent for buses which would carry an
estimated 10 million former commuters. $118 billion would be spent on rapid rail and
light rail facilities which would carry 22 million former commuters. Id. 20.
17M Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 4(c), 49 U.S.C. § 1603(c) (Supp. III,
1973), as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1603(c) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
177 49 U.S.C.A. § 1603(c) (Supp. Feb. 1975).178 Id. § 1604(c)(1).
At the time the law was drafted, operating deficits of the nation's transit systems
were at a rate of $360 million per annum. SENATE CoMI. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, EMERGENCY COMMUTER RELIEF ACT, S. REP. No. 361, 93d Cong., Ist
Sess. 2 (1973).
179 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 5(b)(1); 49 U.S.C.A. § 1604(b)(1)
(Supp., Feb. 1975). This formula is the Administration proposal. The Senate alternative,
allocation by revenue passenger and vehicle-miles, was abandoned because "they were
not reliable ascertainable numbers and were potentially susceptible to manipulation."
HOUSE-SENATE CONFERENCE COMM., CONFERENCE REPORT, S. REP. No. 1288, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 15 (1974).
10 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 5(e), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1604(e) (Supp.,
Feb. 1975).
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that the main thrust of the Act is to assist in the improvement,
extension, and development of rail rapid transit.' 81 Moreover, it
seems likely that the percentage allocated to rail transit systems
has been held down by the long lead time required to bring rail
proposals to the point of funding and by the now eliminated
statutory requirement that not more than 12.5% of the total
funds authorized under the law be used in any one state.1
82
Finally, the 1974 provision for federal subsidy of operating de-
ficits is aimed primarily at assisting cities with existing fixed rail
facilities. 183 This high proportion of funding for rail rapid
transit has occurred in the face of ostensible administrative
priorities for non-rail modes.
184
B. The Basis for the Act's Preference for Rail Rapid Transit
At the outset, it would appear that the de facto preference
for rail rapid transit is sound. Rail rapid transit is potentially the
most efficient form of urban land transportation because it can
carry the greatest number of people per hour along a given
traffic corridor. If operated underground, as are most such sys-
tems, it could be the least obtrusive form of urban transportation
system. Because it generally has exlusive use of its traffic lanes, it
is potentially the fastest form of urban mass transportation. Fi-
nally, rail rapid transit can be easily adapted to recent technolog-
ical advances, such as technology developed by the space pro-
gram. It is the mode with the most potential for adaptation of
the labor-saving techniques of automation. These potential ad-
vantages of rail rapid transit, however, do not reflect the actual
situation.
181 Ninety percent of the 1961 total estimate was earmarked for investment in rail
transit. The 1966 up-dating provided 88% of the total for rail rapid transit. The 1969
projection of $41.6 billion was based on an allocation of 70% of this total to existing,
planned, or proposed rail rapid transit. And the 1974 projection of $58.2 billion invest-
ment between 1972 and 1990 consists of a $43.9 billion investment in rail transit. See text
accompanying notes 158-78 supra (calculations by author). Moreover, over 66% of the
approved capital grants made under the program by December 31, 1973, went to rail
projects with an estimated 40% going to rail rapid transit. The figure for rail totals was
supplied by the UMTA Public Affairs Office. The figure for rail rapid transit was calcu-
lated from data in UMTA APPROVALS, supra note 144. The UMTA breakdown is by state
and recipient, with brief descriptions of projects. In all cases in which project descriptions
included rail and non-rail features, the figures were not included in the percentages
given in the text.
182 49 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970), as amended, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1611 (Supp. Feb. 1975).
183 See Miller, Financing Mass Transit: Mobility is Among the Assets, 76 TECHNOLOGY
REV., Dec., 1973, at 45, 46-47.
184 Text accompanying note 133 supra.
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1. Potential Benefits Examined
a. Cost
The principal problem presented by the ability of rail rapid
transit to move sixty thousand passengers per hour in one traffic
corridor is that few cities can generate that volume of traffic.
85
It can be argued, however, that assuming the land needed for
one lane of limited access highway is approximately the same as
that needed for one line of rail transit, the latter would be more
185 To generate the volume of traffic needed for a minimally successful rail transit
corridor, a central city must have a population density of 14,000 per square mile. New
York meets this standard easily with a central city density of 26,343 per square mile. The
only other major American cities with densities of this magnitude are Chicago, 15,126;
Philadelphia, 15,164; and Boston, 13,936. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 1 CENSUS OF POPULATION 1-187 to -188 (Table 35) (1972). It is often forgotten
in citing the success of new rail transit systems in Canada that Montreal has a density of
9,300 per square mile and 26,400 in the central city, and that Toronto has 8,200 per
square mile and 20,580 in the central city. R. BUEL, supra note 101, at 187.
The extension of Boston's "Red Line" rapid transit system to the South Shore took it
through an area with an average density of 1,300 persons per square mile. It therefore
comes as no surprise that its average one-way ridership in April, 1972 was 11,092 passen-
gers per day. See METROPOLITAN AREA PLANNING COUNCIL, SOUTH SHORE RAIL RAPID
TRANSIT EXTENSION, PRELIMINARY IMPACT STUDY 111-5, V-I (1973).
Bus rapid transit (on exclusive rights of way) requires a population density of
14,000-20,000 per square mile, CBD employment of at least 100,000, daily CBD destina-
tions of at least 300,000, and a corridor generating 70,000 persons per day by all modes.
See Roess, supra note 125, at 97. For a detailed analysis indicating that a bus rapid transit
system would be a poor investment for Milwaukee because of a lack of density and traffic
volume, see Sawicki, Break-Even Benefit-Cost Analysis of Alternative Express Transit Systems, 8
J. TRANSP. ECON. & POLICY 274 (1974).
Commercial bus service is economically viable where there is a volume of 200 round
trips per square mile daily. To achieve this goal the residential population density level
must be at least 10,000. See Markovitz, supra note 14, at 79.
New York is the only city in which actual hourly volume per transit track exceeds
40,000. See J. RAE, supra note 74, at 282 (Table 13.2). See generally A. LANG & R.
SOBERMAN, URBAN RAIL TRANSIT 78-84 (1964). Figures for evening traffic volumes pub-
lished in 1965 indicate that the "approximate number of persons leaving the central
business district per peak hour in an average corridor" were as follows: New York
-above 60,000; Chicago-30,000-40,000; Philadelphia, Boston, and Washington, D.C.
-20,000-30,000; Los Angeles and San Francisco-13,000-20,000. Although approxi-
mate, these figures are probably higher than average, because the evening peak demand
generally exceeds the morning peak and, more significantly, because many of the vehi-
cles and persons counted as crossing the CBD border outbound were passing through
the central business district. See MEYER, supra note 3, at 86-87.
Another rule-of-thumb measure of rail rapid transit viability is the degree of em-
ployment concentration in CBD's. Of total employment in the New York City SMSA,
69.1% of the jobs were located in the central city according to the 1970 census. On the
other hand, central San Francisco employed only 25.2% of the SMSA work force; central
Washington, 27.1%; central Atlanta, 35.3%; and central Boston, 23.1%. See Sagner, The
Impact of the Energy Crisis on American Cities Based on Dispersion of Employment, Utilization of
Transit, and Car Pooling, 8 TRANSP. RESEARCH 307, 308 (Table 1) (1974). This would seem
to explain the perpetual transit deficits in Boston and San Francisco and the foolishness
of constructing fixed rail systems in Atlanta and Washington.
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efficient whenever the traffic volume exceeded 1,500 per hour.
The difficulty with this argument is its failure to cope with the
issue of costs. The latest available figures indicate that a rail
rapid transit line requires a minimum peak-hour load of 12,000
passengers per hour to break even. 186 These figures indicate that
if a new transit line is built in Los Angeles or San Francisco,
virtually one hundred percent of the present traffic along that
corridor would have to switch to rail rapid transit to make the
line economically viable. Even the best run lines may lose money
if traffic volume is insufficient.1
8 7
The land use efficiency of rail rapid transit is thus pur-
chased at a heavy cost because deficits must be funded from
resources that might be devoted to other, equally "worthy" uses.
The staggering level of the costs of rail rapid transit is indicated
by 1973 estimates that the cost of carrying passengers on a rail
rapid transit system was 24.6 cents per passenger mile, while the
same trip by bus would cost 8.6 cents per mile. 188 The private
and public costs of a similar trip by auto were estimated at 26.4
cents per mile. With one occupant, the private cost of driving
was roughly fifty-five percent of the cost of rail transit.
b. Speed
The speed advantage of rail rapid transit also diminishes
upon examination. The Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) in San
Francisco, the newest rapid transit system in the United States,
188 See Lago, United States Subway Requirements 1968-1990: Projections and Benefits, 23
TRAFFIC Q. 71, 80 (1969) ("[M]inimum level for feasibility seems to be the order of
peak-hour passenger volumes at maximum load points of 15,000 persons .... "). But see
Tarpley & Dake, supra note 85, at 255 (in Cleveland, volume of 7,200 per track covers
operating costs and amortization of rolling stock).
187 For example, in 1970 the Chicago Rapid Transit had an average revenue per
passenger (fare) of 47 and an average cost per passenger of 52g. Yet, the Chicago rapid
transit was the most efficiently run system in the country with a cost per car-mile (a
standard measure of efficiency) of $1.23. Boston's Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority
(MBTA), on the other hand, had a cost per car-mile of $3.59 (the highest in the United
States) yet a cost per passenger of only 41,. The difference was passenger volume, with
Chicago generating only 2.05 revenue passengers per car-mile and Boston generating
7.39. See ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 9, at 2-23, 2-24. In all cases, however,
costs exceeded fare levels. See also URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, CHARACTERISITCS OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 2-6
(Table 5) (1974) (1971-72 operating costs for six United States rail rapid transit systems
ranged from $1.01 to $2.79 per car-mile) [hereinafter cited as URBAN TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEMS]. In London the cost of running a bus system is about 1.25 new pence per
passenger-kilometre. See ROAD RESEARCH GROUP, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OPTIMISATION OF Bus OPERATION IN URBAN AREAS 12
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Bus OPTIMISATION].
188J. Reed, Comparison of Urban Travel Economic Costs, Feb., 1973, at A-20.
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was designed to achieve maximum speeds of eighty miles per
hour and operating speeds approximating forty-five miles per
hour. Such speeds, however, are less a function of equipment
than of the distance between stations. BART will attain an aver-
age speed of forty-five miles per hour only because its stations
are spaced an average of 2.3 miles apart. (Because the maximum
rate of acceleration and deceleration that "avoid[s] jerking pas-
sengers about" is four miles per hour per second, the maximum
average speed for a line with stations spaced one mile apart is
thirty-five miles per hour, assuming an in-station stopping time
of twenty seconds.) 189 The Toronto subway, with equipment al-
most as modern as BART's, averages nineteen miles per hour
because its stations are spaced .5 miles apart. 90 London's Vic-
toria Line, built in the 1960's, averages 24.2 miles per hour with
stations spaced an average of .87 miles apart. 19 '
The dilemma, then, is clear. To attain a speed level that will
give mass transit a clear advantage over automobile commuting,
proximity of stations to trip destinations must be sacrificed. Be-
cause there are only four BART stops in downtown San Fran-
cisco, the BART rider may have to change vehicles after leaving
BART, destroying BART's time advantage. At the other end of
the line, the distance between stations means that the feeder-haul
portion of the trip must be longer, again limiting if not eliminat-
ing the time advantage.' 92 Even if faster line-haul speeds could
be achieved, findings generated by a mathematical model, which
simulates the demand for transit service for work trips, indicate
that such trips exhibit twice the elasticity with respect to time on
access facilities (-.709) than on line-haul facilities (-.39).193 Riders
to work would rather have faster feeder service than fast line-
haul service, exactly the opposite of what they are being offered
by the Act.'
94
189 See Rae, supra note 81, at 87. See also URBAN TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, supra note
187, at 2-2.
190 Roess, supra note 125, at 94 (Table 1).
191 See Smith, An Economic Comparison of Urban Railways and Express Bus Services, 7 J.
TRANSP. EcoN. & Poucy 20 (1973).
192 Id. 30.
One study indicates that in a typical bus trip, in-motion time consumes only 41% of
trip time. R. BUEL,supra note 101, at 185. See also Bus OPTIMISATION,supra note 187, at 12.
193 See G. Kraft & T. Domencich, supra note 85, at 10-11.
194 One apparent way out of this difficulty is to provide parking facilities at mass
transit stations so that the auto commuter will provide his own feeder service. BART
plans to make available a total of 35,000 spaces for its park-and-ride program. Park-and-
ride facilities have been provided at many outlying rail rapid-transit stations with mixed
results. See Bailey & Dimitriou, The Commuter and "Park and Ride", 26 TRAFFiC Q. 561, 562
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c. Labor Savings
Rail rapid transit is considered the most promising means by
which public transportation systems can control their burgeon-
ing labor costs. Although the total number of employees de-
clined from 242,000 in 1945 to 138,420 in 1972, the industry
wage bill more than doubled in the same period, with the aver-
age annual wage increasing from $2,612 to $10,515. The indus-
try has been plagued by low productivity and "feather-bed-
ding.' 195 One can understand why an employer in this situation
would favor a more capital-intensive technology.
The prospective labor savings offered by rail rapid transit
may, however, prove illusory. A recent study of rail rapid transit
systems in six European cities reveals a median value of 6.8 staff
per car in peak service as against a median of 3.8 for eleven bus
systems.' 96 Even if rail rapid transit is the more efficient con-
sumer of labor, as states the conventional wisdom, the labor-
saving technology that will lead to the savings has yet to be
developed. The failure of the system developed for BART is
common knowledge. Even if the hardware did exist, the labor
savings would not occur immediately because section 13(c) of the
Act provides that "fair and equitable arrangements" to protect
employees affected by an UMTA grant shall be a condition of
assistance.' 97 This provision has worked to increase labor costs.
(1972). One of the reasons park-and-ride facilities frequently fail to live up to expecta-
tions is that a substantial part of commuting costs are incurred in the drive to the station.
See Meyer, supra note 4, at 44. Moreover, "transit riders who drive to and park at transit
stations would prefer to drive all the way to Boston if parking were inexpensive and
readily available." Mass Transportation Commission Staff, Mass Transportation in
Massachusetts, in URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSPORTATION, 1-2 URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ABSTRACTS 74 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as ABSTRACTS].
"95 The MBTA in Boston presents perhaps the classic case of the industry's labor
troubles. MBTA employees belong to 27 unions, each with an exclusive jurisdiction. An
example of the kind of fractionalization that can result is the "white line rule" which
prohibits a bus driver from taking his vehicle past a white line in the repair yard. From
there on, the task of moving the vehicle becomes the job of various maintenance person-
nel who apparently spend up to 20% of their time moving vehicles. See Boston Globe,
Feb. 25, 1973, at 49, col. 4.
Another example is the collective bargaining agreement between the Transport
Workers Union and the.New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority in 1972 which
provided, inter alia, for retirement at half pay after 20 years. In addition to its direct
financial cost, this provision has caused a "crippling depletion of experienced personnel."
Beggs, Introduction to Urban Transportation Needs, in URBAN TRANSPORTATION NEEDS 10
(1972). See N.Y. Times, July 27, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
196 See Smith, supra note 191, at 23.
197 Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, § 13(c), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1609(c) (Supp.
Feb. 1975) provides:
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As part of its "fair and equitable arrangement," employees of
transit systems whose jobs were eliminated by San Francisco's
BART system had to be hired by BART at their existing salaries,
which were above those of BART employees doing similar work.
The union demanded that all BART employees' salaries be
raised to the higher level. When BART refused, 1,100 of the
1,375 BART employees struck. 198
d. Diversion of Automobile Traffic
The available data confirm that new rail rapid transit
facilities are unlikely to make significant inroads in the number
of automobile commuters.' 99 In the cases of the Yonge Street
subway in Toronto and the Congress Street Rapid Transit Line
in Chicago, both built in the 1950's, over eighty-five percent of
the patronage came from existing mass transit patrons. 20 0 The
most recent data on the impact of the Yonge Street subway indi-
cate an average increase of one percent per year in the number
of vehicles entering the downtown area during the morning
peak between 1955 and 1970.201 The project to extend Boston's
It shall be a condition of any assistance under this chapter that fair and equitable
arrangements are made, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, to protect the
interests of employees affected by such assistance. Such protective arrangements
shall include, without being limited to, such provisions as may be necessary for
(1) the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits (including continuation of
pension rights and benefits) under existing collective bargaining agreements or
otherwise; (2) the continuation of collective bargaining rights; (3) the protection
of individual employees against a worsening of their positions with respect to
their employment; (4) assurances of employment to employees of acquired mass
transportation systems and priority of reemployment of employees terminated
or laid off; and (5) paid training or retraining programs. Such arrangements
shall include provisions protecting individual employees against a worsening of
their positions with respect to their employment which shall in no event provide
benefits less than those established pursuant to section 5(2)(f) of this title. The
contract for the granting of any such assistance shall specify the terms and
conditions of the protective arrangements.
The Secretary's determination as to what is "fair and equitable" is not judicially review-
able. See Kendler v. Wirtz, 388 F.2d 381, 383 (3d Cir. 1968).
There is an obvious contradiction between § 13(c) and the theory of the capital grant
form of assistance to local transit systems, one of whose attractive features was supposed
to be an avoidance of "featherbedding" and "outrageous wage claims." Tye, Economics of
Urban Transit Capital Grants, in PRICE-SuBSIDY ISSUES, supra note 62, at 30, 32.
198 N.Y. Times, July 18, 1973, at 74, col. 1. The strike is an extremely formidable
weapon in the hands of transit employees. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1973, § 1, at 19,
col. I (effect on Christmas shopping "catastrophic").
199 Projections of the impact of a $58 billion investment in mass transit between
1972 and 1990 concede that there would not be "a significant diversion from auto-
mobile travel." STUDY, supra note 175, at 1-4.
200 SeeMEYER, supra note 3, at 79. See also J. RAE, supra note 74, at 88.
201 See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, COORDINATION OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND
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Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA) to Quincy and
Braintree, which cost $111 million, is estimated to have diverted
under 1000 vehicles per day from parallel roadways (particularly
the Southeast Expressway, which carries over 100,000 vehicles
per day).20 2 The 1968-1969 extension of Cleveland's rapid
transit system to the airport has reduced the automobile volume
at peak hours on the downtown end of the parallel expressway
by "at most ... 125 vehicles per lane per hour. '20 3 This reduc-
tion of less than ten percent of the traffic volume permits an
estimated saving of no more than thirty seconds per trip. Sur-
veys taken after the opening of the trans-bay tunnel in San Fran-
cisco indicate that BART has had at most a negligible effect on
auto commuting into the city.
20 4
The only evidence of a decline in auto traffic accompanied
construction of the Lindenwold Line between Philadelphia and
southern New Jersey, which operates parallel to the Ben Frank-
lin Bridge. Since the line came into operation in February, 1969,
peak hour traffic volumes on the bridge have declined about six
percent. In 1969, an average of 13,446 vehicles crossed the
Bridge into Philadelphia during the morning rush hour; in 1972
the average was down to 12,765.205
2. The Argument for Rail Rapid Transit Rebutted
Assuming that new or revitalized rapid transit systems cause
some auto commuters to switch to mass transit, what is the
THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES 116 (1974). A similar
result obtained in Montreal where the Metro resulted in "no appreciable difference in
private car trips to downtown." The net effect of the Metro was to enable more people to
enter the downtown at the peak. Id. 126.
202 Remarks of George Hilton, Former Chairman of Task Force on Transportation
Policy, on "The Advocates," Jan. 25, 1973 (Transcript at 13); AAA Newsletter, Summer,
1973, at 8. See also METROPOLITAN AREA PLANNING COUNCIL, supra note 185 at VI-1: "The
major conclusion ... is that the transit extension has neither reduced total inbound ADT
nor has it reversed the trend of increasing peak hour volumes. However, the traffic
surveys indicate that the new transit extension has reduced the peak hour volume rate of
increase." As the above suggests, the number of cars entering Boston from the extension
service area increased following the opening of the extension. See id. VI-7. See also
Governor Francis W. Sargent, Policy Statement on Transportation in the Boston Region,
Nov. 30, 1972.
203 Wohl, Analysis and Evaluation of the Rapid Transit Extension to Cleveland's Airport, in
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AND PASSENGER CHARACTERISTICS 12, 21 (Highway Research
Record No. 471, 1972).
204 Trouble in Mass Transit, 40 CONSUMER REPORTS 190, 191 (1975); see U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSPORTATION, CARPOOL INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES 29 (1975) (vehicular traffic
across bridge reduced 6%).
205 Allen, The Ipact of the Philadelphia-Lindenwold Rapid Transit Line on Automobile
Traffic, 28 TRAFFIC Q. 21, 29 (1974). The author goes on to make the somewhat Parkin-
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measure of success? The champions of rail rapid transit agree
that the answer lies in a rough cost-benefit analysis. 20 6 Their
most formidable argument for rail rapid transit is the higher cost
of the alternatives. The Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning
Commission estimated in 1959 that by 1970, without changes in
the public transit system, Atlanta would need 120 lanes of ex-
pressway capacity and twenty-eight lanes of downtown connector
capacity. Construction of this capacity would decimate Atlanta.
Moreover, in 1960 the cost per lane per mile was one million
dollars, or $120 million per mile for the expressway lanes alone.
It was easy to conclude that a 64.9 mile rail-based rapid transit
system, at a cost estimated at $421 million in 1967 prices, was a
bargain.
2 0 7
It was estimated that San Francisco would need forty addi-
tional lanes of freeways and 36,000 additional downtown park-
ing spaces without BART. The estimated cost of construction of
these facilities was easily twice the cost of BART. The State
Highway Department stated that even if funds were available, it
could not build highways fast enough "to take care of the grow-
ing needs of the district." And one of the attractions of the
Lindenwold line is that "[w]ith the ultimate capacity equal to
more than two four-lane expressways the Lindenwold line cost
only one-quarter as much. ' '20 8 The 1963 Hearings that led to the
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 are replete with similar
stories of cities threatened with being paved over at astronomical
cost.
2 0 9
On a more sophisticated plane are the "social cost" or "ex-
ternality" arguments, ranging from general comparisons of the
number of automobile fatalities with the number for rapid
sonian argument, see note 194 supra, that the true measure of diversion is the number of,
park-and-ride passengers (4,776) currently using the line.
206 E.g., Governor Francis W. Sargent, Policy Statement on Transportation in the
Boston Region, Nov. 30, 1972, at 16: "Throughout the region, transit investments which
extend existing lines to the perimeter of the high density zone and to connections with
major highways appear to be exceptionally cost effective in terms of the transit service
they provide to the residents of the region and their effect on auto mommutation to the
core." See Address by President Ford to the Sixth International Conference on Urban
Transportation, Sept. 8-10, 1974, in OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS: MARKETING URBAN
RENAISSANCE 41, 44 (1974) ("Investments in local mass transit systems must have reason-
able cost to benefit ratios or relationships."); UMTA Notice of Proposed Policy, 40 Fed.
Reg. 32546 (1975).207 See Tarpley & Dake, supra note 85, at 257.
208 Klauder, The Lindenwold Line, 25 TRAFFIC Q. 323, 334 (1971).
209 For a cost-benefit analysis of a "free transit" proposal in which the "benefits"
consist primarily of foregone investment in highway capacity and "time savings," see
Baum, Free Public Transport, 7 J. TRANsP. EcoN. & PouCY 3, 15 (1973).
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transit to the kind of examination made in Part III of this
Article.210 Such arguments reach their zenith in the "congestion
costs" thesis. 21I By reducing congestion, the time consumed in
remaining trips is decreased; by multiplying the time saving on
each trip by some assumed time value (in dollars), one can arrive
at a figure representing the "savings" or "benefit" of a given
transportation investment.21 2 This formula was used to extend
the interstate highway system into the heart of most of our major
cities.
213
Should these arguments fail to persuade, the rail transit
proponent can fall back on the two-pronged subsidy argument.
The initial argument is that society has long subsidized the au-
tomobile user, especially in the Interstate Highway Program, and
that equity now requires that mass transportation be
subsidized.21 4 Whether this argument is logically valid or not, its
factual premises are incorrect. Highways are almost universally
financed by user charges in the form of license fees, gasoline
taxes, and so forth. Most of those who have studied the matter
have concluded that the urban highway user generates revenues
that are at least sufficient to cover the costs of construction and
maintenance of the roads he uses. 215 The situation with regard
to local street costs provides more support for the subsidy argu-
ment; but local streets are necessary to provide abutting prop-
erty with essential fire, police, and sanitation services, so it can be
argued that the cost should be at least partially if not totally
210 Text accompanying notes 88-127 supra.
211 See text accompanying note 121 supra.
22 See MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, 1972 AUTOMOBILE FACTS AND
FIGURES 54; OECD, supra note 126, at 17; TRAFFIC IN TOWNS, supra note 84, at 14-16; see
also Abelson, Quantification of Road User Costs, 7 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POLICY 80, 93 (1973).
213 See note 121 supra & accompanying text.
For the theory applied to rail rapid transit, see E. Roszner et al., The Impact of
Rapid Transit, July, 1971, summarized in ABSTRACTS, supra note 194, at 396; C. Russell,
The Changing Environment of the Transit Industry (Harvard Business School 1969);
Dajani & Egan, Income Distribution Effects of the Atlanta Transit System, in TRANSPORTATION
FOR THE POOR, supra note 8, at 35. Fifty percent of the net operating benefits of London's
Victoria Line "were attributed to reductions in congestion costs." J. THOMSON, supra note
76, at 85 (citing Foster & Beesley).
214 See, e.g., statement of Senator Percy, Hearings on Emergency Mass Transit Legislation
Before the Subcomm. On Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1972): "For years Congress has pumped
billions of dollars into highway construction while starving our mass transit systems."
2" See MEYER, supra note 3, at 62, 68. The exceptions are urban highway users who
"as a whole have been paying more than the costs of the facilities they use ...." Id. But
see L. FITCH, supra note 84, at 266 (Table IV-3) (indicating incremental highway costs
represent substantial subsidy to peak hour auto commuter).
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borne by the benefited property. 216 Moreover, it appears that
"urban vehicles as a group actually may pay more in user taxes
than all urban highway costs, including those for local streets.
217
The subsidy argument acquires some validity with regard to
peak hour use of urban freeway and arterial facilities.21 8 One of
the principal difficulties in analyzing this issue is in determining
a definition of highway design capacity, because the analysis
turns on a distinction between the capacity required for off-peak
and the capacity required for peak demand. Under either of the
two most plausible definitions of congestion,21 9 it appears that
there is a subsidy element with regard to "very-high-cost urban
expressways." But because the journey to work generally in-
volves use of these highways and "over-priced" portions of the
system (local streets), the subsidy element is probably de minimis.
The second part of the subsidy argument states that urban
mass transportation should be viewed as a public service, like
police and fire protection. 22 0 The reasoning behind this position
is not altogether clear, although much of the argument revolves
around the "transportation disadvantaged." In fact, however, re-
cent developments in the extension or construction of rapid
transit systems seem designed primarily to serve middle or
upper middle class commuters, not the transportation
disadvantaged. 22' To the extent that such projects represent a
210 See MEYER, supra note 3, at 68.
2 17 Id. 69.
2 18 See L. FITCH, supra note 84, at 265 (Table IV-2) (marginal social cost of peak hour
use of urban freeway has been estimated to exceed 1 1Ie per vehicle-mile versus 1t per
vehicle-mile paid in gasoline taxes); Walters, The Theory and Measurement of Private and
Social Cost of Highway Congestion, 29 ECONOMETRICA 676, 677, 693 (1961) (taxes on urban
roads should be increased by 4-8% a mile during off-peak periods and 10-15 a mile
during peak periods if marginal private cost is to be equated with marginal social cost).
219 See MEYER, supra note 3, at 69.
220 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1974, § 4, at 4, col. 4; Workshop No. 11, Confer-
ence on Transportation and Human Needs in the 70's (Am. U.), June 19, 1972, at 140
("The group concluded that it was a shiboleth that a transit system should be self-
supporting, and that transportation services must be subsidized by government in the
same manner as water and sewage."); Cooper, Prospects for a Mass Movement to Public
Transit, 5 URBAN LAW. 679, 693-702 (1973) (summarizing and criticizing proposals); U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 13, 1972, at 75 ("People have to start thinking of transit as
a public service-like the fire or police department-instead of a profit-making busi-
ness.") (quoting Carlos Villarreal, UMTA Administrator).
A related argument is that the benefits of mass transit reach a public larger than its
users and the users should not be forced to bear the entire financial burden. See Batchel-
der, Land Use Transportation Controls for Air Quality, 6 URBAN LAW. 235, 274 n.166 (1974).
221 The newly created BART will move suburbanites into the CBD. Transcript, 1st
Sess., supra note 35, at 42 (remarks of Floyd). The same is true of the Washington, D.C.,
rapid transit system now under construction. It is estimated that it will carry 57% of the
residents of Montgomery County who commute to jobs in Washington but only 21% of
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subsidization of the middle class they are regressive in their in-
come redistribution effects and the poor would be better off if
such expenditures were reduced.
222
The relationship between the "transportation disadvan-
taged" and rail rapid transit is one of the ironies of the federal
program. In establishing its funding priorities UMTA noted that
urban areas with populations of under 250,000 are not ordinarly
faced with automobile-related problems; nor are they likely can-
didates for mass transit technologies.22 3 The urban transporta-
tion problem in urban areas under 250,000 is, therefore, the
problem of the transportation disadvantaged. In urban areas of
one million or more, where the primary objective is the diversion
of the automobile commuter, the goal of improving the lot of the
transportation disadvantaged became "an objective to be met
through the accomplishment" of the primary objective. When it
became apparent that the solution adopted for solving the auto
commuting problem-rail rapid transit-was in fact working
counter to the interests of the transportation disadvantaged, the
Act was amended in 1970 to recognize "the national policy that
elderly and handicapped persons have the same right as other
persons to utilize mass transportation facilities and services. "224
This policy accounts for the rather strange definition of "handi-
capped" discussed earlier-that to be transportation handicap-
ped is to be handicapped in the use of existing mass trans-
portation.
22 5
the Washington residents employed in Montgomery County. See S. Myers, supra note 57,
at 5.
The rapid transit line that runs from Skokie, Illinois, to downtown Chicago "serves a
ridership consisting of households 86 percent of which own a car and 33 percent of
which own two cars." R. BUEL, supra note 101, at 150. During the first two years of
service, costs (including interest) exceeded revenues by $485,000, or 14 per trip. M.
Wohl, supra note 10, at 19. At that time (1967), the median family income for Skokie
passengers was $12,900, compared with $7,342 (1960 census) for the Chicago SMSA.
Id. 21.
The UMTA-funded 1971 extension of Boston's rapid transit system provided service
for passengers whose mean income level was $14,000. See METROPOLITAN AREA PLANNING
COUNCIL, supra note 185, at V-48.
222 Transcript, 2d Sess., supra note 36, at 54 (remarks of Kain); see also R. BURCO,
URBAN PUBLIC TRANSPORT: SERVICE INNOVATIONS IN OPERATIONS, PLANNING AND
TECHNOLOGY 1-5 (1972). For a summary of the arguments for subsidies, see Frankena,
Income Distribution Effects of Urban Transit Subsidies, 7 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POLICY 215
(1973). Professor Frankena concluded that in Canada "the evidence does not support the
popular impression that in general subsidization of urban public transit contributes to the
well-being of low-income groups." Id. 227.
223 MANUAL, supra note 6, at IIB-17.
224 Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1612(a) (1970).
225 See text accompanying notes 27 & 32 supra.
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This criticism does not deny that the handicapped are
transportation disadvantaged; the handicapped encounter grave
difficulties in attempting to use public transportation. 26 A sys-
tematic cataloging of these difficulties would indicate the kinds
of changes needed to make public transportation more accessible
to the handicapped. Fare collection points ought to be dispersed
so that fares are collected while waiting for a vehicle, during the
trip, or afterward. Turnstiles should be replaced with gates and
shelters provided at bus stops. Rushing for trains and buses,
which occasions many of the fears of the handicapped in their
use of transit, could be reduced if accurate arrival and departure
schedules were available. Because handicaps affect passengers
throughout their trip, the entire system needs to be modified if
the handicapped rider is to benefit. One who cannot walk long
distances (about sixteen percent of the handicapped) cannot
usually climb stairs, wait in line, or move rapidly. To remove the
principal physical barriers to the use of mass transit facilities by
the handicapped would involve capital expenditures of nearly
one billion dollars.
227
Who would benefit from this expenditure? In our earlier
discussion we noted that thirty-eight percent of the handi-
capped, approximately five million persons, live in "transit-
oriented" urban areas. Even if an area is transit-oriented,
however, an individual desiring to ride may not have transit
available. (Availability is generally understood to be the loca-
226 In a survey of elderly passengers on the New York City subway system, 54% of
those interviewed agreed with the statement that "it is dangerous to ride the subway
because the doors close too fast." Nahemow, Shuman & Kogan, Findings From a Study of
Participants in a Reduced Fare Program, in TRANSPORTATION AND AGING, supra note 13, at
42, 47. In a San Antonio survey the most common complaint was infrequency of service,
which resulted in long periods of standing at bus stops. See Carp, Public Transit and
Retired People, in id. 82, 85. See generally TRAVEL BARRIERS, supra note 27, at 41.
227 The total cost of $990 million is made up of (1) $5000 per bus for 50,000 existing
buses, (2) $.8 million per existing transit stop for 800 stops, (3) $.5 million per stop in
new systems for 200 stops. UMTA, supra note 12, at 16. These estimates may even be far
too low. William Ronan, Chairman of the Metropolitan Transit Authority in New York,
projected a minimum capital cost of a billion dollars to equip the subway system with
elevators at every station. See Ronan, Transit System Planning and Management for
Transit Dependent Groups, Conference on Transportation and Human Needs in the
70's (Am. U.), June 20, 1972, at 158, 164. BART stations are equipped with self-service
elevators from street to train platform. Restrooms have been designed to accommodate
wheelchairs. Stairs at stations have handrails that extend 18 inches beyond the top and
bottom steps. Wilson, The Elderly and Handicapped on The San Francisco Bay Area Rapid
Transit System, in TRANSPORTATION AND AGING, supra note 13, at 159, 161. The Federal-
Aid Highway Act of 1973 requires that transit vehicles financed under its provisions be
equipped for effective utilization by the elderly and the handicapped. 23 U.S.C. § 142
(Supp. III, 1973).
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tion of a transit stop within two blocks of the point of origin
or destination.) Of the five million handicapped in transit-ori-
ented areas, 700,000 live within two blocks of a transit stop
but cannot use transit because of their handicap.
228
The relevant issue with regard to the handicapped and the
transportation disadvantaged in general is therefore not how
mass transit can be modified to meet their needs but rather what
their transportation needs are. Our analysis of the latter point
led us to conclude that they need public transit, not mass transit,
and that adequate public transit may be expeditiously provided
by modification of the existing system of taxicabs. Despite the
admonition of section 3(e) of the Act that assistance should not
be given to public transit bodies that compete with private transit
companies, a recently published study indicates that reduction in
the number of taxicab businesses and employees may be corre-
lated with UMTA grants.229 The existing federal program seems
therefore to operate against, rather than in favor of, the trans-
portation disadvantaged.
The available data seem to buttress the conclusion that de-
voting billions of dollars to the improvement of rail rapid transit
is unlikely to lead to a significant diversion of work trips from
automobile to mass transportation. 230 The issue is not how rail
rapid transit can be used to divert automobile commuters but
how automobile commuters can be persuaded to leave their cars
at home. This requires an exploration of why commuters drive
to work. The crucial question is why, given a choice between the
automobile and public transportation, the commuter invariably
chooses the automobile. It is submitted that this problem cannot
be solved simply by examining and attempting to cure the afflic-
tions of mass transit, because those afflictions are the result, not
the cause, of increased automobile commuting. As early as 1918
mass transit began to reflect the characteristics of a dying
industry.23' The decline in total revenue passengers on all forms
228 Text accompanying note 29 supra; UMTA, supra note 12, at 16.
229 See Black, The Impact of Transit Subsidy on the Taxi Industry, 28 TRAFFIC Q. 619, 628
(1974). Section 3(e) is a weak shield for the affected private competitor because he has no
standing to challenge a grant and even if he did, the Secretary's determinations would
probably stand, see South Suburban Safeway Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 416 F.2d 535,
539-40 (7th Cir. 1969).
230 See generally text accompanying notes 200-205 supra.
21 Eckert & Hilton, The Jitneys, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 293 (1972). See also HEATHINGTON &
Scor, PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IN URBAN AREAS 3,4 (Transp. Research Bd. Special Rep.
No. 144, 1974). Six years after it embarked on its massive aid program, Congress finally
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of public transportation from 18.98 billion in 1945 to 5.27 billion
in 1972 correlates almost perfectly with the rise in automobile
ownership. 232 Before an intelligent program can be fashioned to
remedy and to prevent the damage inflicted upon our cities by
automobile commuting, one must understand why commuters
drive.
V. WHY COMMUTERS DRIVE
The most thorough study on why individuals prefer au-
tomobiles to public transit was published in 1969 by Paine, Nash,
Hille, and Brunner.233 In surveys of consumer attitudes con-
ducted in Baltimore and Philadelphia, the authors found that
respondents considered the following factors important deter-
minants of mode choice for work trips: First place was given to
what the authors term "reliability of destination achievement,"
which incorporates a stated preference for safe arrival. 234 Private
auto travel was considered as safe as public transit despite statis-
tical evidence to the contrary.235 The faulty perception is most
likely explained by the degree of control exercised over the
recognized that the sad state of mass transit was an effect of increased access to au-
tomobiles. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1264, supra note 143, at 3.
232
Transit Revenue
Auto Passengers
Year Registrations (millions)
1945 25,694,926 18,981.9
1950 40,190,632 13,845.0
1955 51,960,532 9,189.0
1960 61,430,862 7,521.0
1965 74,903,163 6,798.0
1970 88,762,304 5,931.7
Sources: MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION, 1973-74 AUTOMOBILE FACTS
AND FIGURES 16; '72273 TRANSIT FACT BOOK 8 (Table 6). The negative correlation be-
tween automobile ownership and the use of public transit is a widespread phenomenon.
In Gothenberg, Sweden, for example, the ratio of population to private cars decreased
dramatically from 40 in 1950 to 18 in 1955, to 7 in 1960, to 4.6 in 1965, and thence to 3.6
in 1970. At the same time, the drop in the ratio of public transit journeys to population
went from a highpoint of 334 in 1950 to 296 in 1955, 239 in 1960, 219 in 1965, and 192
in 1970. See HUD BRIEF, supra note 80, at 24. Similar correlations are reported for
London and Madrid in U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 201, at 31, 40.
233 Paine, et al., Consumer Attitudes Toward Auto Versus Public Transport Alternatives, 53
J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 472 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Paine]. See also Quarmby, Choice
of Travel Mode for the Journey to Work, 1 J. TRANSP. ECON. & PoLICY 273 (1967).
234 Paine, supra note 233, incorporates a preference for "on-time" arrival, a factor
given pride of place in other surveys, e.g., Golob, supra note 26, at 91, into the second
category, travel time, see text accompanying notes 246-47 infra.
23
5 See PASSENGER PSYCHOLOGICAL DYNAMICS, supra note 108, at 6. But cf. Boston
Globe, Aug. 2, 1974, at 39, col. 1.
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transit mode.136 The safety of transit passengers is in the hands
of third parties, while a substantial portion of the risk of acci-
dents in automobile travel is a function of the driver's skill and
the condition of his vehicle. Although buses or subway trains
may be considered safer on the average, the perceived risk in
any one case from the passenger's point of view may be mag-
nified by the unknown condition of the vehicle and skill of the
driver. In such circumstances it may be "safer" to rely on one's
own abilities. Moreover, if one considers oneself a "good driver,"
the universal accident statistics can be implicitly dismissed as ir-
relevant. Finally, even if one knows that transit vehicles are
"safer," the absolute incidence of accidents and fatalities in cars
for any one individual is so small as to be discounted as de
minimis. 23 7 Thus in a category in which transit enjoys an advan-
tage, namely safety, that advantage is lost because of the "faulty"
perception of the commuter.
Paine found that the second most important consideration
in work trip modal choice was travel time.2 38 Consumers per-
ceived a significant difference between the alternative transit sys-
tems, with ninety percent satisfied with automobile travel time
but only sixty to seventy percent satisfied with public transit
travel time.239 Although rated second in overall importance,
travel time is in fact the key determinant of modal choice.240
This finding-confirmed by recent studies in Boston, Chicago,
San Francisco, and Leeds, U.K.,241 as well as in several German
cities 242 --bodes ill for mass transit in its efforts to lure au-
tomobile commuters. Because mass transit cannot provide door-
to-door service and almost always involves waiting and changes
of vehicle, it will rarely if ever be able to achieve a time advan-
tage over the automobile.
Even if technology could afford mass transit such an advan-
tage, the advantage might not weigh heavily with commuters
236 See Baum, supra note 209, at 11.
237 See PASSENGER PSYCHOLOGICAL DYNAMICS, supra note 108, at 7.
238 Paine, supra note 233, at 476.
239 Id. 474.
40 See Wallin & Wright, Factors Which Influence Model Choice, 28 TRAFFIC Q. 271, 276
(1974); Bailey & Dimitriou, supra note 194, at 565; PASSENGER PSYCHOLOGICAL DYNAMICS,
supra note 108, at 14. See also McDonough, The Demand for Commuter Rail Transport, 7 J.
TRANSP. ECON. & POLICY 134, 142 (1973); G. Kraft & T. Domencich, supra note 93, at 11
(Table 2).
241 See McGillivray, supra note 23, at 847 (in cost-time model, time always the
"stronger" variable).
242 See Baum, supra note 209, at 1I.
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because of "qualitative" differences in time. Transit planners
generally assume that commuters perceive "out-of-vehicle" time
as longer in duration than "in-motion" time. The latest figures
indicate that time spent waiting and interchanging vehicles is
valued at two to three times time spent in the vehicle.243
Next in importance in the Paine study was the "weather
factor," which was divided into two points: "vehicle unaffected
by weather" and "protected from weather while waiting." On the
latter point, as might be expected, the automobile enjoyed an
overwhelming preference. Transit planners have generally as-
sumed that the advantage is lost in a "trade-off" against the
relative imperviousness of public transit to weather conditions;
but consumers in fact also gave the automobile a higher rating
on the "vehicle unaffected by weather" criterion.244
Cost appeared as a surprisingly low fourth on the list of
importance in modal choices. 245 More surprisingly, consumers
saw auto travel for work trips as significantly less expensive than
public transit. 246 This perception can probably be explained by
the average consumer's failure to take depreciation into account
as a cost. In a government study of the costs of owning and oper-
ating an automobile, depreciation was the single greatest cost.
247
243 Quarmby, supra note 233, at 280, 292; PASSENGER PSYCHOLGOCIAL DYNAMICS,
supra note 108, at 21; Transcript, 3d Sess., supra note 45, at 5 (remarks of Domencich);
Navin, Urban Transit Ridership in an Energy Supply Shortage, 8 TRANSP. RESEARCH
317, 318 (1974). See also Vickrey, Pricing, Metering, and Efficiently Using Urban Transporta-
tion Facilities, in PRICE-SUBSIDY ISSUES, supra note 62, at 36. There are no studies indicat-
ing what increments of time are significant.
244 Paine, supra note 233, at 477.
245 Id. Another study indicated that, of the 28 factors found to affect modal choice,
cost ranked nineteenth. Lisco, Value of Commuters' Travel Time: A Study in Urban
Transportation, in ECONOMIC FACTORS INFLUENCING ENGINEERING DECISIONS 36 (Highway
Research Record No. 245, 1968). In fact, survey data indicate that 72% of auto commut-
ers "never bother to estimate what it costs to drive to work." See Lansing & Hendricks,
How People Perceive the Cost of the Journey to Work, in PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION 44, 45
(Highway Research Record No. 197, 1967). But see Inglis, A Multimodal Logit Model of
Modal Split for a Short Access Trip, in TRAVEL BEHAVIOR 12 (Highway Research Record No.
446, 1973) (commuters equate significance of travel cost and travel time).
246 Paine, supra note 233 at 477. But see Lansing & Hendricks, supra note 245, at 55:
"Because people in general overestimate the cost of gas and oil for driving to work, it is
not surprising that they tend to think of the automobile as the more expensive mode of
travel."
The reason one may well be shocked is that recent studies by the Federal High-
way Administration indicate that the average cost per mile for operating an auto-
mobile was 13 .6j for a standard sized vehicle, 10.8e for a compact, and 9.4e for a
subcompact. These costs do not include parking fees. No public transit system charges
a fare even close to these figures for an average work trip.
247 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, COST OF OPERATING AN AUTOMOBILE 5 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as COST OF OPERATING AN AUTOMOBIIIE]. There is some evidence that
rates of depreciation are accelerating. See R. BUEL, supra note 101, at 24-25.
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The urban transit consumer normally dismisses this cost
out-of-hand,248 on the theory that because he needs his au-
tomobile for personal use, the only relevant costs of his work trip
are the variable costs directly attributable to the trip, such as
gasoline, tolls, and parking. 249 These do not usually total more
than 25% of total trip costs of a reasonably new car.2 50 The
relative insensitivity of drivers to the cost differences between
mass transit and automobiles has been established in several
studies.
25 1
248 Survey data indicate that only one third of respondents include depreciation in
their cost estimates of the journey to work. Lansing & Hendricks, supra note 245, at 47.
See also L. FITCH, supra note 84, at 128.
249 See Paine, supra note 233, at 477; Lansing & Hendricks, supra note 245, at 48. The
latter indicate that this is "appropriate" because, inter alia, "the journey to work accounts
for only a quarter to a third of the annual mileage on cars." Id. 49.
250 L. FITCH, supra note 84, at 128; see also Segelhorst & Kirkus, Parking Bias in Transit
Choice, 7 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POUCY 58, 59 (1973). The FHWA figures indicate the
variable cost component of the total cost per mile of a standard size vehicle at 28%, of a
compact vehicle at 33%, and of a subcompact at 34%. See COST OF OPERATING AN
AUTOMOBILE, supra note 247, at 5.
For data and analysis indicating that gasoline prices have little effect on comsump-
tion, see Hooper & Mullen, The Effect of Increased Fuel Prices on Car Travel, 15 TRAFFIC
ENG'R & CONTROL 728 (1974); Orski, supra note 94, at 249. For data and analysis indicat-
ing that the relationship between gasoline prices and consumption is unity, see J.
THOISON, supra note 76, at 91-92. What the data do not reveal, however, is the effect of
gasoline price increases on work trips.
Parking fees are almost equal to vehicle operating costs but are involved in only 8%
of automobile journeys to work in metropolitan areas. Lansing & Hendricks, supra note
245, at 49.
251 One leading study analyzes "the kinds of price changes that would be required to
induce shifts from automobile commuting to public transportation .... " Moses & Wil-
liamson, Value of Tine, Choice of Mode and the Subsidy Issue in Urban Transportation, 71 J.
POL. ECONOMY 247, 259 (1963). Based upon interviews of commuters from the Chicago
area conducted by the Cook County Highway Department, the authors constructed a
table of diversion prices. Ignoring disutilities, the authors found that an increase in the
cost of automobile commuting of ten cents per trip would divert 7% of the auto commut-
ers who had the alternative of commuting by mass transit. Thereafter they plotted the
following diversion prices: up twenty cents, 14%; thirty cents, 23%; forty cents, 33%; fifty
cents, 43%; sixty cents, 54%. Id. 260 (Table 1). That there is a price at which even the
most tenacious driver will be diverted will be considered at note 282 infra. Moses and
Williamson also calculated the diversion effects of reducing transit fares. These figures
are more surprising. If a transit fare of thirty cents were reduced to zero it would divert
13% of those for whom the bus and streetcar are alternatives and 18% of those for whom
the el-subway is the alternative. More substantial diversions would require negative
prices. Id. 261 (Table 2). The authors caution that the figures may overestimate potential
diversion because they do not take into account disutilities and assume one passenger per
automobile. Id. 262.
Other studies have indicated a general price elasticity for transit of -. 20. Price
elasticities ranged from a low of -. 08 in Baltimore to a high of -. 30 in Chicago. See
Charles River Associates, Inc., An Evaluation of Free Transit Service, 1968, quoted in J.
THOMSON, supra note 76, at 98.
Similar price elasticities are found in Europe. In a study of eight German cities, price
elasticities ranged from a low of -0.015 in Hanover to -0.41 in Hamburg. See Baum,
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Finally, the Paine study identified a number of items as
"disutilities" of mass transit, which are difficult, if not impossible,
to quantify.252 Because there is no data indicating the extent to
which these disutilities outweigh any cost or time advantages
enjoyed by mass transit, they are the great unknowns of the
urban transportation problem. The condition of the vehicle and
its effect on the riders' comfort is one of the most important
disutilities.
25 3
Paine also identified a stated consumer preference for
avoiding "riding with strangers" and "unfamiliar areas." The
desire to avoid "riding with strangers" may be a particularly
formidable barrier for mass transit to overcome. The desire to
live in a "nice" neighborhood and to send one's children to
schools with other "nice" children are commonplace
phenomena; the same prejudices inform choices of transporta-
tion mode. The desire to isolate oneself from a cross-section of
the community is thus not a surprising component of individu-
als' aversion to public transit. The aversion to riding with stran-
gers may also flow in part from occasional, but sensational, re-
ports of criminal activity on public transit vehicles. 254 Another
supra note 209, at 4. See also STUDY, supra note 175 at V-5 (Rome's no-fare experiment
failed to decrease auto traffic after forty-three days). These elasticity figures are for all
types of trips. Both the German and the American data, however, indicate that the cross
elasticities are lower for work trips. See Baum, supra, at 5.
An econometric model of urban travel demand developed by Charles River As-
sociates, Inc., indicates a cross-elasticity between auto work trips and transit with regard
to cost of only .138 for the line-haul portion of a transit trip and a zero cross-elasticity for
the access portion, e.g., feeder bus. G. Kraft & T. Domencich, supra note 85, at 18.
Experiments in Philadelphia and Boston in 1962 and 1963 indicated that "under the
most modern of assumptions" it would cost at least 80, per round trip or $200 per year
to divert a commuter from auto to transit. MEYER, supra note 3, at 101-02. See also Kain, A
Contribution to the Urban Transportation Debate: An Econometric Model of Urban Residential and
Travel Behavior, 46 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 55 (1964) (insensitivity of transit ridership to
increases in service frequency). But cf. Segelhorst & Kirkus, supra note 250 at 61 (service
level elasticities seven to ten times greater than fare elasticities).
252 Paine, supra note 233, at 478. See also McGillivray, supra note 23, at 834 (e.g.,
weather, need for freight or passenger carrying capacity, comfort, flexibility, time of
day); Quarmby, supra note 233, at 281 (comfort, safety, reliability); Costantino, Attributes
of Transit Demand, 29 TRAFFIC Q. 243, 257 (1975).253 See DeSimone, Issues of Urban Transportation and the Environment, in URBAN
TRANSPORTATION NEEDS 18, 20 (1972).
254 In the New York City subways, for example, transit police indicated that from
January 1, 1973 to August 15, 1973 there were 831 robberies of passengers, 198 feloni-
ous assaults, and 952 purse snatchings reported. For 1972 the figures were 1315 pas-
senger robberies, 304 felonious assaults, and 1163 purse snatchings. N.Y. Times, Aug.
18, 1973, at 1, col. 2, 53, col. 1. See Nahemow, Shuman & Kogan, supra note 226, at 42,
47. The failure of carpooling has been attributed to the loss of privacy inherent in the
system, see Eash, Swanson & Kaplan, An Analysis and Evaluation of Alternate Schemes To
Increase Auto Occupancy, 8 TRANSP. RESEARCH 335, 341 (1974).
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important disutility, and perhaps a corollary of the "avoiding
riding with strangers" factor, is the need for privacy, in which
case an absolute time or cost advantage for mass transit would be
irrelevant.
Faulty perceptions and irrationality so pervade the question
of consumer choice of urban transport mode that one must ask
if modal choice is determined by factors operating beyond the
conscious level. That there is a strong subconscious tie to the
automobile has long been an element of popular mythology, but
there is little published data supporting the nexus between the
automobile and subconscious desires.
Means by which mass transit can be "reinvigorated '255 so as
to cope with the modal choice variables considered in this section
are difficult to imagine. A public relations campaign might im-
press upon commuters the greater relative safety of mass transit.
The costs of mass transit trips might be better equated with the
costs of automobile commuting by adoption of a multi-trip
ticket. 256 The aversion to riding with "strangers" might be over-
come by creating several classes of service as in the Paris
Metro.2 57 The federal program seems well designed to deal with
the problem of vehicle condition and will undoubtedly succeed
in providing many existing systems with shiny, new equipment,
at least in the short run. Federal programs that take account of
the more significant determinants of modal choice remain to be
unveiled, and they may never come into existence.
Most observers agree that "it is unbelievably difficult to di-
vert auto commuters to transit. '25 8 Note, however, that the "un-
believably difficult" task is to lure commuters to transit. The dif-
ficulties may not be as great if attraction is abandoned for a
strategy of strong persuasion and mild coercion. Given the tenac-
ity with which the auto commuter grips his steering wheel, the
effort may have to involve substantial limitations on the freedom
to use automobiles in urban areas.
2 59
255 Note 128 supra & accompanying text.
256 See R. BURCO, supra note 222, at V-9; Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 27, 1972,
at 7, col. I.25
-
7 See Burck, How to Unchoke Our Cities, 63 FORTUNE, May, 1961, at 119, 264.
258 Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1973, at 22, col. 3.
259 But cf. J. RAE, supra note 74, at 89: "One solution is compulsion; urban travel by
private automobile could be prohibited or at least drastically restricted. This, however, is
not only a counsel of desperation, whose adoption in a free society would be an acknowl-
edgment of defeat, it is also a remedy likely to create more problems than it solves."
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VI. LIMITING AUTOMOBILE COMMUTING
Programs to limit automobile commuting have been
categorized as either traffic restraint or traffic restriction. A traffic
restraint program would include all methods designed to dis-
suade people from using their cars.260 They range from a freeze
on the approval of off-street parking facilities and the cessation
of construction of new limited access highways in urban areas to
the more positive steps of parking bans and toll systems. The
most common and effective form of traffic restraint is conges-
tion. This is, in fact, the principal reason why traffic will never
"grind to a halt."26' Vehicular traffic is self-regulating: conges-
tion discourages traffic increments. The failure to recognize this
fact-that to do nothing in the face of increasing congestion is a
very effective means of traffic restraint-has led to massive in-
cursions of limited access highways into central business districts
and to the absurd arguments concerning the "need" for addi-
tional roads to "accommodate" future traffic demands.
The difficulty with relying upon congestion as the primary
means of regulating automobile flow is that it is unplanned.
262
Traffic restraint and traffic restriction strategies are examples of
planned congestion. The difference between the two is that
while traffic restraint strategies seek to discourage automobile
commuting to and from the central business district, traffic re-
striction programs encompass methods of preventing vehicles
from going where they would otherwise go by act of law and/or
physical obstruction. Several traffic restraint and restriction
programs will be discussed briefly. It must be borne in mind in
considering such proposals that an important determinant of
their viability, perhaps the determinant, is their political
acceptability. 263 Although it is impossible to articulate criteria for
political acceptability in all situations, political tolerableness will
260 See J. THoMaSON, supra note 76, at 9.
261 Id. 30-3 1. See Quarmby, supra note 233, at 273.
262 See generally Kain, supra note 251, at 345; Patrassi, Balancing Road and Transit
Systems, 23 TRAFFIC Q. 441 (1969).
263 The point was graphically illustrated in hearings on an EPA proposal to ration
gasoline in order to limit auto travel and thereby lower air pollution levels in Los
Angeles. In a statement before the hearing panel, Senator Tunney termed gasoline
rationing "a drastic and nonsensical" measure that "would lead to economic and social
chaos and be impossible to enforce without putting a bayonet at the back of every
motorist. Instead of turning to police state solutions, we should mobilize our effort to
develop mass transit and to mass produce an alternative to the internal combustion
engine." N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1973, at 35, col. 3. One obvious difficulty with the EPA Los
Angeles proposal was that it affected all motor vehicle operators as well as sellers of
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usually correlate in some measure with (a) the size of the group
affected by the proposal, (b) the political vociferousness of the
affected group, and (c) the group's ability to perceive that it has
been affected. 2 4
A. Traffic Restraint
The most widely considered traffic restraint program in-
volves a system of toll charges to be levied against automobile
commuters. 265 The idea of toll charges is the subject matter of a
voluminous literature whose primary concern is utilization of the
price mechanism to rationalize highway investment and use.
First, a price mechanism may be used to justify the commitment
of resources to a particular use.266 (Advocates of mass transit
argue that federal subsidization of highway construction has dis-
torted the investment process.) 267 After allocating the cost of
investment, the price mechanism can be useful in allocating how
the facility should be used, as a form of rationing.268 This second
phase of using tolls attempts to apply marginal cost pricing to
highway use by relating tolls to the "congestion" costs imposed
by the incremental vehicle. 269 Despite the relative insensitivity of
gasoline instead of focusing more narrowly on those types of trips that cause a dispropor-
tionate amount of pollution, are easily postponed, or for which an alternate transport
mode is available.
264 A fuel tax cannot, for example, discriminate between urban and rural traffic, nor
between times when urban roads are congested and when they are not. A 1964 Ministry
of Transport study in England noted that "[a] charge of Id per mile is higher than the
cost of using uncongested roads and far lower than the cost of using congested roads and
thus discourages the use of lightly-trafficked roads and encourages the use of crowded
roads .. " GREAT BRITAIN MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT, ROAD PRICING: THE ECONOMIC AND
TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES 9 (1964), quoted in J. THOMSON, supra note 76, at 46
[hereinafter cited as MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT].
26 See L. FITCH, supra note 84, at 127. Note that tolls cannot be levied on roads built
with federal funding, see 23 U.S.C. § 301 (1970). Toll imposition on federally aided
bridges and tunnels is restricted by id. § 129(a), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973). See also 33
U.S.C. § 529 (1970).
266 See Strotz, Principles of Urban Transportation Pricing, in TRAFFIC CONGESTION AS A
FACTOR IN ROAD-USER TAXATION 113 (Highway Research Record No. 47, 1964)
[hereinafter cited as TRAFFIC CONGESTION].
267 See L. FITCH, supra note 84, at 158, 265-66; text accompanying notes 214-18 supra.
266 See Strotz, supra note 266, at 113.
269 See Mohring, Relation Between Optimum Congestion Tolls and Present Highway User
Charges, in TRAFFIC CONGESTION, supra note 266, at 1. In a study of traffic in London it
was estimated that if traffic were moving at ten miles per hour, and another vehicle
joined the stream, each vehicle-mile of the new vehicle would impose an additional
eleven minutes to the travel time of all vehicles. This eleven-minute delay was estimated
(in American currency) to be the equivalent of 52t in the journey costs of all vehicles. G.
ROTH, PAYING FOR ROADS 29 (1967). Thus a rush hour entrant ought to pay 52 per mile
as a congestion toll.
Two major criticisms are leveled against marginal cost/congestion pricing. It is ar-
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automobile commuters to price increases, 7 ° tolls of sufficient
magnitude would divert all but the wealthiest or most fanatical
auto commuters. Even more modest tolls may serve as an effec-
tive restraint.
271
A major difficulty with road toll proposals is in the
mechanics of implementation. In cities like New York and San
Francisco, where access is channeled through tunnels and
bridges, reasonable toll points are readily apparent. Most other
cities, however, are land-oriented and have scores of radial ac-
cess routes. The nightmare of a toll booth on every street 272 can
be eliminated by automatic vehicle monitoring (AVM) systems.
Such systems are primarily of two kinds, on-vehicle and
off-vehicle. 273 The trouble with the on-vehicle system is that
meters may fail to function, either inadvertently or as a conse-
quence of tampering. This problem may be avoided by using an
gued that the foundation of the marginal cost analysis is "the value of time" which is "so
uncertain, so mercurial in character, that its use.., is questionable." St. Clair, Congestion
Tolls-An Engineer's Viewpoint, in TRAFFIC CONGESTION, supra note 266, at 66, 99. A second
objection is the unfairness of making the traveler who suffers from congestion also pay
for it. Id. 86.
270 The econometric model of urban travel demand developed by Charles River
Associates, Inc., indicated an elasticity of auto work trips to parking and toll charges of
-. 071. See G. Kraft & T. Domencich, supra note 85, at 18. In this model elasticity is "the
percentage change in the number of trips demanded for a given purpose and mode in
response to a one percent change in one of the variables ...." Strangely the model
indicates an elasticity of -. 494 with regard to all auto operating costs. Id.
171 Research among auto drivers in Stockholm indicates that congestion toll of 15e
would deter 44% of those questioned from entering the central city by car and a 7 5t toll
would deter 63%. SWEDISH ROAD FEDERATION, THE AUTOMOBILE IN SWEDISH SOCIErY
(1971), quoted in W. OWEN, supra note 3, at 51. See also Moses & Williamson, supra note
25 1, at 261 (Table 1) (at an added driving cost of $1.00 per trip, 77% of auto commuters
would be diverted to public transit modes.) For a detailed and sophisticated analysis
relating congestion costs to road charges, see Strotz, Urban Transportation Parables, in THE
PUBLIC ECONOMY OF URBAN COMMUNITIES 127 (J. Margolis ed. 1965).
272 Note, however, that one of the risks of a toll system is diversion to other parts of
the system. This requires wide coverage and "sophisticated differentiation between dif-
ferent classes of facilities." MEYER, supra note 3, at 65. Professor Samuel Abbott suggests
that a limited number of toll points plus "congestion" on the free corridors may solve the
problem.
273 In an on-vehicle system, meters are installed in all vehicles, electrical loops are
placed in the roadbed, and the meter begins to operate when the vehicle enters a de-
lineated zone (continuous pricing system) or is advanced when the vehicle passes over
electronic coils at different places (point pricing system). The coils can be altered to vary
tolls depending on the traffic volume or other relevant factors (coil systems could even be
used to replace parking meters); while meters could be varied to reflect performance,
pollution, and noise characteristics of each vehicle.
AVM utilizing on-board transmitters are used to monitor bus traffic in Hamburg,
and a combination of on-board and in-street equipment is being used experimentally in
Rochester, N.Y., to increase bus traffic. See R. BURCO, supra note 222,.at 111-19, 20. Such
systems would cost roughly two cents per trip. MEYER, supra note 3, at 325.
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off-vehicle system, in which the unit on the vehicle serves solely
for identification purposes. As the vehicle passes over pricing
points its identity is recorded and a monthly bill is presented to
the registered owner.
2 74
A mechanical problem presented by both AVM systems is
installation of recording or identification meters in automobiles.
At the end of 1971 there were eighty-three million automobiles
registered in the United States. To provide for the installation of
recording meters in all of them within a limited time period
would be virtually impossible. To provide for phased-in installa-
tion on new cars only would take many years, and such a policy
would place a heavy premium on ownership of a pre-metered
automobile. While the installation of identification meters might
be simpler and accomplished more expeditiously (for example,
through attachment to license plates),275 their use raises a serious
question of invasion of privacy.
Even if the mechanical difficulties could be overcome,276
metering might not pose a sufficient deterrent to automobile
use. Evidence suggests that the costs of automobile commuting
can only be brought home to the commuter by periodic transac-
tions on a daily basis.27 7 Monthly toll bills might begin to fade
into the area of fixed costs not associated with any one trip. 8 In
England it has been suggested that tolls might be administered
by renting or selling daily licenses which would permit the li-
censee to enter the central business district. These could be ob-
tained from gasoline stations, roadside vending machines, or
other generally accessible facilities. The price of a license could
vary with the CBD destination point. This system would involve
substantial reliance on individuals' cooperation with the re-
quirement of purchasing a license.
279
274 J. THOMSON, supra note 76, at 53. Equipment for an off-vehicle scheme has been
under test in the United Kingdom for about three years. Results indicate that identifica-
tion units could be mass-produced for about $12 each and pricing points for about
$5,000 each. Id. 54.
275 G. ROTH, supra note 269, at 47; see Sterzer, Electronic License Plate for Motor
Vehicles, 35 RCA REv. 167 (1974).
276 As of June, 1974, there were no "operational" metering systems in existence. See
R. KIRBY, supra note 59, at 411.
277 Cf. note 271 supra.
278 See text accompanying notes 248-49 supra.
2'9 See J. THOMSON, supra note 76, at 47, 49; MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT, supra note 264,
at 15. This problem might be solved by the timer-ticket described in Myers, Collection
Problems and the Promise of Self-Canceling Tickets, in PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING ROADWAY
PRICING 21 (Transp. Research Record No. 494, 1974).
A proposal to introduce a license for using a car in London was dropped for political
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The principal objections to all toll systems are political. First,
they are regressive in impact. 280 Second, and perhaps more sig-
nificant, access to the existing system of roads and streets has
been a "free" good for too long; without a major "repackaging"
effort it is highly unlikely that automobile owners would tolerate
the novel imposition of a toll system.28 '
To increase the palatability of a toll proposal, tolls might be
applied to parking charges. 28 2 Because the auto commuter is the
all-day parker, a first step in discouraging him from driving to
work would be to reverse the present practice of making it less
expensive to park all day than to park for shorter periods of
time.283 This could be done by adding a surcharge for arriving
or leaving at peak hours.28 4 Such a system would be easier to
administer than a metering system; but it would also be suscepti-
ble to evasion, primarily by collaboration between commuters
and lot owners who prefer steady customers. Employer subsidies
of parking fees285 and employer-supplied parking could also
reasons. See THE ECONOMIST, July 12, 1975, at 27. An analogous EPA proposal for a
"colored sticker" system was discarded because of public opposition. See Bracken, Trans-
portation Controls Under the Clean Air Act: A Legal Analysis, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv.
749, 758 (1974).
280 See Strotz, supra note 266, at 114.
281 See R. BUEL, supra note 101, at 73; (N.Y.C. mayor's proposal for $10 annual use
tax on automobiles killed "because of public pressure in favor of the automobile"); Fitch,
Financing Urban Roadways, in FINANCING HIGHWAYS 141 (E. Williams ed. 1957). See also G.
ROTH, supra note 269, at 18: "Although the 'freedom of the road' is regarded by many as
a traditional right, it is in fact a fairly modern idea; toll roads were ended in London only
in 1871."
282 But an EPA proposal for a $5 parking surcharge for cars parked in CBD's
between 6 a.m. and 10 a.m. was withdrawn due to "pressure from Congress." Boston
Globe, July 21, 1974, at 2, col. 2. See generally South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d
646, 657 (1st Cir. 1974). Congress has prohibited the EPA from imposing parking sur-
charges, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5(c)(2)(B) (Supp. 1975). See 39 Fed. Reg. 1848 (1974).
Studies in London establish that drivers are not insensitive to increases in parking
charges. As an experiment the London County Council doubled and quadrupled parking
meter charges. The time necessary to find a vacant meter was reduced 60% when charges
were doubled and 83% when they were quadrupled. Inwood, Some Effects of Increased
Parking Meter Charges in London, Road Research Laboratory Rep. No. 7, 1965, quoted in
Harvard Business School, Urban Road Pricing Through Selected Parking Taxes (Case
No. 9-371-261), at 7.
A detailed case study is provided in KULAsH, PARKING TAXES As ROADWAY PRICES: A
CASE STUDY OF THE SAN FRANCISCO EXPERIENCE (1974).
283 See Kain, A Reappraisal of Metropolitan Transportation Planning, cited in Harvard
Business School, supra note 282, at 13; L. FITCH, supra note 84, at 150.
284 See J. THOMSON, supra note 76, at 65-66; Meyer, supra note 4, at 65.
285 See ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTORATE, supra note 101, at V-9. See also R. BURCO, supra
note 222, at V-7, V-10. A 1966 study indicated that between 30% and 50% of all CBD
employees received subsidized parking. A national sampling indicated this figure may be
as high as 80%. See Segelhorst & Kirkus, supra note 250, at 58.
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undermine the system.28 6
Limitation of space for parking is a form of traffic restraint
that overcomes some of the shortcomings of tolls.2 87 Tradition-
ally, permission to develop in urban areas has been tied to the
developer's provision of parking facilities. Municipalities could
reverse this practice by limiting the amount of space that de-
velopers could provide for parking.2 88 Space limitations are less
susceptible to evasion or circumvention than tolls. Because com-
muters generally arrive downtown earlier in the day than shop-
pers or visitors, however, a limitation on parking spaces would
discourage non-peak hour trips more than those by peak hour
commuters. Prohibiting lots from opening before 10:30 a.m.
would more effectively deter the commuter from driving. Even
then, parking restrictions of any kind will only reduce that pro-
portion of traffic that would have parked in the central business
district, and "there is no definite relationship between parking
space and traffic flow. '28 9 Moreover, the reduction in congestion
by reducing "parking" traffic may only encourage an increase in
"non-parking" traffic, such as trucks that move through the cen-
tral business district on the way to the waterfront or other
destinations.
29 0
286 See L. FITCH, supra note 84, at 151. KULASH, supra note 282, at 5, indicates that
20% of San Francisco's 50,000 off-street parking spaces are reserved for private em-
ployee parking. A survey of metropolitan areas in the mid-1960's indicated that "only 8
percent of auto journeys to work involve a parking fee." Lansing & Hendricks, supra note
245, at 49.
287 See, e.g., J. THOMSON, supra note 76, at 57; Fitch, Improving Urban Transportation,
in THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN TRANSPORTATION 179 (E. Williams, Jr. ed. 1971). Congress
has also expressed some opposition to limitations on parking, but the EPA may impose
such limitations after a public hearing. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1857c-5(c)(2)(C), (D) (Supp. 1975).
288 In London, developers are now limited to maximum parking allowances. See J.
THOMSON, supra note 76, at 59. New York and Boston have limited new garage construc-
tion. In Chicago the same result is obtained indirectly by prohibiting driveways into
streets with pedestrian flows exceeding 25,000 per day. See id. In Munich, developers can
either provide parking in accordance with building ordinances or, if the city council
requires it, contribute a sum of about ten percent less than prevailing construction costs
for the required parking to finance parking lots at subway stops. Kfihnemann & With-
erspoon, Thirty-Two German Cities, in ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, STREETS FOR PEOPLE 57, 65 (1974) [hereinafter cited as STREETS FOR
PEOPLE].
289 G. ROTH, supra note 269, at 76. But see Governor Francis W. Sargent, Policy
Statement on Transportation in the Boston Region, Nov. 30, 1972, at 6: "[lI]t is essential
that we employ the most effective lever available for the limitation of traffic demand
-parking policy." On the difficulties of enforcing parking prohibitions, see Patrassi,
supra note 262, at 459.
288 See MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT, supra note 264, at 13. For a detailed comparison, see
J. THOMSON, Supra note 76, at 97. Empirical evidence indicates 15% to 30% of CBD
automobile trips do not involve parking. See R. KIRBY, supra note 59, at 412.
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The flaw in traffic restraint programs is that they are incre-
mental and in no way affect the way streets function in the core
of the city. Incremental decreases in automobile commuting may
be sufficient to reduce pollution or energy consumption to toler-
able levels. But even if successful in reducing the system costs of
automobile commuting, the victory may prove pyrrhic. Success
in discouraging the auto commuter may result in his driving to a
job in the suburbs instead of switching to inadequate public
transit for the trip to the CBD.291 Such a change would not
represent a departure from but rather an acceleration of an
already existing trend.292
This perverse result points up the fundamental weakness of
the federal mass transportation effort. It has been submitted that
the federal attempt to "lure" commuters away from automobiles
with new rail rapid transit systems will not solve the problem.
Like the highway program and the systems of traffic restraint
just discussed, it misses the fundamental point by viewing urban
transportation as an end in itself with the goal of achieving the
most "efficient" system of transportation. In contrast, the most
basic transportation primers begin with a description of trans-
portation as a system for getting from point A to point B.293 A
fortiori, if no one wants to get to point B there is no need for a
transportation system between points A and B. Urban America
has been witnessing an accelerating lack of desire to go from
point A (the suburbs) to point B (the central business district).
Two explanations for this phenomenon present themselves:
first, the increased difficulty of going from A to B, because of
congestion, makes "getting there" not half the fun but no fun at
all; second, point B is becoming increasingly unattractive. The
problem is not that "[t]here is no there there," as Gertrude Stein
once said of Oakland, California, but that whatever is there has
become progressively less alluring to the increasing numbers of
people who concentrate their lives in the suburbs.
294
2" See statement of Governor Francis W. Sargent, July 9, 1973 ("Drastic restriction
on [automobile] travel to the core.., might well direct substantial economic activity from
the core to the suburbs."); Moses, Economics of Consumer Choice in Urban Transportation,
quoted in St. Clair, supra note 269, at 107-08.
I92 Between 1960 and 1970 the number of people employed in the central city
portion of metropolitan areas declined from 63% to 52.4%. The percentage of those who
live and work in the suburbs increased from 67.8% to 72.3%. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 15,
1972, at 58, col. 5.
293 Cf. Nahemow, Shuman & Kogan, supra note 226, at 43; Webber & Angel, The
Social Context for Transportation Policy, 29 EKISTICS 25 (1970).
291 McQuade, Downtown is Looking Up, FORTUNE, Feb., 1970, at 132.
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B. Traffic Restriction
A program to solve the urban transportation problem must
contain two critical elements, one that will effectively discourage
individuals from using automobiles for work trips into the center
city and one that will encourage those individuals to continue to
work in the city. A gradual introduction of a series of physical
traffic restrictions will get individuals out of their cars without
leading to a wholesale loss of jobs to the suburbs. A correspond-
ing improvement in mass transit could effectively serve suburban
commuters. Federal mass transit efforts alone may not be able to
solve the urban transportation problem, but a refocusing of the
effort combined with an effective system of traffic restrictions
would get commuters out of their cars onto public transportation
and would make the centers of cities more attractive for resi-
dents, workers, and visitors alike.
Jane Jacobs has suggested the concept for such a program
and has labeled it "attrition":
Attrition as a steady, gradual process (something that
does not now exist) would steadily decrease the number
of persons using private automobiles in a city. If prop-
erly carried out . . . attrition would decrease the need
for cars simultaneously with decreasing convenience for
cars....
In real life ... attrition of automobiles by cities is
probably the only means by which absolute numbers of
vehicles can be cut down. It is probably the only realistic
means by which better public transportation can be
stimulated ....
... Although its cumulative effects should be rev-
olutionary, like any strategy aimed at keeping things
working it has to be engaged in as a form of evolu-
tion.2
95
Such an attrition program can be implemented by traffic restric-
tion, that is, by preventing vehicles from going where they would
otherwise go by act of law and/or physical obstruction. The over-
all strategy is based on urban land use planning.
Urban land use planning must begin again with a recogni-
tion that the designation of an area as a "street" represents a first
step, not an end, in the planning process. The second step in-
volves acknowledgement that an urban street has more purpose
2951 j. JACOBS, supra note 80, at 363.
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than a route linking two points. With that insight, the planner
can begin to choose from the wide array of possible street uses
that most likely will be compatible with overall planning goals.
Lewis Mumford has suggested that priority be given to use by
pedestrians. "Nothing would do more to give life back to our
blighted urban cores than to re-instate the pedestrian, in malls
and pleasances designed to make circulation a delight.
'29 6
Barring vehicular traffic from a street or group of streets
forces the planner to focus on a variety of street uses hitherto
ignored. In many areas the street is the site of a daily
promenade. 9 7 Making provision for this type of activity
amounts to a recognition that streets are "the main public places
of a city."' 298 Pedestrian streets also provide a humanizing envi-
ronment which tends to ameliorate the fear and alienation
caused by being constantly surrounded by strangers. "The bed-
rock attribute of a successful city district is that a person must
feel personally safe and secure on the street among all these
strangers. ' 299 Fear is further alleviated by the cafe, an institution
"almost always part of the street. '30 0 In fact, the cafe has been
termed a stationary version of the promenade. On the Continent
the cafe is considered indispensable to city life.3° 1 Although
some have attributed its absence in this country to American
cultural characteristics, 30 2 would the cafe not appeal precisely to
that group of middle and upper middle class suburbanites who
deplore the decay of the downtown area but in whose hands its
revival lies? A committee appointed by the mayor of New York
296 L. MUMFORD, supra note 124, at 244.
To encourage people to walk "[tihere must be short blocks so that there can be a
varied pattern of street usage, so that intermingling of neighbors is encouraged, so that
the opportunity for wide casual contacts is increased." R. BUEL, supra note 101, at I1
(paraphrasing Jane Jacobs).
297 In several countries streets are in fact labeled by this function. Thus Spain has its
rambla and paseo, Italy the corso, and France the cours, alle, and promenade. See B.
RUDOFSKY, STREETS FOR PEOPLE 112 (1969).
298 J. JACOBS, supra note 80, at 29.
299 Id. 30. Jacobs believes the extremely high rate of street crime (e.g., forcible rape,
aggravated assault) in Los Angeles is causally related to the "suburban" character of that
city. See id. 32-33.
300 B. RUDOFSKY, supra note 297, at 308.
3
01 
Id. 310.
02 Id. 19. Rudofsky observes that the Americans adopted the English conception of
street life, which precluded the use of the street for cafes, special interaction, recreation,
or indeed anything but hurried passage. Samuel Johnson is said to have observed, "Al-
most anything that sets us above savages has come from the shores of the Mediterra-
nean." Lord Tennyson may have expressed the predominant English view: "I loathe the
squares and streets/ And the faces that one meets." Id. 19.
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City reported that "more sidewalk cafes and later closing hours
would bring the people back into the streets, thereby reducing
the likelihood of crime in the streets." Street crime would be
deterred not only by the increased numbers of potential wit-
nesses and "apprehenders" but also by a heightened sense of
responsibility for the safety of others which comes from
"sidewalk contacts. ' 30 3 Thus pedestrian use of streets for a vari-
ety of purposes should enjoy a high priority.
Second, CBD streets must be used for the delivery of freight
in a way that allows necessary access while minimizing interfer-
ence with pedestrian uses. One solution to the inefficiency of
present-day delivery systems and their excessive number of truck
trips into the CBD would be to establish one or more freight
consolidation terminals on the periphery of the city or at its
center.30 4 Interference with other street uses could also be re-
duced by restricting permissible delivery times to early morning
or night hours. 30 5 A more imaginative proposal would utilize
existing rapid transit lines and underground freight railways to
303 B. RUDOFSKY, Supra note 297, at 316; R. BUEL, supra note 101, at 167 (paraphras-
ing Jacobs).
304 It has been estimated that such a system could eliminate 15% of the truck trips
into Manhattan. TRI-STATE TRANSPORTATION COMM'N, ECONOMICS OF A RATIONAL
URBAN PICKUP AND DELIVERY SYSTEM (1970), cited in J. THOMSON, supra note 76, at 79.
See J. JACOBS, supra note 80, at 346; McDermott & Robeson, The Role of Terminal Con-
solidation in Urban Goods Distribution, in URBAN GOODS MOVEMENT, supra note 81, at 40.
A study of Manhattan indicates that over 25,000 trucks are involved in delivering
goods daily within the nine square miles of the CBD with frequent overlapping of
routes and stops. Trucks with an average freight capacity of 8 to 10 tons deliver only I to
1-1/4 tons of freight each day. A. Schwartz & Associates, The Role of Trucks in the Region
and Manhattan, quoted in J. THOMSON, supra note 76, at 79. See Arrow, Coyle & Ketcham,
supra note 104, at 81.
Within the area covered by the Tri-State Transportation Commission it was found
that "430,000 trucks perform local trucking services and generate 11 percent of all
vehicle-miles driven in the ... area. One-third of these trucks do not move at all on any
given weekday, and of those moving, about half carry no load." W. OWENS, supra note 3,
at 61. See Survey, Freight, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1974, at 24 (internal freight needs
of Tri-State region require 2.8 million truck trips per day). In London the average
delivery truck is on the move about one-eighth of its working day. Id. 25.
For the Tri-State Region, consolidation of shipments into twelve-ton loads for trans-
port between off-street sorting terminals spaced about three miles apart in centers of
truck activity could reduce transport between centers by about 90%. J. THOMSON, supra
note 76, at 94 (citing W. OWENS, supra note 3). But see de Goyet, Railroad Terminals, Road
Freight Terminals, in THE URBAN MOVEMENT OF Goons 141-54 (1970) (in Brussels, such
terminals generated more urban traffic by replacing one heavy vehicle by five to ten light
vehicles); Survey, Freight, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1974, at 28 (transfer depots estab-
lished north and south of Paris have not been successful because "costs have been much
higher than expected").
305 In Cologne, Germany, for example, deliveries by vehicle are permitted only be-
tween 6 a.m. and 10 a.m. In other German cities, service traffic and access for residents
by car is allowed after 9 p.m. and before 8 or 9 a.m. KiIhnemann & Witherspoon, supra
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deliver freight during off-peak hours.3° 6 Such a plan would en-
tirely eliminate some truck traffic, and it would offer a way for
rail rapid transit systems to mitigate the economic effect of low
demand for off-peak service. Finally, freight deliveries that must
be made by truck might be facilitated, and interference with
other street activities reduced, by restricting streets adjacent to
pedestrian streets to delivery or service uses only.30 7 This would
allow direct delivery to most CBD stores and offices.
The next concern is the movement of people into the CBD.
This process should begin with two systems: existing urban mass
note 288, at 64. Such systems are strongly resisted by many merchants, who object to the
necessity for maintaining staff on overtime to receive deliveries after hours, Survey,
Freight, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 1974, at 29 (reason for failure of London "moon-
drop" experiment). See Orski & Jakobsberg, Improvements and Innovations in Urban Goods
Movement, in URBAN COMMODITY FLOW 100, 102 (Highway Research Bd. Special Rep. No.
120, 1971). A British grocery chain, "Sainsbury," solved this prblem by adding a delivery
area to each of its stores. Drivers are provided with a key to the outside door. This system
still leaves the problem of drivers having to work at night, but the added cost here may
be offset by the speed with which deliveries can be made at night. Survey, Freight, supra.
Besides, much freight transport takes place at night now anyway. See generally Weiss,
Labor Practices and Problems in Urban Goods Movement, in URBAN COMMODITY FLOW, supra,
at 90, 91-93.
306 Underground urban freight deliveries are not a new idea. There is, for example,
a 6.5-mile underground postal service railway in London which operates automated
trains between eight stations. See J. Fruin, Goods Movement on Urban Transit Systems,
July 26-30, 1971, at 2 (ASCE-ASME Preprint No. 1521). The system carries more than
40,000 bags of mail daily and is estimated to save 1,700 truck trips per day. Residents of
Chicago might be surprised to learn that there is a 62-mile underground freight delivery
system which operated from the turn of the century to the late 1940's and was connected
with all rail lines serving Chicago, ten public warehouses, and many of the Loop's major
buildings. (The only section operating today delivers newsprint to the Chicago Tribune.)
While the cost of tunneling under an existing city would be enormous, where excavations
already exist, as in Chicago, or where underground rapid transit facilities exist, they
ought to be utilized for freight deliveries. But see Arrow, Coyle & Ketcham, supra note
102, at 86. Their principal arguments are that (1) there are no facilities for vertical
movement of goods, (2) there is no storage space and/or sidings, (3) headways between
trains are too small to permit loading and unloading, (4) stations are not "immediately
adjacent" to business houses, and (5) the cost of additional transfer between truck and
subway car "would probably be prohibitive." No data are cited in support of these argu-
ments, however; nor are any studies referred to or cited. Mohr, supra note 81, at 105,
107. Mohr also points out the operational problems and notes that street congestion, low
during off peak hours, would not be significantly affected by truck transport at night.
For a design for a freight tunnel to be added to the proposed Second Avenue
subway in New York, see W. BREINES & J. DEAN, THE PEDESTRIAN REVOLUTION 142
(1974).
307 This is the system in Munich. See Walter-Ulrich Jager, Environment Improve-
ment in Center City, Sixth International Conference on Urban Transportation, in
OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS: MARKETING URBAN RENAISSANCE 145, 146 (1974). Bus and truck
service could be integrated through refinement of the concept of "the European 'articu-
lated bus,' essentially a tractor that pulls either a freight or a passenger trailer." Goeller,
Freight Transport in Urban Areas: Issues for Research and Action, in URBAN COMMODITY FLOW,
supra note 305, at 149, 158.
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transit and walking. If rail rapid transit systems already exist,
planners should begin with them. For although the case for new
rail transit systems is extremely weak, this is not so for existing
systems whose capital costs are sunk. Rapid transit stops in the
central business district and selected bus lines in cities without
rail rapid transit therefore become the initial planning points.
Using each of these points as the center, a circle can be drawn to
encompass the area served by any one stop, the radius of which
is determined by the distance the transit user is willing to
walk.30 8 The fragmentary data that exist indicate that the urban
transit commuter will walk two or three blocks from his transit
stop to his place of work.30 9 Within that walkable area, that is, a
three block or thirteen hundred foot radius from a transit stop,
private automobile traffic should be prohibited. This restriction
is the ultimate goal. To minimize the expenditure of economic
and political capital the plan should be implemented on a
street-by-street basis.
Further refinements in the plan might permit access for
taxicabs transporting the handicapped on service streets. A
model for development might utilize the system of street "use
308 See, e.g., RHODE ISLAND SCHOOL OF DESIGN, supra note 118, at 114.
A walkable distance is a function of the ambience. Thus shopping center studies
indicate that the average shopper will not walk more than 600 feet from car door to shop
door but will then walk 2,500 feet up and down supermarket aisles. The architect and
planner, Victor Gruen, has found that a lazy walker on a single-purpose trip will travel
1,250 feet "[i]n an attractive but not weather-protected area during periods of inclement
weather," 2,500 feet "[i]n a highly attractive environment in which sidewalks are pro-
tected from sunshine and rain," and 5,000 feet in "a highly attractive, completely
weather-protected and artificially climatized environment." V. GRUEN, THE HEART OF
OUR CITIES 249-50 (1964); Kwantes, Transportation Aspects of Multi Use Centers, 26 TRAFFIC
Q. 517, 522 (1972); HUD BRIEF, supra note 80, at 5.
309 See MEYER, supra note 3, at 188-89 & Table 9. Interview data from New York City
indicate a median walk to work from a subway stop of 1010 feet. See Pushkarev & Zupan,
Pedestrian Travel Demand, in PEDESTRIANS 37, 52 (Highway Research Record No. 355,
1971). Data generated by the Tri-State Regional Planning Commission's 1963-64 home
interview survey indicate that more than 85% of all trips involve less than four minutes of
walking from transit mode to destination. See Fort, Walk Time from Vehicle to Final
Destination, in PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION CHARACTERISITCS IN URBAN AREAS 28, 31
(Highway Research Record No. 439, 1973). In trips to CBD destinations this study
indicates that the average walk for those using automobiles was 1.17 minutes versus 4.66
minutes for mass transit passengers. Id. 30 (Table 1). But see Puskarev & Zupan, supra, at
52 (Table 9). (The New York City data indicate a median walk from garage or parking
lot of 1490 feet versus 1010 feet for the subway commuter.) The evidence is that the
outer limits for walking to a bus stop from one's residence is 1/4 mile or three blocks.
Schmidt, et al., Specification and Evaluation of Alternative Feeder and Local Transit Systems in a
Suburban Area, PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AND PASSENGER CHARACTERISTICS 37, 43 (High-
way Research Record No. 417, 1972). For a formula to determine how many blocks can be
served by a transit stop, see MEYER, supra note 3, at 190.
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classifications" suggested by Victor Gruen in his famous Fort
Worth plan and refined in his plan for Cincinnati. 310 The seven
use classifications in the Cincinnati plan were: pedestrians only;
pedestrians and pedestrian carriers; pedestrians and limited
truck use; express and local buses only; trucks only; shuttle
buses, trucks, taxis, and pedestrians; automobiles, buses, trucks,
and pedestrians. Given an average transit stop spacing of one-
half mile in central business districts, a completed traffic restric-
tion program of this type will create a half-mile wide continuous
automobile-free zone within the CBD. Buses might be permitted
to cross the corridor at selected points, giving them a substantial
time advantage over automobile traffic in transit from a point on
one side of the corridor to a destination on the other side.
31'
Crossing points for automobiles would be severely limited, if
provided at all. The atrophying effect of the original zones thus
spreads. The next step would be to extend the restrictions and
the resulting boundaries of automobile-free zones outward until
the desired central city ambience is achieved.
312
A policy of automobile attrition by traffic restriction offers
several advantages over policies heretofore considered. By phys-
ically barring vehicular traffic from a given street, problems such
as the regressive effect of financial restraints, the problematic
impact of daily versus monthly charges, and the necessity of
relying on complex mechanical or labor-intensive enforcement
techniques are avoided. More importantly, traffic restriction
programs may be implemented on an experimental basis at little
cost.31 3 Because such experiments can be carried out by readily
310 V. GRUEN, supra note 308, at 225, 234. For a similar proposal for Manhattan, see
Gruen & Ackwith, Plan to End Our Traffic Jam, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1960, § 6 (Magazine),
at 18. See also TRAFFIC IN TOWNS, supra note 84, at 50 (classification of streets for their
primary function). Note, however, the criticism of dividing traffic into levels of "essential-
ity," Kain & Beesley, supra note 84, at 180-8 1. The authors suggest "ease of substitution"
as a more relevant criterion.
311 But see Cecilia, How to Improve Urban Traffic Conditions by Restraining Private
Traffic-Preference of Public Surface Transport, in OECD, supra note 126, at 38.
312 Note that while the program would be implemented on a street-by-street basis the
goal would be the creation of auto-free zones. See TRAFFIC IN TOWNS, supra note 84, 38
(Buchanan Report). The Buchanan Report took the idea from the "Radburn system,"
plan developed for the town of Radburn, New Jersey, in 1928 but which "seems to have
had singularly little influence on American practice." Id. 123. The main principle is the
creation of an area free of vehicular traffic in which circulation is by pedestrian foot-
paths.
The zones will not be subject to the criticism leveled against "pedestrian malls" by
Jane Jacobs, see J. JACOBS, supra note 80, at 344, and Victor Gruen, see V. GRUEN, supra
note 308, at 222-23.
313 HUD BRIEF, supra note 80, at 25. An experiient in traffic restriction in the
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reversible means, they can be implemented without awaiting
time-consuming (and frequently incorrect) detailed analysis. Er-
rors are easily corrected. Contrast this situation with a capital
investment of a. billion dollars for a rail rapid transit system
based on an analysis that turned out to be wishful thinking. It
seems almost madness to commit vast resources to "new mass-
transportation systems-as proposed for Atlanta, Los Angeles,
San Francisco, and Washington"-when even their most ardent
champion confesses that the question "[w]hether [they] will at-
tain traffic projected for them can be discovered only by build-
ing at least some of them.
31 4
Increased public transit can be gradually phased in as the
traffic restriction program evolves. To the extent possible, the
traffic restriction plan should be implemented to focus each in-
cremental restriction on as narrow a residential area as possible.
Then additional transport capacity can be added along corridors
most likely to reflect an increased demand for service. Because
an increasing number of mass transit passengers will come from
the automobile-owning classes, old myths about maintaining low
transit fares to help the poor may at last be removed as govern-
ing principles of mass transit. Transit fares should be increased,
so that the acquisition of new equipment will be financed out of
increased revenues. The implementation of the traffic restriction
plan should be coordinated with the capacity of the transit au-
thority to acquire new equipment. Finally, when measured
against the social costs of automobile commuting, the traffic re-
striction program offers assured amelioration of the damage. 15
business district of Gothenberg, Sweden, for example, was implemented by blocking
access roads with movable fences. Traffic restriction has also been used in Copenhagen,
id. 10, and in New York City with the closing of the thoroughfare through Washington
Square Park, J. JACOBS, supra note 80, at 360-62 (predictions of dire traffic jams not
borne out). Similar experiments could be attempted here with the ubiquitous police
barrier or "sawhorse."
314 L. FITCH, supra note 84, at 54.
315 Experiments in New York, Marseilles, and Vienna indicate that traffic restriction
will reduce carbon monoxide and noise levels. See ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTORATE, supra
note 101, at 1-21, V-2 to V-4; HUD BRIEF, supra note 80, at 2, 47; Lindquist, The Traffic
Zone System in the City Core of Gothenburg, Sweden, in PARKING AS AN ALTERANT TO THE
TRAFFIC PATTERN 31, 32 (Highway Research Record No. 474, 1973); Parker & Eburah,
Oxford Street Experiment, GREATER LONDON COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE UNIT Q. BULL., Dec.,
1973, at 18, 19 (Figure 6). A traffic restriction program may also have a significant effect
on motor vehicle accidents. In 1972 only 3% of all urban motor vehicle accidents in-
volved collisions between a motor vehicle and a pedestrian, yet these accidents resulted in
39.9% of all traffic fatalities. During the first seven months of the Oxford Street experi-
ment, there was a considerable reduction in serious pedestrian accidents. Parker &
Eburah, supra, at 17.
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VII. STREET USE PLANNING
An automobile attrition policy should be a major component
of many communities' answer to the urban transportation prob-
lem. Such a policy would not only force commuters to switch to
the more practicable modes of public transit, but would also
make a central business district a more humane, enjoyable place
to be. By making the district more attractive-through the crea-
tion of quiet yet bustling pedestrian malls, cleaner air, and other
amenities-street use planning can fulfill a dual function of eas-
ing the transportation problem and retaining and acquiring
business for the business district.
The attrition policy, of course, should be combined with the
upgrading and expansion of public transit facilities in response
to increased demand. Such improvements should not be effected
to attract passengers with fancy hardware, but to upgrade service
once demand has been demonstrated and the revenues raised
from the fare box to pay for improvements. Without such im-
provements, the commuter who gives up his automobile may
give up making his trip altogether, abandoning the central
business district rather than shifting to alternate modes of
transportation.
Successful implementation of such an attrition policy re-
quires that a major role be played by the law and lawyers. Attor-
neys, of course, would fulfill their traditional role, designing and
operating planning institutions. Street use planning also de-
mands a far more complex analysis of underlying legal doctrine
than does typical land use work. The use of streets involves a set
of public and private legal relationships that existed long before
zoning was a significant concept. Many of these relationships
have been reexamined and altered by the street and highway
construction boom of the 1950's and 1960's. Indeed, one of the
ironies of the Interstate Highway Program is that the case law it
spawned may facilitate the adoption of traffic restriction pro-
grams. But the combination of hoary doctrine and modern
circumstance remains a major legal problem for street use
planning.
The lawyer also has a heavy responsibility for structuring
implementation of a program. Characterizations of actions may
determine whether the community has the power to effect its
plans and whether it must compensate owners of abutting prop-
erty. Ancient doctrines and tides, if unanticipated, may have a
significant impact on the results achieved. Finally, when com-
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pensation is necessary, the lawyer may discover a medium other
than cash-"special benefits"-with which to pay the abutting
owners. Because these problems arise on a block-by-block and
even building-by-building basis, the lawyer must be an integral
part of the planning team.
A. The Power to Restructure Street Use
The first legal question confronting the street use planner is
whether the governmental body proposing to implement a pro-
gram has the authority to do so. In the case of a municipal cor-
poration, the extent of the delegation of power from the state
must be scrutinized. In all cases, the validity of the exercise of
power must be examined.
1. Delegation of Authority from State to Municipality
Plenary power over the streets and their use resides in the
state. Municipalities have only such power over their streets as
the state has delegated to them.3 16 Such delegations may be
explicit31 7 or implicit in more general grants. 31 8 With either
316 See, e.g., St. Louis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465 (1893); Grantham v.
City of Topeka, 196 Kan. 393, 411 P.2d 634 (1966).
317 Kentucky statutes, for instance, explicitly delegate authority to regulate street use.
A public way is defined as "a public street, sidewalk, boulevard, avenue, road, lane,
highway, parkway, court, or terrace." Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 94.010 (1971). The city
council of a city of the second through sixth classes has authority to "exercise exclusive
control over the public ways . . . of the city. [The city legislative body] may establish,
open, alter, widen, extend, close, grade, pave, repave, clean, sprinkle and repair the same
.... Id. § 94.360. The city council has power to "[l]icense, tax and regulate . . . all
vehicles using the streets .... " Id. § 84.160. Similar provisions in earlier Kentucky law,
nearly identical in language, were sufficient to authorize the city of Somerset to enact an
ordinance permitting the passage of "all carriers of freight and passengers by motor
vehicle" only on such streets "as may be designated or approved by the Mayor and Board
of Council of the City of Somerset, Ky." Bell Bros. Trucking v. Kelley, 277 Ky. 781,
782-83, 127 S.W.2d 831, 832 (1939), discussed in Comment, Converting a City Street Into A
Pedestrian Mall: Shade Trees, Fountains and Lawsuits, 28 U. PITT. L. REv. 293, 296-97
(1966).
3"8 Compare, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 2, 3(a), 7 and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 642, 660, 672 (1959) with In re Grand River Dam Auth., 484 P.2d 505 (Okla. 1971).
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a constitutional grant of "all powers of local
self-government" includes a grant of the "power of complete regulation and control of
the streets." Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 255, 140 N.E. 595, 598
(1923) (validating village ordinance prohibiting buses from "starting and stopping"
within its limits).
The right to frame a home rule charter, see, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 410.04 (Supp.
1975), is itself a delegation of state authority. See, e.g., City of St. Paul v. Whidby,
295 Minn. 129, 203 N.W.2d 823 (1972). Therefore, a charter provision authorizing
"care, supervision and control" of streets which permits changing an avenue from two-
way to one-way traffic, Benson Hotel Corp. v. City of Minneapolis, 290 Minn. 14, 17, 187
N.W.2d 610, 612 (1971), derives its force from that implicit delegation.
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form, the extent of municipal authority over streets is never
clearly defined. Despite the delegations, the state often retains
substantial authority over public highways and their use or, al-
ternatively, vests conflicting authority in its various instrumen-
talities.
A typical conflict may arise when a city is granted general
police power by one state statute or the state constitution but a
separate state statute specifically restricts regulation of streets.
The city of Madison, Wisconsin, for instance, attempted to estab-
lish exclusive bus and taxi lanes3 19 under a broad statutory grant
of powers. 320 The state vehicle code, however, provided that
"[n]o local authority may enact or enforce any traffic regulation
• .. in any manner excluding or prohibiting any motor vehicle
... from the free use of all highways, except as authorized [in
two other sections.]" 32 1 Although one of the two exceptions was
facially inapplicable,322 the other provided that the city could
interfere with free use "to regulate heavy traffic. ' 323 The court
found the "heavy traffic" section inapplicable by interpreting it
to permit only restrictions that would bar use of all of a street or
highway by "some" members of the public. Restrictions barring
all members of the public from some part of a street or highway
were impermissible. In support of its position, the court argued
that if the general police power delegation were "all-inclusive"
there would be no need for the exceptions to the vehicle code
restrictions on local authority. The very existence of those
specific exceptions was evidence that the general delegation of
police power over traffic was not comprehensive. While a more
imaginative court might have found the city's action permissible
under the "heavy traffic" exception, the case is not so clearly
wrong that counsel would have been able to give a clear opinion
a priori as to the scope of the city's power in this case.
In Adley Express Co. v. Town of Darien,324 the Connecticut
Supreme Court was faced with a conflict between a delegation of
the regulation of traffic and a retention of the regulation of
319 See City of Madison v. Reynolds, 48 Wis. 2d 156, 180 N.W.2d 7 (1970).
320 "Except as elsewhere in the statutes specifically provided, the [city] council shall
have the management and control of the city property, finances, highways, navigable
waters ...... Wis. STAT. ANN. § 62.11(5) (1957).
321 Id. § 349.03(2) (1967), as amended (Supp. 1975).
3 22 Id. § 66.046 (1965) (permitting barricading of certain streets for play purposes).
32 3 Id. § 349.17 (1971).
324 125 Conn. 501, 7 A.2d 446 (1939), discussed in Comment, supra note 317, at 297
n.28.
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motor vehicles. The court concluded that "while the state dele-
gated to its municipalities the power to make traffic rules apply-
ing to all vehicles alike, the special power to regulate motor vehicles
was retained by the state . ... 325 Therefore an ordinance ban-
ning through trucks from a certain street was invalid.
Counsel's task is not limited to attempting to reconcile the
overlaps between state and local traffic regulation. Other state
legislation may also conflict with the municipality's ability to im-
plement a traffic restriction program. 326 In Benson Hotel Corp. v.
City of Minneapolis,3 27 the city acted under a charter provision,
authorizing local control of the streets, to change Third Avenue
South from a two-way to a one-way street. The Municipal Hous-
ing and Redevelopment Act conferred authority on the Min-
neapolis Housing and Redevelopment Authority328 (MHRA) to
acquire property for the purpose, inter alia, of reducing traffic
hazards and to install, construct, and reconstruct streets.
3 2 9
When the city attempted to alter the traffic pattern within an
area that the authority had set aside for urban renewal, it was
objected that exclusive authority over streets within that area had
been conferred on the MHRA. With a minimum of analysis the
court concluded that the city retained the right to regulate traffic
absent a "clear" legislative intent to "deprive the city of its inher-
ent and traditional power to regulate traffic on its streets.
'
1
30
The case could easily have been decided the other way.
Finally, home rule charters, enacted locally under authority
325 125 Conn. at 505, 7 A.2d at 447 (emphasis supplied).
326 In Sparrow v. City of Columbus, 40 Ohio App. 2d 453, 320 N.E.2d 297 (1974),
the county commissioners attempted to vacate a portion of a road located within the City
of Columbus. The Commissioners purported to act under the State code which provides
that the "board of county commissioners may locate, establish, alter, widen, straighten,
vacate, or change the direction of roads .... This power extends to all roads within the
county. ... OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5553.02 (Anderson Supp. 1974). The City of
Columbus, on the other hand, claimed it had exclusive jurisdiction over streets within the
city limits. The court found that the resolution lay in an interpretation of a home rule
provision of the state constitution which provides that: "Municipalities shall have author-
ity to exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their
limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with
general laws." OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. The trial court had concluded that a street
vacation was an exercise of police powers and that § 5553.02 was a "general law" which
gave exclusive power to the county commissioners. The appellate court disagreed. It
found that because the city had tide to the street as trustee, only the city could dispose of
it. Such a disposition would involve "an exercise in local self-government." 40 Ohio App.
2d at 457, 471, 320 N.E.2d at 303, 307.
327 290 Minn. 14, 187 N.W.2d 610 (1971).
321 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 462.411-.711 (1963), as amended (Supp. 1975).
329 Id. § 462.421(13) (1963), as amended (Supp. 1975).
330 290 Minn. at 17-18, 187 N.W.2d at 612.
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delegated by the state, may create conflicting loci of power. In
Fifth Avenue Association, Inc. v. Lindsay,331 the city's Transporta-
tion Administration proposed to close Madison Avenue to all
private vehicles, widen the sidewalks, and narrow the roadway
from fifty-four to twenty-two feet. The Administration pur-
ported to act under charter provisions giving the Administration
the power to regulate traffic 32 and the power to design, con-
struct, and repair public roads, streets, highways, and
parkways. 333 The court, however, construed the design and con-
struction authority as limited to making changes necessary to
fulfill the repair function. The Administration did not have the
power to effect "a drastic transmutation of the very heart and
soul of Madison Avenue.' '334 Instead the power to transmute
remained with the Board of Estimate which, under the Charter,
had "control of the streets of the city, except as in [the] charter
otherwise provided. 333
Potential conflicts of these types may dwell in the statute and
ordinance books of every jurisdiction. An initial step in imple-
menting a street use plan, therefore, may have to be an articula-
tion of the boundaries of authority within a state through advi-
sory opinions and test cases.
2. The Validity of Restructuring Street Use
Even when authority is properly delegated, the question
may arise whether any entity, state or local, may legitimately
enforce the restructuring of street use. Attacks on such restruc-
turing may allege that the actions are outside those that protect
the general welfare, that is, outside the police power; that the
actions are not reasonably related to their purposes; or that the
actions involve arbitrary and discriminatory classifications. Im-
position of traffic restrictions must be in furtherance of the pub-
lic health and safety, that is, within the police power. In light of
the social costs of automobile commuting, 336 this requirement
should present little difficulty. The lawyer should nevertheless
relate each restriction to a particular police power issue.
337
331 73 Misc. 2d 111, 341 N.Y.S.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
332 N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 2103(1)(b) (1972).
3 33 Id. § 2103(3)(b).
334 73 Misc. 2d at 114, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
335 N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 326 (1972).
336 See notes 88-127 supra & accompanying text.
3 37 But cf. City of Chicago v. McKinley, 344 Ill. 297, 176 N.E. 261 (1931), in which
the court sustained an ordinance limiting "standing" time in a large area of downtown
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The cases evidence few justifications for traffic regulation
insufficient to support exercise of the police power. In Salomone
v. City of Canton,33  however, the city attempted to justify a 1958
no-parking ordinance with a 1956 traffic survey. The court held
that the two-year-old study was insufficient support and
struck down the ordinance. More typical is Chicago National Bank
v. City of Chicago Heights.339 There the city council restricted a
shop-lined street to use by pedestrians and police, fire, and
emergency vehicles. A planning commission study that recom-
mended that the street be converted into a pedestrian mall was
held to provide sufficient support for the exercise of the power.
Until recently traffic studies such as those in Salomone and
Chicago Heights were the typical justifications for traffic restric-
tions. The findings sufficient to sustain action under the police
power were conveniently summarized by the California Supreme
Court in Simpson v. City of Los Angeles,340 a case involving the
closing to vehicular traffic of a cross street connecting two
thoroughfares. The court found that the action was justified by
the police power when (1) movement on the thoroughfares
would be interfered with less if the cross streets were closed, (2)
traffic on the cross streets was not essential to the orderly flow of
traffic, (3) the best use for the street was for pedestrian traffic,
and (4) allowing vehicular traffic thereon would interfere with
and endanger the safety of pedestrian traffic.
To the traditional police power concerns of traffic move-
ment and pedestrian safety can now be added prevention of air
and noise pollution. 341 In Cincinnati Motor Transportation Associa-
tion v. City of Lincoln Heights,342 for instance, these new grounds
supported an ordinance prohibiting truck traffic from Shepherd
Lane. In particular, the court found that heavy trucks traveling
Shepherd Lane sometimes made it impossible for residents "to
conduct normal conversation, that their sleep was sometimes in-
Chicago. Having decided that the ordinance was reasonable on its face, the court refused
to consider whether the police power justifications flowing from traffic congestion must
be present on each and every street in the designated zone. The determination of how to
alleviate the "loss and inconvenience" arising from traffic congestion was a matter for the
council unless clearly unreasonable.
338 30 Ill. App. 2d 474, 175 N.E.2d 663 (1961).
339 14 Ill. 2d 135, 150 N.E.2d 827 (1958), discussed in Comment, supra note 317, at
297-98.
340 4 Cal. 2d 60, 47 P.2d 474 (1935), discussed in Comment, supra note 317, at 298-99.
311 See notes 99-112 supra & accompanying text.
342 25 Ohio St. 2d 203, 267 N.E.2d 797 (1971).
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terrupted and that vibrations from the trucks had caused dam-
age to residences. These circumstances indicate that the only
feasible method by which the municipality could preserve its
residential character was for it to regulate truck traffic by
ordinance. ' 343 Counsel's task in establishing a justification for
the exercise of police power then ought not to be onerous.
Given the justification to regulate, state courts will still inves-
tigate the substance of the regulation for "reasonableness." Traf-
fic restrictions have been struck down by the conclusory phrases
"arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious or oppressive . . . or
[motivated by] malice or ill will."' 3 4 4 In reality the courts are
redetermining questions settled by the legislatures (whether a
particular regulation has a reasonable relationship to the goal to
be achieved or whether the regulation is overbroad in that it
reaches more than the conduct it is intended to cure) or they are
vesting rights in the users of streets.
Haggenjos v. City of Chicago,3 45 for instance, was a case in
which the court apparently failed to see a reasonable relationship
between the problem and the solution. The problem, of course,
was the effective regulation of downtown traffic. The solution
was an absolute ban on vehicles' standing on any street in a
specified downtown zone between 7 a.m. and 6:30 p.m. The
delegation of power to the city was clear. A fifty thousand dollar
traffic survey, characterized by the court as "exhaustive," jus-
tified the exercise of the police power.346 The court concluded,
however, that the ordinance unreasonably failed to provide for
standing for the purpose of delivering goods, without which the
streets "would be of comparatively little use. '347 The court was
merely stating its judgment that the legislative judgment about
the proper solution was wrong. The court apparently reached
this determination on the face of the statute rather than on the
facts of the case: first, because Mr. Haggenjos parked his car
rather than "stood" outside his downtown office for thirty
minutes, the court could have relied on well-established prece-
dent supporting no-parking laws as reasonable; and second, Mr.
3 43 Id. at 207, 267 N.E.2d at 800.
341 Bell Bros. Trucking v. Kelley, 277 Ky. 781, 785, 127 S.W.2d 831, 833 (1939)
(quoting Town of LaGrange v. Overstreet, 141 Ky. 43, 47, 132 S.W. 169, 170 (1910)).
345 336 111. 573, 168 N.E. 661 (1929).
346 Id. at 575, 168 N.E. at 663.
347 Id. at 578, 168 N.E. at 664.
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Haggenjos was not among those who were unreasonably barred
from the downtown zone.
348
Haggenjos may still be used as precedent that restrictions
banning deliveries to commercial establishments at certain times
are arbitrary on their face. In some jurisdictions, its dictum that
the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit
may still carry weight. But in Illinois, at least, this proposition
has been undermined.
3 49
The court in Chicago National Bank v. City of Chicago
Heights,35 0 distinguishing Haggenjos, quite properly called the
regulation/prohibition distinction a false issue. The court noted
that cases that seemed to invalidate ordinances on the grounds
of "prohibition" actually turned on questions of reason-
ableness.351 Thus even if prohibition is not completely ruled out,
it still must be shown to be reasonable.
A different form of "reasonableness" test involves considera-
tion of the narrowness of the statute. In Good Humor Corp. v. City
of New York, 352 the city passed an ordinance prohibiting the
peddling of goods on any city street. The ordinance was enacted
under the city's power with regard to the care, management, and
use of its streets, as well as under the general delegation of police
power contained in the city charter. The city offered evidence
that "some 'itinerant peddlers' are unclean in their habits and are
irresponsible, insolent, unfair and abusive in the manner in
which they conduct their business; that at times some fraudu-
lently use defective scales and measures; that some keep and store
merchandise and offer it for sale in unsanitary manner .... -353
In addition, the city argued that licensing procedures were inef-
fective because many of the vendors simply failed to obtain
licenses. The court nonetheless carefully demonstrated that
Good Humor avoided all the evils that the city sought to elimi-
nate. The court continued:
3 48 Id. at 575, 577-78, 168 N.E. at 662-63.
The ordinance was amended to permit up to three minutes of standing for reasona-
bly expeditious loading and unloading of passengers and up to thirty minutes for freight.
The ordinance was then upheld in City of Chicago v. McKinley, 334 Ill. 287, 1'76 N.E.
261 (1931).
349 See Chicago Nat'l Bank v. City of Chicago Heights, 14 ill. 2d 135, 150 N.E.2d 827
(1958).
350 Id.
351 Id. at 141, 150 N.E. at 830.
352 290 N.Y. 312, 49 N.E.2d 153 (1943).
353 Id. at 318, 49 N.E.2d at 156 (emphasis in New York Reports only).
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An ordinance which prohibits a business so conducted
because others conduct a similar business in manner
which creates conditions which the public should not be
compelled to tolerate, is patently unreasonable, at least
where it does not appear that discrimination between
the harmful and the harmless is impractical and that the
public interest may be served better by complete prohi-
bition than by further attempts at regulation.
354
The converse of the overbroad ordinance is the law that
solves only part of the problem, arbitrarily selecting one classifi-
cation of contributors to the problem to be regulated while leav-
ing another class untouched. Such classification is also subject to
attack as unreasonable. A recent case considering the question is
Great Lakes Motorcycle Dealers Association, Inc. v. City of Detroit,
3 55
which involved the prohibition of the use of certain streets by
two-wheeled motor vehicles. Despite evidence of excessive noise
and speed, the court found the prohibition impermissible. The
court viewed the relevant category as "motor vehicles" and thus
found that "it is unreasonable and arbitrary to deny the use of
the public streets to motorcycles, and yet, allow automobiles to
continue to use those streets."
Such findings of arbitrary classification are, however, rare.
Since the adolescence of the automobile era, for example, courts
354 Id. at 319, 49 N.E.2d at 156.
The court also used "reasonable relation" language, but it is difficult to see why an
ordinance that admittedly would eliminate the harm the legislature intended to cure
would be unreasonably related to the goal of the legislature. A secondary ground for the
decision was that the city council had exceeded its police power. The court reached this
ground because the council had received a report suggesting a ban on peddlers to
"prevent unfair competition by itinerant peddlers with storekeepers who pay rent and
various taxes. ... Id. at 317, 49 N.E.2d at 155. Such an object, the court said, was
beyond the legitimate objectives of local government and so could not serve as a justifica-
tion for exercise of the police power. But see Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio
St. 245, 249, 140 N.E. 595, 596 (1923) ("A village might well contemplate that its mer-
chants who own property in the municipality, and live in the municipality, contributing to
its development and welfare and paying their taxes in the municipality, should not have
as competitors upon its streets a line of street stores operated by motor busses [sic].") For
another case of prohibited purpose see Hofstra College v. Board of Trustees, 145
N.Y.S.2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1955), aJf'd without opinion, 3 App. Div. 2d 712, 159 N.Y.S.2d 943
(1957) (closing to prevent through traffic to college beyond power of village).
355 38 Mich. App. 564, 196 N.W.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1972). The court actually con-
strued the statute as both too broad and too narrow. It first found the blanket prohibi-
tion against motorcycles overbroad because it applied to both the "Hell's Angels" and
law-abiding riders. Without a pause the court addressed the arbitrary classification prob-
lem and then, again without pause, determined what the proper solution to the problem
should be. The proper solution would be enforcement of the speed and noise ordi-
nances.
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have permitted the regulation of motor vehicles without regulat-
ing "vehicles drawn by horses." This distinction was held not
arbitrary because the horseless carriages "introduced a new ele-
ment of danger to travelers on the highway."
'3 56
Another attack on the exercise of the police power is that
such action interferes with the vested rights of the users of a
street. While certain rights are clearly recognized in owners of
land abutting a street, 357 some courts have also assigned rights in
a street to the general public. Such an assignment may be in-
ferred, for instance, from the language of a court overturning
the creation of exclusive bus and taxi lanes: "[N]o matter how
liberally we construed the police power of a city in relation to its
streets we cannot find the right to discriminate against the gen-
eral public's use of a one-way lane in a street for the benefit of
only city buses and taxicabs.' '358 Despite the piling on of lan-
guage of police power and discrimination, the court apparently
meant that the city was taking the vested right of automobile and
truck drivers to use the lane, to give it to another group, taxis
and buses, without just compensation.
The problems with finding or recognizing such a right are
multitudinous. While abutting owners may be relatively easily
identified and compensated for infringement of their rights, a
municipality would be hard pressed to compensate the "general
public." Carried to an extreme, which is not too far from the
initial premise, any individual who is in any way inconvenienced
by any alteration of traffic patterns-implemented for purposes
of safety, to increase speed of traffic, to decrease pollution, or
whatever-would have a right to compensation. With such con-
straints, government regulation of traffic would cease.
35 9
Courts, however, have had little problem in upholding the
banning of trucks from residential streets without compensating
potential truck users.3 60 The facile explanation has been that the
"6 Commonwealth v. Nolan, 189 Ky. 34, 37, 224 S.W. 506, 507 (1920).
3'1 See notes 362-434 infra & accompanying text.
358 City of Madison v. Reynolds, 48 Wis. 2d 156, 160, 180 N.W.2d 7, 10 (1970).
3'9 This point does not imply that members of the public would not have standing to
challenge an "unreasonable" regulation.
360 See, e.g., Cincinnati Motor Transp. Ass'n v. City of Lincoln Heights, 26 Ohio St.
2d 203, 267 N.E.2d 797 (1971). The court found that the availability of alternative
routes, even though circuitous and considerably longer than those available before the
truck ban, supported the reasonableness of the ordinance. Note that the inconvenience
and denial of use of certain streets was not a taking. If absolutely no routes had been
available, the question of right of access to one's own property would have arisen. That
issue is clearly separable.
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general public holds an easement in a street, but that an indi-
vidual common carrier or entrepreneur has only a mere
privilege of engaging in gainful enterprise by participating in the
right of passage. 361 If this terminology were applied to traffic
restrictions, those with a general right, the public, would be
banned from the streets, and those with a mere privilege
would be admitted to street use. On such an analysis the restric-
tions might be struck down. The absurdity of the result sug-
gests the absurdity of the distinction. The better view is that
the city holds the easement in the streets to fulfill its general wel-
fare function, and those who have no abutting land, be they en-
trepreneur or individual, have no "vested" right in a particu-
lar mode or route of passage.
B. The Abutters' Rights
The principal legal issue raised by a street use plan, the issue
on which the cost and ultimate feasibility of a program may turn,
is the right of access of owners of land abutting public ways. The
right of access of the abutting landowner is a legally protected,
real property interest in the nature of an easement.3 62 At a
minimum it is the right to enter and leave realty abutting a
public way and the converse right to enter and leave the public
way without being forced to pass over the land of another. 363
361 See, e.g., Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923);
Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 168 P. 516 (1917).
362 See, e.g., Morrison v. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960) (easement of
ingress and egress); People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1944) (easement);
Clokey v. Wabash Ry., 353 Ill. 349, 187 N.E. 475 (1933); Department of Highways v.
Linnecke, 86 Nev. 257, 468 P.2d 8 (1970) ("special right of easement for access pur-
poses"); Dr. T.C. Smith Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 279 N.C. 328, 182 S.E.2d 383
(1971) (easement appurtenant). See also 3 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 927
(3d ed. 1939) (rights inherent in nature of highway-incident to ownership of abutting
land-not an easement but analogous to it).
On the origin of the right, see the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in
Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544, 571 (1905).
3'3 See cases collected in 10 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
30, at 649 n.65 (3d ed. 1966). See also Surety Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. State Dep't of Transp.,
54 Wis. 2d 438, 444, 195 N.W.2d 464, 467, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972): "[T]he
right of access involves only the right to enter and leave the property without being
forced to trespass across the land of another." But cf. Campbell v. State, 39 App. Div. 2d
615, 617, 331 N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (1972), afffd mem., 32 N.Y.2d 952, 300 N.E.2d 736, 347
N.Y.S.2d 205 (1973). There claimant owned a tract which did not abut on a public
highway. To gain access to the highway he crossed three other tracts "with the permission
or acquiesence of the various owners" although he "did not have an easement or right of
way." The state took a strip along the northern boundary of claimant's land and thereby
blocked his access to the old highway.
Whatever the legal nature of the access before the taking, the fact is that it was
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The public way to which access relates must in turn be connected
to the general system of public streets.364
1. The Right of Access and Compensation
The questions on which a restriction program turns are how
much intrusion on this right is permissible without compensating
the abutting landowner, and what deprivations must be compen-
sated. To say that the answers given by the courts have been
muddled is an understatement. As the United States Supreme
Court observed nearly seventy years ago in Sauer v. New York:
The right of an owner of land abutting on public high-
ways has been a fruitful source of litigation in the courts
of all the States, and the decisions have been conflicting,
and often in the same State irreconcilable in principle.
The courts have modified or overruled their own deci-
sions, and each State has in the end fixed and limited,
by legislation or judicial decision, the rights of abutting
owners in accordance with its own view of the law and
public policy.
365
Since Sauer the confusion has been compounded by a new
wave of litigation concerning the Interstate Highway Program.
Much of that program has consisted of the conversion of existing
roads and highways to limited access highways which have af-
fected the physical access of the abutting landowners. In the
process of working out the circumstances under which land-
owners should receive compensation for loss of access, the courts
have left the law in this area in a "shambles. ' 366 Thus, fifty-six
years after Sauer, the Supreme Court of New Mexico could note
that:
used by claimant without objection from the time he acquired the property in
1941 and by others before him as early as 1909... [T]he question in determin-
ing whether or not claimant is entitled to consequential damages is whether or
not he has been deprived of this access-not the quality of it.
On the definition of "abutter," see, e.g., Royal Transit, Inc. v. Village of W. Mil-
waukee, 266 Wis. 271, 63 N.W.2d 62 (1954).
1'4 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 307 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1962), quoted and discussed in
Stoebuck, The Property Right of Access Versus the Power of Eminent Domain, 47 TEXAS L. REV.
733, 735 (1969); Breidert v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 659, 394 P.2d 719, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 903 (1964); People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Becker, 262 Cal. App. 2d 634, 69
Cal. Rptr. 110 (Ct. App. 1968); James v. State, 88 Idaho 172, 397 P.2d 766 (1964). See
also Jennings v. Patterson, 488 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1974) (allegation of denial of access on
grounds of racial discrimination held violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970)).
365 206 U.S. 536, 548 (1907).
366 Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 13, 21 (1972).
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The authorities are in hopeless conflict on this sub-
ject. It would seem that this is one phase of the law
upon which the courts, sometimes even within the same
jurisdiction, have adopted seemingly inconsistent views,
and, in addition, in almost all of the cases, there are
either vigorous dissents or special concurring opinions
which join in the result only. There seems to be a radi-
cal difference in viewpoint among justices who have
been required to rule upon the point. This conflict is so
pronounced that most of the cases contain lengthy dis-
sertations expounding the views of the author of the
opinion or the dissent.
367
One clear source of confusion is the line of cases that tries to
distinguish between compensable and noncompensable damages
in terms of "the police power." Financial loss resultant from the
exercise of the police power is, we are told, damnum absque
injuria3 68 Yet if this is so and only damages from actions outside
the police power'are compensable, then the traffic restriction
programs will have little trouble. For if the action is outside the
police power, as we have seen, the municipality cannot act at
all.369 Therefore any permissible action would be noncompensa-
ble. This makes no sense. Clearly "police power" is being used as
a meaningless label. Professor Arvo Van Alstyne put it aptly:
[T]he "police power" rubric employed to justify denial
of compensation in cases where alleged property value
depreciation has been caused by "traffic regulations,"
describes only the result; it does not advance supporting
reasons.... [T]he "police power" approach lends itself
to mechanical application with potentially irrational
results.370
367 State v. Danfelser, 72 N.M. 361, 364 384 P.2d 241, 243 (1963). Whether depriva-
tion of reasonable access has occurred is sometimes a question of fact, see State Highway
Comm'n v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755 (1957); Henderickson v. State, 267
Minn. 436, 127 N.W.2d 165 (1964); W.E.W. Truck Lines v. State Dep't of Roads, 178
Neb. 218, 132 N.W.2d 782 (1965); Slepian v. State, 34 App. Div. 2d 880, 312 N.Y.S.2d
338 (1970). The question is sometimes treated as a question of law. See, e.g., People v.
Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943); Brock v. State Highway Comm'n, 195
Kan. 361, 404 P.2d 934 (1965); Stefan Auto Body v. State Highway Comm'n, 21 Wis. 2d
363, 124 N.W.2d 319 (1963).
368 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 479 F.2d 1383 (Ct. CI. 1973); Farmers-
Kissinger Market House Co. v. City of Reading, 310 Pa. 493, 165 A. 398 (1933).
369 See notes 336-60 supra & accompanying text.
370 Van Alstyne, Just Compensation of Intangible Detriment: Criteria for Legislative Modifi-
cations in California, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 491, 507 (1969) (footnote omitted).
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Therefore the attorney must look to a variety of factors to
determine the probability that compensation will be required.
Certainly he must consider the nature of the damages to the
abutter, the rationale for the municipal action, and the alterna-
tives open to the municipality. Ultimately he must determine
whether the highest and best use of the property has been
affected.
If a municipality built a fence completely surrounding a
private parcel, rights of access would clearly be infringed and
compensation due. But the concept of right of access contains
major ambiguities. For instance, the question must be asked:
What mode of access? Take the residential situation in which an
ordinance prohibits X from driving his car on the street in front
of his house. X must now park one block away and walk to his
house. Has his right of access therefore been "damaged" or
"taken"? The answer is "no" if access means physical accessibility
because X can walk from his car to his house. The answer is "yes,"
however, if access means entering his property from the public
way by automobile.3 7 1 Because a traffic restriction plan involves a
separation of transportation modes and their redistribution on
the streets of the central business district, a more precise defini-
tion of access is critical. If the right of access means accessibility
by any one of a wide variety of transportation modes, then the
implementation of a street use planning scheme will give rise to
claims for compensation by most abutters. Virtually no case law
exists on this critical question.
One writer has suggested that the right of access be con-
sidered "the reasonable capacity of a landowner to reach the
abutting public way by customary means of locomotion. 3 7 2 One
of the few cases touching on the point sounds in a similar vein.
In Hatfield v. Straus, the New York Court of Appeals held that
the right of access includes "such means of conveyance for the
171 In Breinig v. Allegheny County, 332 Pa. 474, 481, 2 A.2d 842, 847 (1938), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that "[a]n abutting owner undoubtedly has the right to
place his car in a garage on his own lot and for the purpose of access thereto he may use
the sidewalk, cutting the curb under municipal permit .... " But the court tempered its
holding with a discussion of some general propositions:
First, a municipality cannot, without condemnation, completely shut off an abut-
ting owner's access to his land, particularly pedestrian access. Second, in highly
congested areas the right of vehicular access may be reduced to a minimum ...
vehicular access may, in proper cases, be restricted to the hours of least conges-
tion.
Id.
372 Stoebuck, supra note 364, at 765.
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transportation and delivery of goods and merchandise as are
usual and customary. ' 37 3 While both formulations provide useful
authority for the proposition that a municipality may act to regu-
late or prohibit access by modes that are not customary-a don-
key or elephant, for instance-they are ambiguous on whether
the right of access includes all customary modes. If not, does the
right extend only to modes that have actually been utilized in the
recent past and are customary or normal?37 4 To modes that have
been available?
The concept that access includes all reasonably available
modes might by bolstered by the analogy of a line of abuse-of-
easement cases. In Marden v. Mallard Decoy Club, Inc. ,35 the court
recently interpreted a 1799 grant of a cartway to include passage
by automobile. The decision rested on the theories that an ease-
ment changes to serve the reasonable uses of the dominant estate
and that easements may "be employed .. . for the means of
transportation in common use by a succeeding generation. 37 6
With such a view applied to the right of access, the abutter might
have constantly expanding modes available to him. The more
reasonable view seems to be that the easement provides the
dominant estate with the right to use a modern mode of trans-
portation functionally equivalent to his accustomed mode. By
analogy, a shift in mode brought about by exercise of the police
power would not be compensable if the new mode adequately
served the "reasonable uses" of the abutters.
Thus, the use of the abutting land as well as the abstract
change in mode may be an important factor in determining
levels of compensation.3 7 7 In fact, no one has ever successfully
argued that a gasoline station or motel cut off from a highway by
new construction had suffered no taking of its right of access
373 189 N.Y. 208, 214-15, 82 N.E. 172, 175 (1907).
374 See Johnson v. United States, 479 F.2d 1383, 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
375 278 N.E.2d 743 (Mass. 1972); see McDonnell v. Sheets, 234 Iowa 1148, 1154, 15
N.W.2d 252, 255 (1944): "And it is the general rule that where a right-of-way is granted
it may be used for any purpose to which the land accommodated thereby may reasonably
be devoted ......
376 278 N.E.2d at 745 (quoting Swenson v. Marino, 306 Mass. 582, 587, 29 N.E.2d
15, 18 (1940). A third factor sometimes considered is whether the proposed mode mate-
rially increases the burden on the servient estate. See, e.g., Phillips v. Bonadies, 105 Conn.
722, 136 A. 684 (1927).377 But see Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town of Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, 51 N.E. 758 (1898).
There the court held that an ordinance barring "traffic teams" (horse-drawn wagons)
from a particular street, which was likely to drive the plaintiff out of business, did not
give rise to a claim based on the right of access when the police power was validly
exercised.
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because the facility could still be reached by bicycle or on foot.3 7 8
But it could be argued successfully that a motion picture theater
in a central business district has suffered no taking when its
street is converted to a pedestrian mall.
Aside from mode of access and use of land, it may be ar-
gued that a factor to be considered is which persons have been
denied access to the property. The cases rarely explore the class
of those who benefit from the abutter's right of access. Certainly
the abutter himself is entitled to enter and leave the abutting
property unhindered. So is his lessee. What of his invitees and
licensees? This question does not arise normally because the
abutter's route of physical access is also used by these other
groups. For the traffic restriction program, however, the distinc-
tion may be significant. We might continue to allow freight vehi-
cles to use a street for deliveries, but prohibit access to au-
tomobiles bringing customers or clients. Would such a restriction
give rise to a claim on the part of an abutter? The few cases that
have taken up the question directly have virtually assumed the
conclusion that the abutter's right of access includes "patrons,
clients, customers and visitors generally.
37 9
Another issue that an abutter may raise is that his route of
access has been so elongated as to constitute a taking of his right.
The rule is clear that damages resulting from circuity of access
are considered damnum absque injuria.3 80 On the other hand,
when remaining access is "unsuitable," compensation must be
given. 381 Again these terms are conclusory labels. The archetypal
'78 See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 103-Ariz. 194, 438 P.2d 760 (1968); Underwood v. State,
40 App. Div. 2d 749, 337 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1972).
319 10 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 363, § 30.63. See City of Birmingham v. Hood-
McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114 (1937); State v. Wilson, 103 Ariz. 194,
438 P.2d 760 (1968); Reining v. New York L. & W. Ry., 13 N.Y.S. 238, 240 (Super. Ct.),
aff'd, 128 N.Y. 157, 28 N.E. 640 (1891); Lenci v. City of Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664, 388
P.2d 926 (1964).
380 The leading case is Smith v. Boston, 61 Mass. (7 Cushing) 254 (1852). See Johnson
v. United States, 479 F.2d 1383, 1391 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Stanwood v. Malden, 157 Mass. 17,
31 N.E. 702 (1892); Buhl v. Fort St. Union Depot Co., 98 Mich. 596, 57 N.W. 829 (1894);
Kings County Fire Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 101 N.Y. 411, 5 N.E. 353 (1886).
"I1 See Priestly v. State, 23 N.Y.2d 152, 155, 242 N.E.2d 827, 829, 295 N.Y.S.2d 659,
662-63 (1968); Holmes v. State, 282 App. Div. 278, 279, 123 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (1953);
Merritt Manor Estates, Inc. v. Village of Elmsford, 30 Misc. 2d 935, 941, 218 N.Y.S.2d
371, 377 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
An alternative formulation contrasting "reasonable" with "unreasonable" access is
occasionally found in the cases. See, e.g., Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. ex tel.
People v. Mokres, 28 Ill. App. 3d 422, 328 N.E.2d 357 (1974). "It is readily seen that
these words 'reasonable access' are the generators of uncertainty and trouble." New York,
C. & St. L.R.R. v. Bucsi, 128 Ohio St. 134, 142, 190 N.E. 562, 565 (1934).
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route case involves limited access highways: An abutting land-
owner previously could proceed from his land to a major
thoroughfare, but with conversion of that road to a limited-
access highway, the abutter is left with only a service or access
road which, in turn, leads to the major thoroughfare. In Under-
wood v. State,3 82 for instance, respondents in an eminent domain
proceeding were compensated for their loss of frontage on a
state highway. To reach their filling station and restaurant, it
had become necessary to travel "south 750 feet" along the high-
way, "then east 180 feet along the south edge of the leased
premises, then north 460 feet to the enclosed area. 3 83 And in
State v. Wilson,384 Highway Number 86, later known as Interstate
10, had bisected condemnee's motel and guest ranch so that
patrons could turn off the highway "directly" into condemnee's
property.
[Following limited access conversion,] visitors no longer
had direct access to the ranch but had to use the
Dragoon Road Interchange, between 800 or 900 feet
west of appellees' property. A traveler going east must
take a ramp road 1500 feet west of the interchange,
leave the ramp at Dragoon Road, turn south and go
about three-quarters of a mile, then turn off Dragoon
Road and turn onto the Wilson property, the building
still being approximately 2000 feet away. A westbound
traveler must go past the Wilson property, turn onto
the interchange approximately 500 feet beyond the
overpass of Dragoon Road and Interstate #10, turn
back to Dragoon Road, pass under Interstate #10 and
then go to the Wilson property on Dragoon Road in the
same manner as the traveler coming from the west. 385
Despite the fact that the journey probably consumed less time
than reading a description of it, the court found that "the substi-
tute access road is, in our opinion, unreasonably circuitous.13 86
These holdings relate not only to route of access but sub
silentio to the mode. The abutter's invitees and licensees in each
382 40 App. Div. 2d 749, 337 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1972).
383 Id. at 750, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
384 103 Ariz. 194, 438 P.2d 760 (1968).
385 Id. at 196, 438 P.2d 762 (1968).
386 Id. at 197, 438 P.2d at 763 (emphasis supplied). The resolution of the issue of
inappropriate remaining access, or "unreasonable circuity," is occasionally affected by
whether the interference emanates from a "traffic regulation," for instance, the construc-
tion of a median barrier. See, e.g., Department of Pub. Works v. Logan, 198 Cal. App. 2d
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case can reach his premises only in their automobiles. To the
extent the court focuses at all, its attention is therefore fixed on
the increased difficulty of going from point A to point B in an
automobile. The court has skipped the initial step of considering
whether the automobile is necessary to the right of access. 387 The
cases may therefore be distinguishable were an attempt made to
apply them to a traffic restriction scheme in an urban context,
where it may be shown that automobiles are unnecessary.
In resolving these circuity cases, the courts provide some
guidance for the street use planner. The tribunals attack these
cases by citing two kinds of data. First, an opinion may recount
the additional number of turns, with appropriate descriptions
like "difficult," "narrow," "roundabout," and then add comments
on increased distances, 388 to convey an impression of the added
"burden" placed upon one seeking access to the claimant's
premises. Comparisons of the time necessary to enter the
premises, before and after the change, are rarely consid-
ered.38 9 Second, the opinion may point to the decline in claim-
ant's business due to the change in access. While the prevailing
view is that loss of business earnings is not compensable, evi-
dence of such is often used to support expert testimony that
the change in access has altered the "highest and best use of
the property" to the detriment of the claimant.
3 90
581, 17 Cal. Rptr. 674 (Ct. App. 1961). Such reasoning has been correctly labeled "cir-
cular and spurious." Van Alstyne, supra note 370, at 503.
For a different approach, see State Highway Comm'n v. Finch, 237 Miss. 314, 114
So. 2d 673 (1959), in which the court read the Mississippi cases to hold that where a
highway alteration "renders the abutting landowners' property less accessible to the
highway" and where a Mississippi statute defines a "Controlled-access Facitity" as one
"over, from or to which" abutters have only a controlled right of access, nothing more
was needed to establish a "taking."
In Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Wilson & Co., 22 111. App. 3d 302, 317
N.E.2d 103 (App. Ct. 1974), the state took the defendant's entire frontage on a high
volume traffic artery. It "proposed to build an access road to connect the remaining tract
to a north-south residential street ... [which street] eventually intersects with [the traffic
artery.]" The court found "a complete taking of access." Id. at 303, 305, 317 N.E.2d at
104, 105.
387 See notes 371-78 supra & accompanying text.
38 For cases collected and divided by number of feet, see Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 13,
84-88 (1972).
389 For one such rare consideration, see Calumet Fed. Sav. & Loan v. City of
Chicago, 306 Ill. App. 524, 29 N.E.2d 292, 295 (1940).
39 See, e.g., State ex rel. Herman v. Wilson, 103 Ariz. 194, 438 P.2d 760 (1968).
Serious alterations in the manner of doing business, as well as lost profits, may be
marshalled to show a detriment to the highest and best use of a property. See, e.g.,
Holmes v. State, 282 App. Div. 278, 123 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1953). There, prior to the closing
of a street entrance, claimants carried on ninety percent of their feed mill business with
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This reference to use is in fact the common thread of ration-
ality that ties together the access cases in which courts have been
willing to go beyond a mechanical recitation of the litany of
police power versus the right of access. 391 The leading case de-
fining the right of access as a function of "the highest and best
use of the property" is Priestly v. State.392 The state rendered
access to the abutting property more circuitous, but the court
indicated that this circuity did not necessarily give rise to a com-
pensable claim. Because the abutting property was vacant the
court could point to no decline in patronage or substantial
change in the volume of traffic to aid in drawing "the rather
murky distinction" 393 between circuitous and unsuitable access.
Instead the court indicated that analysis begins with establishing
the "highest and best use of the property" before the change and
then determining whether the remaining access has affected that
use in a negative way.
In applying the Priestly rule, the court in Underwood v.
State394 confirmed the finding that the changed access had
rendered unsuitable the premises' highest and best use before
the appropriation-some commercial business catering to the
traveling public, such as a motel, restaurant, or gift shop-and
resulted in a decline from the highest and best use to limited
commercial development, such as trailer sales. This finding
makes it clear that the description of the increased number of
twists and turns and distances is at best a makeweight that
merely confuses the real issue. The critical factor is not the
added effort imposed on the abutter and his invitees and licen-
sees, but whether they are willing to make that effort.3 95 If the
farmers who called upon the claimants' place of business. After the closing, access could
be had only by a road that was difficult for customers to use; as a result, the claimants
had to deliver over ninety percent of their sales. Claimants received compensation.
391 See Mayberry & Aloi, Compensation for Loss of Access in Eminent Domain in New York:
A Re-Evaluation of the No-Compensation Rule with a Proposalfor Change, 16 BUFFALO L. REv.
603, 620 (1967); Hendrickson v. State, 267 Minn. 436, 127 N.W. 165 (1964) (prohibiting
or limiting access as exercise of police power does not preclude claim for eminent domain
damages). For a discussion of the police power litany, see notes 368-70 supra & accom-
panying text.
392 23 N.Y.2d 152, 242 N.E.2d 827, 295 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1968). Earlier New York cases
include Red Apple Restaurant, Inc. v. State, 27 App. Div. 2d 417, 280 N.Y.S.2d 229
(1967); Holmes v. State, 282 App. Div. 278, 123 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1953). See generally
Johnson v. United States, 479 F.2d 1383 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Chandler v. Hjelle, 126 N.W.2d
141 (N.D. 1964) (considering all uses to which the property is adaptable and for which it
is needed or likely to be needed).
393 23 N.Y.2d at 155, 242 N.E.2d at 829, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
39 40 App. Div. 2d 749, 337 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1972).
'95 See note 390 supra & accompanying text.
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number of patrons at Underwood's filling station or Wilson's
guest ranch had increased after the highway was altered, it is
submitted that the court would have had some difficulty in find-
ing the new access route "unreasonably circuitous" or "unsuita-
ble," despite the increased distance and number of turns.
An analysis more appealing from the twin vantages of logic
and experience would recognize the right of access as a function
of the highest and best use of land and would squarely face the
fact that a decline in traffic or patronage can and usually will
alter the highest and best use.396 But to adopt the "highest and
best use" test does not amount to creating a right to compensa-
tion for a mere change in value of a property. 397 Compensation
would be available only for a change in the highest and best use,
not for a change in value if the use remains or could remain the
same. In United California Bank v. People ex rel. Department of
Public Works,398 for instance, application of the test would have
396 A major cautionary note to this approach is that the right of access is in the access
and not in a particular flow of traffic. A long line of "diversion-of-traffic" cases has held
that providing an attractive new route that lures motorists away from the route that abuts
the owner's property is not compensable, even when the owner loses substantial business.
People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943) (dictum); see James v. State, 88
Idaho 172, 397 P.2d 766 (1964); Ray v. State Highway Comm'n, 196 Kan. 13, 410 P.2d
278 (1966); A.E. Nettleton Co. v. State, 11 App. Div. 2d 899, 202 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1960);
Stefan Auto Body v. State Highway Comm'n, 21 Wis. 2d 363, 124 N.W.2d 319 (1963).
The paradigmatic case grows out of a rural setting in which the owner of a roadside
establishment loses business when a new limited-access throughway diverts traffic from
the front of his establishment, although the old road is left in place. The costs of such
diversion are particularly high for abutters in rural areas where land values are based
solely on agricultural uses except where the land abuts highways and has valuable poten-
tial for gasoline stations, motels, and souvenir stands. See, e.g., Castellano v. State, 38
App. Div. 2d 652, 327 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1971) (value as agricultural land $650 per acre;
value for low intensity commercial development $7,000 per acre).
The rationale for not socializing these losses may have been that the volume of
claims would be so high the building of roads would be discouraged. See, e.g., Bacich v.
Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 353, 364, 144 P.2d 818, 831 (1943) (concurring opinion)
(rule broadening liability "might prove so burdensome as to stop or substantially decrease
needed improvements").
These policy considerations would not generally apply in the central business district.
The scope of possible land uses in a CBD is much wider than in a rural area. Thus any
drop in traffic immediately abutting a CBD site is unlikely to have a significant negative
impact on the site's highest and best use. In fact, experiments indicate that a traffic
restriction program is more likely to upgrade the value of the land within the area
covered by the program.
In terms of highest and best use, the diversion issue for CBD's is then not a serious
problem. If diversion elevates the highest and best use, the owner cannot complain of a
taking. Even if he could, he may be faced with a setoff of "special benefits." See notes
480-503 infra & accompanying text.
19' See, e.g., Meyer v. Richmond, 172 U.S. 82, 95 (1898); People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.
2d 390, 395-96, 144 P.2d 799, 802 (1943).
391 1 Cal. App. 3d 1, 81 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1969).
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resulted in no compensation, the opposite of the actual result.
Compensation was sought for loss of exposure and access by a
small department store as a result of street closings that pre-
vented cars from stopping on an adjoining curb, construction of
a roadway that impaired the view of the store, and turning the
abutting streets into a parking lot. The jury awarded the owners
$54,625. If the highest and best use had been considered, how-
ever, the court would have followed the testimony of the experts
for both sides that the highest and best use of the land remained
as a small or medium-sized department store.399
The Priestly rule making access a function of highest and
best use subsumes issues that are rarely, if ever, discussed in the
case law, such as mode of transport and benefited group. An
illustration of the satisfactory operation of the rule can be found
in Castellano v. State.400 Appellant's cold-storage and fruit-
packing building stood on a road that was "dead-ended." Large
tractor-trailers which formerly had easy access to the building
could then serve the building only by backing in or backing out
399 A considerable refinement of the "highest and best use test" has been suggested
by Professor Arvo Van Alstyne. Van Alstyne, supra note 370. To decide whether the
remaining access is reasonable, Professor Van Alstyne has suggested a rather unwieldy
though comprehensive statutory provision on the factors to be taken into account:
a. The extent to which the property retains direct access capabilities reasonably
adequate for its highest and best use in light of (i) the nature and requirements
of that use; (ii) the number, physical dimensions, and usefulness of access
facilities; and (iii) any other circumstances relevant to effective utilization of the
property, including reasonably available alternatives....
b. The degree to which the property enjoys general accessibility to the sur-
rounding community, which is reasonably adequate in relation to its highest and
best use, in light of (i) increased travel time and distance to normal destinations;
(ii) greater hazards of traveling alternate routes; (iii) the practical unavailability
of reasonable alternate routes; and (iv) the likelihood that visits to the property
by members of the public (including commercial patronage) may decline due to
difficulties in travelling between the general street system and the property....
c. The extent to which the claimed impairment of access may be regarded as
reasonable and thus noncompensable because (i) the challenged governmental
action has a primary purpose and effect of safeguarding public health, safety
and welfare by means which would be substantially impaired or deterred by the
cost of making just compensation, if required, and for which equally salutory
alternatives, with less capacity for interfering with private access rights, are
unavailable at equal or lower cost; (ii) the adverse impact of the governmental
action upon access rights is so widely shared, speculative in nature or amount, or
relatively slight that the cost of distributing such losses in the form of constitu-
tional compensation would impose an unreasonable burden upon governmental
finances, or upon the judicial system, or both; or (iii) the claimants abutting
land enjoys compensating special benefits derived from public improvement or
from the practical operation of the regulatory measure.
Id. 512-15.
400 38 App. Div. 2d 652, 327 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1971).
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two-tenths of a mile. As a consequence, of the three trucking
lines that served appellant's business before the change, one re-
fused to continue and the other two had to send smaller trucks
or park their large trucks on the highway and move the goods
from appellant's warehouse to those trucks by fork-lift. If the
test were whether the limitation on access was "unreasonable,
°4 0 '
"substantial,' 40 2 or "material, '40 3 the case could have gone either
way.4 0 4 Applying the Priestly rule, however, there could be only
one outcome once the court confirmed that "[t]he use of smaller
trucks has not been shown in any way as detrimental to the
commercial value of the property .... "405
The Castellano application of Priestly is important to a plan of
traffic restriction. Its facts are an example of precisely the kind
of modal change in freight delivery that would take place, for
example, if freight delivery via rapid transit were found feasible
and implemented. 40 6 An alternative would be establishment of
centrally located freight depots with local deliveries by smaller
vans. 40 7 Neither change should give rise to a claim for taking of
or damage to the right of access without a showing of change in
the highest and best use of the property.
408
401 See, e.g., State ex rel. Herman v. Schaffer, 105 Ariz. 478, 467 P.2d 66 (1970).
402 See, e.g., James v. State, 88 Idaho 172, 397 P.2d 766 (1964).
403 See, e.g., State v. Geiger & Peters, Inc., 245 Ind. 143, 196 N.E.2d 740 (1964).
404 See, e.g., Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 366, 144 P.2d 818, 831
(1943) (concurring opinion).
405 38 App. Div. 2d at 653, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
406 See note 306 supra & accompanying text.
407 Note 221 supra & accompanying text.
408 In the recent case of La Briola v. State, 36 N.Y.2d 328, 328 N.E.2d 781, 368
N.Y.S.2d 147 (1975), the New York Court of Appeals preserved an unsatisfying distinc-
tion between damage due to loss of access and damage due to traffic diversion.
Claimant's land formerly abutted Route 22. That route was relocated, reducing
claimant's frontage on the highway from 1100 feet to 165 feet. In addition an access
ramp 150 feet in length was constructed connecting claimant's land with the new road.
As a result of these changes the highest and best use of claimant's land was reduced from
retail to light industrial. While Priestly would seem to militate in favor of compensation in
this case, the Court of Appeals felt that case was not applicable. "Put another way, the key
to the resolution of the issue in this case is that the reduction in highest use of claimant's
property was caused not by loss of suitable access but by the loss of abutment on a
highway and its profitable traffic." Id. at 334, 328 N.E.2d at 785, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 153. In
the view of the Court of Appeals, the case turned on the factual finding by the Court of
Claims that it was "the non-compensable diversion of traffic by the construction of the
new highway [which] destroyed the old highest use for [the] roadside business." Id. On
the other hand "[i]f the State's appropriation of highway-abutting land (true frontage), or
the physical construction of the improvement itself, so impairs access to the remaining
property that it can no longer sustain its previous highest and best use, then the State
must pay consequential damages to the owner . I.." Id. at 332, 328 N.E.2d at 783-84, 368
N.Y.S.2d at 151 (citing Priestly).
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Castellano also sheds light on the question of access points.
Suppose the property in question is in the middle of a central
business district block and abuts streets to the front and rear-a
typical situation. When municipal action results in the barring of
vehicular access to the property from one of the streets, has the
right of access been taken or damaged?40 9 As a result of the
changes in Castellano, "only one point of entry and exit remained
where there were formerly three .... , Yet without the effect
on highest and best use no compensation needed to be paid.
411
In Lysaght v. City of Fort Worth4 12 the city converted the abutting
street upon which the landowner had his loading dock into a
limited access freeway. His premises could no longer be served
by "large six-wheel trucks." In denying his claim for compensa-
tion the court found that "ordinary trucks" continued to have
access to his building from an alley in the rear. The approach in
those two cases seems more attractive than the usual mechanical
ones of noting that the reduction in the number of access points
is automatically a taking or damaging of the right of access413 or
that access need not be provided at every point.
41 4
409 For a list of states in which the exercise of the eminent domain power gives rise to
a claim for compensation if property is "damaged" see Stoebuck, supra note 364, at 734
n.2. The broader constitutional protection existing in these states has not led to a wider
conception of the right of access. See, e.g., Darnall v. State, 79 S.D. 59, 108 N.W.2d 201
(1961).
410 38 App. Div. 2d at 653, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 165.
411 A more conventional analysis was utilized in City of Wato v. Archenhold Auto.
Supply Co., 386 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd, 396 S.W.2d 111 (1965). A viaduct
constructed in an abutting street blocked the loading platform of a corner property.
Despite a finding that the viaduct was an inconvenience and a limitation on the
customer's access to the loading dock and despite a jury verdict that the market value of
appellee's property had been reduced, the court found no compensable injury on the
dual grounds that the construction of the viaduct by the city was a valid exercise of its
police power and that appellee had not been denied total access to its property.
412 359 S.W.2d 128, 129, 131 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
3 See, e.g., Brownlow v. O'Donoghue Bros., Inc. 276 F. 636 (D.C. Cir. 1921) (clos-
ing one driveway entrance to corner lot on which claimant maintained a gasoline station
gave rise to compensable claim despite fact that claimant had access from other street
and that closing was to protect endangered pedestrians); State v. Diamond Lanes, Inc.,
251 Ind. 520, 523-24, 242 N.E.2d 632, 634 (1968). Contra, Johnson v. United States, 479
F.2d 1383, 1390-91 (Ct. Cl. 1973) ("[T]he owner is not entitled to access to his land at any
and all points in the boundary between it and the highway."); State Highway Comm'n
v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 875, 82 N.W.2d 755, 759 (1957).
414 See, e.g., Fowler v. City of Nelson, 213 Mo. 82, 246 S.W. 638 (Ct. App. 1923).
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2. Abutters' Rights and Street Use Planning-
Special Problems
a. The "Piazza" Principle
One of the most pleasant images conjured up by imaginative
planners is an inner city of squares, piazzas, or areas similar in
function where pedestrians can sit or stroll without the intrusion
of motor vehicles. That such urban amenities can also be made
to serve a traffic restriction function has long been known to
planners. 415 The restriction effect is obtained by "dead-ending" a
street at a square. By dead-ending four streets at an intersection
a square or piazza is created. "Dead-ending" or creating a
cul-de-sac automatically eliminates through traffic and serves to
discourage even locally-destined vehicular traffic. The closing of
one end of a street to create a cul-de-sac is one of the more
common types of action affecting the right of access. A separate
line of access cases deals with culs-de-sac.
Courts generally apply two theories to deny recovery to
abutters on a cul-de-sac street. The first is that the injury to the
abutter is different in degree but not in kind from the harm to
the general public. 416 This point recognizes that the impact of a
cul-de-sac is primarily on through traffic. The abutter's driveway
or existing means of entry or exit is rarely blocked or altered.
Usually the creation of a cul-de-sac occasions at most a journey
around the block, a distance which the courts hold almost as a
matter of law not unduly circuitous. 41 7 The second theory upon
which recovery is ordinarily denied is the "one-way" street anal-
ogy. The right of a municipality to convert a street from a two-
way street to a one-way street in the interests of better traffic
management has long been held to be noncompensable. 41 8 The
" The street pattern of the typical CBD in the United States is a grid pattern
"designed to equalise the flow of traffic on parallel streets by giving motorists numerous
alternative routes of equal length. This pattern is intended to maximize average traffic
speed for a given lane-mileage [and] is intended to serve the interests of traffic move-
ment." Contrasting with the grid pattern is the cul-de-sac pattern which confines traffic to
the principal through roads and is intended to serve environmental objectives. J.
THoMsoN, supra note 76, at 12.
416 New York, C. & St. L.R.R. v. Bucsi, 128 Ohio St. 134, 190 N.E. 562 (1934). See
also In re East 5th St., 1 Misc. 2d 977, 146 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1955); cases collected in
2A P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.4443[3] n.15 (3d rev. ed. 1975).
411 Cf. notes 380-95 supra & accompanying text.
418See, e.g., Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 372 n.1, 144 P.2d 818, 835
n.3 (1943) (dissent) (dictum); Beckham v. City of Stockton, 64 Cal. App. 2d 487, 149 P.2d
296 (Ct. App. 1944) (dictum); State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Danfelser, 72 N.M.
361, 384 P.2d 241 (1963) (dictum). See also Eighth Ave. Coach Corp. v. City of New York,
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negative effect of the cul-de-sac is the same as the conversion of a
street to one-way traffic in the direction of the barrier creating
the cul-de-sac. In both cases one cannot enter the street from the
barred end. The general assertion is that the abutter's right of
access "does not include the right to travel in any particular
direction from one's property.
4 19
Like all assertions, this one can be, and has been, con-
tradicted. In the leading California case of Bacich v. Board of
Control, the California Supreme Court noted that "[i]t would
seem clear that the reasonable modes of egress and ingress
would embrace access to the next intersecting street in both
directions. ' 420 Why this is "clear" is not apparent from the opin-
ion. It was, in fact, this lack of clarity that led to a vigorous
dissent by Justice Traynor who noted that the majority begged
the question by simply redefining the right of access. 421 This so-
called "next intersecting street" rule has the attraction of preci-
sion and predictability but the weightier drawback of a lack of
foundation in either logic or experience. 422 As traffic planners
have noted, the main impact of creating a cul-de-sac is the barring
of through, but not of local, traffic. The rule is well settled that
an abutter has no legal right in the volume of traffic.42 3 Thus the
abutter cannot state a legally cognizable complaint about this
effect. The basis for his claim, if any, is the necessity of making a
U-turn where none was required before.424 The "cost" of the
170 Misc. 243, 10 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 286 N.Y. 84, 35 N.E.2d 907, 20
N.Y.S.2d 401 (1940).
419 State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Meier, 388 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Mo.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 846 (1965). See also In re East 5th Street, 1 Misc. 2d 977, 982, 146
N.Y.S.2d 794, 800 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (at common law "[a]ccess had to be preserved but not
necessarily in both directions .... "); Fearing v. Irwin, 55 N.Y. 486 (1874) ("though one
public way to property is closed, if there is another left, the property owner sustains no
actionable damage." [footnote omitted]).
420 23 Cal. 2d 343, 352, 144 P.2d 818, 824 (1943), discussed in Van Alstyne, supra note
370, at 494.
421 Justice Traynor noted that the trust that arises from the appropriations of land
for public thoroughfares is for the benefit of the public at large and only incidentally for
the benefit of the abutting owners. "The extension of the abutting owner's rights in the
present case makes the primary consideration the benefit of abutting owners rather than
the benefit of the public." 23 Cal. 2d at 371, 144 P.2d at 834.
422 See Van Alstyne, supra note 370, at 494-95.
42' See note 396 supra.
42 4 But see New York, C. & St. L.R.R. v. Bucsi, 128 Ohio St. 134, 139-40, 190 N.E.
562, 564 (1934): "If we let one hundred per cent equal their right of access to their
property prior to the date of the vacation ... [of one end of the street], then fifty per
cent must represent it now. Prior to the date of this improvement they could travel in two
directions. Now they can travel in but one direction in order to get into communication
with the street system of the city."
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U-turn may range from a minimal exertion of effort to the loss
of immediate proximity to transportation modes unable to
negotiate the turn. Against recognition of claims in compensa-
tion for these losses must be weighed the social costs of deter-
mining, litigating, and satisfying such claims. It is not surprising
then that a majority of jurisdictions deny compensation for clos-
ing one end of a street.
42 5
b. "Squeezing"
The narrowing of a thoroughfare, cutting down its absolute
capacity to carry automobiles, may be an effective tool of street
use planning. At first glance, a narrowing may seem to impinge
on a compensable right to light and air. But the leading cases
recognizing such a right generally involve a narrowing of the
open space by construction in the former thoroughfare 426 or the
operation of a steam railroad therein. 427 Far from diminishing
light and air quality, contemporary street narrowing accom-
plished by sidewalk expansion enhances full enjoyment of those
attributes. In implicit recognition of this benefit, the courts
should treat questions of the width of streets as involving only
the legal right of access.428
c. Leveling
Reconstruction of central business district streets to bring
them up to sidewalk level may facilitate pedestrianization of
those streets and traffic restrictions generally. Such reconstruc-
425 New York, C. & St. L.R.R. v. Bucsi, 128 Ohio St. 134, 190 N.E. 562 (1934). See,
e.g., Meyer v. Richmond, 172 U.S. 82 (1898); Krebs v. State Roads Comm'n, 160 Md.
584, 154 A. 131 (1931). Cases finding compensable damage for the creation of a cul-de-
sac are collected in Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 353, 144 P.2d 818, 829
(1944).
A special cul-de-sac rule apparently exists in New York. While conceding that as long
as "some means of access was made available" the common law right of access was not
taken or damaged, the court in In re East 5th St., 1 Misc. 2d 977, 986, 146 N.Y.S.2d 794,
804 (Sup. Ct. 1955), recognized the "ancient street doctrine" which gives landowners a
"private easement" to have access from each end of the block when "it appears that a
common grantor has by deed dedicated the street to the use of all grantees .... " The
rule applies "only when it is shown that the dominant tenement (ownership of the land)
and the bed of the street were once the property of a common grantor." Id. at 985, 146
N.Y.S.2d at 803.
426 See, e.g., Fry v. O'Leary, 141 Wash. 465, 252 P. 111 (1927).
41" See, e.g., Adams v. Chicago, B. & N.R.R., 39 Minn. 286, 39 N.W. 629 (1888).
428 See, e.g., City of Houston v. Fox, 444 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Tex. 1969) (no "property
right in any particular type or size of street"; only claim based on impairment of access
cognizable). See also Brown v. Board of Supervisors, 124 Cal. 274, 281, 57 P. 82, 84
(1899): Narrowing of Turk Street from 100 feet to 68 feet, 7 inches was not compensable
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tion provides a physical barrier to vehicular use. At the same
time it eliminates a major travel barrier for the handicapped
-the street curb. Finally, the plaza-like appearance encourages
pedestrians to cross back and forth among shops, something
they may be reluctant to do with a vehicle-free but still extant
street bed.
An objection that could be raised against such street leveling
is that the alteration constitutes a change of grade. Whether a
change in level of a few inches is a change of grade is arguable.
No cases resolve the question; typically a change of grade in-
volves several feet.429 Nonetheless, because grade changes impli-
cate various statutory and other rights separate from the right of
access, the street use planner must consider the effect of these
additional rights. At common law changes in grade did not give
rise to a claim for compensation under the "taking" provisions of
state constitutions. 430 This rule led to some harsh results; fol-
lowing suggestions by the courts,43 1 remedial legislation was
enacted. Generally legislation took the form of constitutional
amendment which added the phrase "or damaged" to the word
"taking. '43 2 In jurisdictions in which this is the law, compensa-
tion for change of grade may be obtained if an abutter can
establish that the market value of his property has been lowered
by the change.
433
because (1) no claims that reduction in width impaired access, (2) nor could such conten-
tion be made because "by the proposed reduction of the street it will have the same width
as the majority of streets in city."
Generally the procedure for altering the width of streets is incorporated in a statute.
When this is the case, the statutory procedure must be followed. See, e.g., City Improve-
ment Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 234 Pa. 486, 83 A. 408 (1912). In the absence of a statute
the municipality has discretion to decide on the width. See, e.g., Village of Moreauville v.
Boyer, 138 La. 1070, 71 So. 187 (1916).
The narrowing of a street may be considered a vacation. See text accompanying notes
436-49 infra. See, e.g., City of Mt. Carmel v. Shaw, 155 Il. 37, 39 N.E. 584 (1895). On the
other hand, a statute delegating power to vacate does not necessarily include the power
to narrow. See Dorsch v. Beaumont Glass Co., 74 Ohio St. 208, 78 N.E. 215 (1906).
429 See, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823); Cook v. State, 176
Misc. 947, 29 N.Y.S.2d 626 (Ct. Cl. 1941), modified, 267 App. Div. 847, 46 N.Y.S.2d 15
(1944) (six feet); O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187 (1851) (seventeen feet).
430 Sauer v. New York, 180 N.Y. 27, 72 N.E. 579 (1904), aff'd, 206 U.S. 536 (1907);
Thompson v. Seaboard Airline R.R., 248 N.C. 577, 104 S.E.2d 181 (1958); McCullough
v. Village of Campbellsport, 123 Wis. 334, 101 N.W. 709 (1904). See also 2A P. NICHoLs,
supra note 416, § 6.4441[2].
431 See, e.g., Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418, 434-35 (1823).
432 E.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15; PA. CONST. art. X, § 10.
433 See Fox v. City of South Norwalk, 85 Conn. 237, 82 A. 642 (1912); Ressegieu v.
City of Sioux City, 94 Iowa 543, 63 N.W. 184 (1895); Cook v. State, 176 Misc. 947, 29
N.Y.S.2d 626 (Ct. Cf. 1941); City of Willimon v. City of Greenville, 243 S.C. 82, 132
S.E.2d 169 (1963).
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As we have seen, the right of access is an ill-defined concept.
A change in grade, on the other hand, gives the appearance of
being a readily identifiable event. With a wooden jurisprudence
a traffic restriction plan might trigger an actionable claim if it is
implemented by a grade change, but not if it is done by a barrier
fence. Courts might avoid this result either by finding no
"change of grade" or by finding no liability for "ordinary and
reasonable" changes of grade.4 34 In early cases, "ordinary"
changes were those made as a result of the natural formation of
the surface or the original mode of construction, while "reason-
able" changes were those that increased the public convenience
or improved the general appearance of the street. Either of
these kinds of change were held noncompensable through the
fiction that such changes were contemplated when the munici-
pality first acquired its rights in the street and therefore com-
pensation had already been paid for such future changes. If
courts take the wooden though traditional approach, traffic re-
striction programs implemented by raising street beds to curb
levels could easily give rise to compensable claims. To avoid such
claims, planners would be well advised by their legal counsel to
avoid changing street levels when the goals of a traffic restriction
program can be achieved through other physical modifica-
tions.
C. Vacation
A major legal danger in modifying the existing street system
is that the changes will be found to constitute vacations. Vacating
a street would be counterproductive to a street use plan. In
many jurisdictions, vacation requires a particular procedure, and
actions that depart from the procedure may be invalidated. 435
Complying with the procedure may obstruct implementation of
the street use plan. 436 If a valid vacation is found, the street may
revert to the abutting landowners, possibly leading to the ex-
pense of a new taking by eminent domain.437 If reversion does
411 City Council of Montgomery v. Townsend, 80 Ala. 489, 495, 2 So. 155 (1887);
City of Pueblo v. Strait, 20 Colo. 13, 36 P. 789 (1894); 2A P. NIcHoLs, supra note 416, §
6.4441[9]. See also Williams v. State, 34 App. Div. 2d 101, 103, 309 N.Y.S.2d 795, 798
(1970): "Minor adjustments ... for purposes of repair or improvement [are not a] ...
change of grade within the meaning of the statute."
411 See notes 450-60 infra & accompanying text.
411 See notes 463-70 infra & accompanying text.
437 See notes 471-75 infra & accompanying text.
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not occur pursuant to a valid vacation, compensation may
nonetheless come due.
438
1. Vacation Defined
Generally a street vacation involves "a substantial and mate-
rial alteration ... in its character as a street.' '439 Because a traf-
fic restraint program involves "substantial and material" change
in street use, a finding of "vacation" is more than a mere possibil-
ity. In Wolfe v. City of Providence,440 for instance, the municipal
authorities closed part of Promenade Street to through vehicular
traffic as part of a plan of rotary traffic. The plan provided for
angle parking in the area of Promenade Street blocked off. The
court found that "to permanently prohibit . . . the use of the
highway at all times to all vehicles... [was], in effect, [to] decree
the abandonment of the street as a vehicular way."'44 ' To the
argument that Promenade Street remained open to the public
for pedestrian and parking purposes, the court responded that
"except for pedestrians, the public easement of travel on Prom-
enade Street ... has been banned permanently, and the area has
been devoted solely to parking .... It is an exclusive use of the
street inconsistent with the public easement of passage thereon.
Such an inconsistent use is unlawful. '442 By failing to articulate
the nature of the "public easement of passage" the court in Wolfe
assumed its conclusion, leaving two broad issues unanswered.
First is the question what uses of the public easement of
passage must be exercised to avoid abandonment. The public
easement has been repeatedly held to encompass the passage of
water mains and gas, sewer, telephone, telegraph, and electric
lines. 443 Surely the court was not implying that all uses must be
maintained. To say that removal of gas lines or water mains
amounts to an abandonment would be absurd. The court then
must have meant that the easement in motor vehicle traffic is
essential. But can it be said the easement incorporates a particu-
lar mode or modes of transport? Such incorporation is hardly
likely when most streets were laid out and used long before
425 See notes 476-79 infra & accompanying text.
439 11 E. McQUILLIN,supra note 363, 30.178a (3d rev. ed. 1964).
440 77 R.I. 192, 74 A.2d 843 (1950), discussed in Comment, supra note 317, at 304-05.
441 Id. at 204, 74 A.2d at 850.
442 Id. at 206, 74 A.2d at 851.
4'3See, e.g., In re Grand River Dam Auth., 484 P.2d 505, 510 (Okla. 1971) (use of
easement for streets to permit construction of power lines is "a proper use incidental to
enjoyment of the public easement").
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motor vehicles existed. And even if one were to read the ease-
ment narrowly so that it incorporated only the prevailing mode
at a particular time one would still have to face the question
whether the prevailing mode will be considered the mode in use
on the street prior to the change or the mode that will be in use
after the legislative body has acted within the scope of its police
power. That is to say, is "prevailing mode" solely a function of
technology, or can the legislature change the prevailing mode
through police power regulation? Such considerations could be
pursued ad nauseum. Logic does not require the legal conclusion
that vacation be considered a function of the use of streets by
motor vehicles.
The second question is what rights and how much discretion
are possessed by the municipal corporation in its use and struc-
turing of the easement. Clearly the "public easement of passage"
creates no legal right in members of the public as such. Rather
the municipality holds the right in trust for the public.4 44 When
the Wolfe court says that devoting Promenade Street to pedes-
trian and parking uses is "unlawful," it is really saying that the
municipality has abused this trust. Assuming the municipality is
properly exercising its police power in implementing a traffic
restriction program, can it at the same time be abusing a public
trust? Is the municipality any more a trustee of the streets than
of any municipally-owned property? There seems to be no point
in drawing a legal distinction between the relationship of the
public to the exercise of traditional governmental functions in
general and the relationship of the public to the exercise of
municipal authority over streets. The Wolfe court escaped this
problem by finding the vacation of Promenade Street beyond
the authority delegated by Rhode Island to the City of Provi-
dence and also violative of due process.
Closing the street to vehicular traffic is not necessarily con-
sidered a vacation. In Calumet Federal Savings and Loan Association
v. City of Chicago,445 Torrance Avenue was closed at its intersec-
tions with 95th and 97th Streets by the erection of seven-inch
high concrete curbs. The trial court found that the construction
of the curbs amounted to a vacation. The Appellate Court of
444 Wolfe v. City of Providence, 77 R.I. 192, 202-03, 74 A.2d 843, 849 (1950). See
Nielson v. City of Chicago, 330 Ill. 301, 161 N.E. 768 (1928); Lohr v. Metropolitan
Elevated R.R., 104 N.Y. 268, 10 N.E. 528 (1887); Hamilton G. & C. Traction Co. v.
Parish, 67 Ohio St. 181, 65 N.E. 1011 (1902).
145 306 Ill. App. 524, 29 N.E.2d 292 (1940).
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Illinois reversed, indicating that a "vacation of a public street in-
volves its complete abandonment for street purposes .... "446
Because vehicles continued to have access to Torrance via 96th
Street it was obvious to the court that there had been no vacation.
The meaning of vacation was subsequently refined in Chicago
National Bank v. City of Chicago Heights,447 which involved an or-
dinance closing a street to all vehicular traffic. The court found
that this did not amount to a vacation either, because it was not
a "complete abandonment. ' 448 Unlike the court in Wolfe, which
found that limiting a street to pedestrian use amounted to reduc-
ing it to a "mere footway," 449 the Chicago National Bank court
recognized pedestrian use as a legitimate street use. Considering
that any rational program of traffic restriction would provide for
access for emergency vehicles, a finding of vacation will generally
turn on this question of whether or not the court considers pe-
destrian use a legitimate street use. Given the temper of the times
and the ready availability of data justifying exercise of the
police power, it is more likely than not that courts would not
find a vacation in a plan of traffic restriction that included limit-
ing a street to pedestrian use.
2. Procedural Problems
A finding of a vacation would raise barriers more substantial
than would claims for compensation that may arise with regard
to taking or damage of the right of access, although the issue of
compensation to abutters would also arise.450 The procedure for
44
6 
Id. at 529, 29 N.E.2d at 294.
447 14 Ill. 2d 135, 150 N.E.2d 827 (1958).
Cf. CAL STS. & H'wAYs CODE § 8306 (West 1969), which provides that "'[v]acation'
includes the abandonment of public street easements and the closing of streets to public
use."
Whether a vacation occurs depends in part on the nature of the easement. To the
extent that the street continues to be used consistently with the easement there has been
no vacation. See In re Grand River Dam Auth., 484 P.2d 505 (Okla. 1971).
"Vacation" can occur without a "closing." In McKinney v. Rowland, 197 Iowa 180,
186, 197 N.W. 88, 90 (1924), for example, the court held that vacation is "simply a
disclaimer . . . to assume further jurisdiction in the supervision of the streets in con-
troversy, and removes the burden of taxation incidental in keeping said streets in use or
repair." In Bigelow v. Ballerino, 111 Cal. 559, 565, 44 P. 307, 309 (1896), on the other
hand, the court noted that a vacation "involves something more than a mere constructive
closing .... It involves a physical closing as well .... See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.298
(Supp. 1975) (designation of street as pedestrian mall "shall not constitute a ... vacation
of such street .... ").
448 14 Ill. 2d at 142, 150 N.E.2d at 830.
449 77 R.I. at 204, 74 A.2d at 850.
450 See notes 476-79 infra & accompanying text.
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vacating a public way is the subject of statute in virtually every
jurisdiction. The prevailing rule is that the statutory procedure
must be strictly adhered to or the proposed vacation will be
enjoined. 451 Extreme examples of the application of this rule are
cases in which vacations have been struck down when authorized
by resolution instead of ordinance,4 52 or when the statute re-
quired five disinterested "freeholders" to assess damages and the
council selected five "householders. ' 453 Although courts occa-
sionally find deviations from the statutory formula not
substantial, 454 a part of a traffic restriction program found to be
a vacation will generally fail unless strict compliance with the
applicable statute is manifested.
Vacation statutes generally provide for local legislative
bodies to order a vacation. 455 Because the decision to vacate is a
legislative one, it generally is not the subject of judicial review.
456
This general proposition is subject to the conventional excep-
tions of fraud, arbitrariness, collusion, and "clear abuse of
power. '45 7 In addition, statutes authorizing vacations generally
451 See, e.g., Mahan v. Rockport, 287 Mass. 34, 190 N.E. 810 (1934); Hughes v.
Bingham, 135 N.Y. 347, 32 N.E. 78 (1892); Shapera v. Allegheny County, 344 Pa. 473,
25 A.2d 566 (1941); In re Mackrill's Addition, 85 S.D. 196, 200, 179 N.W.2d 268, 270
(1970). See also Messinger v. Cincinnati, 36 Ohio App. 337, 173 N.E. 260 (1930); 11 E.
McQUILLIN, supra note 363, § 30.185.
Why strict compliance with this type of statute should be required is none too clear.
One court has suggested that the "vacation of highways is not favored." McHenry v.
Foutty, 223 Ind. 335, 339, 60 N.E.2d 781, 782 (1945).
452 Mitchener v. City of Okmulgee, 100 Okla. 98, 228 P. 159 (1924).
13 Jones v. City of Aurora, 97 Neb. 825, 151 N.W. 958 (1915).
454 Village of Bellevue v. Bellevue Improvement Co., 65 Neb. 52, 90 N.W. 1002
(1902).
15- Occasionally the vacation power is delegated to the courts. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 723.09 (Page 1954). See, e.g., In re Hull, 163 Minn. 439, 204 N.W. 534 (1925); Duenke
v. County of St. Louis, 358 Mo. 91, 213 S.W.2d 492 (1948). See also Dorsch v. Beaumont
Glass Co., 74 Ohio St. 208, 78 N.E. 215 (1906).
456 See, e.g., Beals v. City of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 381, 144 P.2d 839 (1943);
Blanding v. City of Las Vegas, 52 Nev. 52, 280 P. 644 (1929); Banchero v. City Council, 2
Wash. App. 519, 468 P.2d 724 (Ct. App. 1970); cases collected in 3J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS 1837 (5th ed. 1911). See also ILL. ANN. STATS., ch. 24, § 11-91-1 (Smith-
Hurd 1962): "The determination of the corporate authorities that the nature and extent
of the public use or public interest to be subserved is such as to warrant the vacation of
any street or alley, or part thereof, is conclusive ......
4'7 See, e.g., People v. City of Mt. Vernon, 404 Il1. 58, 88 N.E.2d 45 (1949); Smith v.
Village of Wintersville, 26 Ohio Op. 2d 40, 187 N.E.2d 511 (Ct. App. 1962); City of
Greenville v. Bozeman, 254 S.C. 306, 315, 175 S.E.2d 211, 215 (1970); Sweetwater
Memorial Park, Inc. v. City of Sweetwater, 213 Tenn. 1, 4, 372 S.W.2d 168, 169 (1963);
Banchero v. City Council, 2 Wash. App. 519, 525, 468 P.2d 724, 729 (Ct. App. 1970);
Clifford v. City of Cheyenne, 487 P.2d 1325 (Wyo. 1971).
Generally a legislative body will have a strong case when its action is predicated, at
least in part, on the recommendations of an expert body or consultant. In Hoskins v. City
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define the criteria for judicial review. These grounds are usually
rather broad, for instance, that the "public interest will be
subserved. '' 458 This admonition may be read literally so that "the
advantage to the public must come from the vacation itself and
not the use to which the property will be put in the future. '
459
Municipal decisions to close streets have been overruled by
courts because they failed to comply with the broad "public in-
terest" language. 460 The archetypal case is a vacation "for the
sole purpose of benefiting an abutting property owner.
'
"461
Courts rarely find such exclusive benefit, however.46 2 The
statutory criteria are thus unlikely to pose difficulties for traffic
restriction plans.
A more serious difficulty presented by vacation is that some
statutes provide for participation of abutting owners in the deci-
of Kirkland, 7 Wash. App. 957, 503 P.2d 1117 (Ct. App. 1972), the court went further
and found that even though the City Council was "free to evaluate the force and effect of
the commission's recommendation. Such disagreement alone does not amount to bad
faith ... " Id. at 964, 503 P.2d at 1122.
458 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-91-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962). See, e.g., CAL. STS. &
H'WAYS CODE § 8323 (West 1969) ("[If streets are] unnecessary for present or prospective
public purposes"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 723.05 (Page 1954) (good cause ... and not
detrimental to the general interest"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1672 (1974) ("necessary");
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.297(1) (Supp. 1975) (if "the public interest requires . . . or [the
streets are] of no public utility"); NEw YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § E15-3.0(a) (Supp. 1974)
(vacation permitted to "further the health safety, pedestrian or vehicular circulation,
housing, economic development or general welfare of the city").
459 Clifford v. City of Cheyenne, 487 P.2d 1325, 1330 (Wyo. 1971) (citing Webb v.
City of San Rafael, 95 Cal. App. 733, 273 P. 138 (Dist. Ct. App. 1928).
460 See, e.g., Yarrow First Associates v. Town of Clyde Hill, 66 Wash. 2d 371, 374,
403 P.2d 49, 52 (1965) (vacation to prevent use of street by nonresidents not "based upon
some element of 'public use' ").
461 Stahl Soap Corp. v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 200, 205, 156 N.E.2d 443, 445,
182 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1959); City of Greenville v. Bozeman, 254 S.C. 306, 315-16, 175
S.E.2d 211, 215 (1970). See Hudson v. American Oil Co., 152 F. Supp. 757 (E.D. Va.
1957), aff'd, 253 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1958); Banchero v. City Council, 2 Wash. App. 519,
523, 468 P.2d 724, 728 (1970) (review the legislative determination "[o]nly where there is
no possible benefit to the public"); Clifford v. City of Cheyenne, 487 P.2d 1325 (Wyo.
1971). The Banchero test was applied in Hoskins v. City of Kirkland, 7 Wash. App. 957,
963-64, 503 P.2d 1117, 1122 (1972).
462 In City of Greenville v. Bozeman, 254 S.C. 306, 175 S.E.2d 211 (1970), for
example, the city and a bank entered into an agreement to redevelop a three-block area
of the center city. The city was to construct a parking facility for 700 vehicles and the
bank was to construct a high-rise bank office building. To accomplish this goal several
streets had to be vacated. The court responded to the allegation that th& benefit accrued
solely to the bank by noting that while the bank "instigated" the vacation, the redevelop-
ment project "is a joint venture, so to speak, between the City of Greenville and the Bank
which will inure to the benefit of both and by benefitting the City it will benefit its
citizens." Id. at 316, 175 S.E.2d at 215. Similarly, in Clifford v. City of Cheyenne, 487
P.2d 1325 (Wyo. 1971), a shopping center developer who owned property on both sides
of a street proposed the vacation of that portion of the street. The vacation would enable
the developer to enlarge his parking lot. The vacation would also be a step in a transac-
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sion to vacate.463 Some statutes require a hearing as a prerequi-
site to vacation.46 4 When vacation is a judicial proceeding,
abutters must be joined as defendants. 465 The significance of
these requirements is that should a plan be found to constitute a
vacation, the statutory process will provide a convenient focal
point for the organization of forces opposed to the street use
plan.
At least initially, street closings for pedestrianization have
been opposed by abutting merchants. In New York City, for
instance, the Fifth Avenue Association represented merchants
who owned shops on Madison Avenue in a successful suit to
prevent implementation of a plan to ban private vehicles and
taxis from Madison Avenue.466 The merchants apparently
brought the suit because they feared their customers would take
their trade to establishments more accessible by taxi or auto.
46 7
Mumford found similar attitudes among the merchants of
Coventry and Rotterdam, where there was significant opposition
to restricting traffic on shopping streets for fear of loss of the
"carriage trade. ' 468 And at a symposium, sponsored by the Or-
ganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, where
the experience with "car-free zones and pedestrian streets in
Bremen, Cologne, Copenhagen, Landskrona, Leeds,. Marseille,
tion for the elimination of a "five-legged intersection," something the town had long
planned. And in exchange for the vacation the city received an alternate right of way and
other benefits which saved the city $15,000 to $20,000.
Despite the manifest private benefit in these cases, the courts were reluctant to find
that the benefits were exclusively private. Instead they seem inclined to follow the path of
development of the "public purpose" requirement in eminent domain.
4 63
E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 11-3310 (1947), discussed in Kemmer v. City of
Bozeman, 158 Mont. 354, 492 P.2d 211 (1971).
464 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.297(2) (Supp. 1975). See generally N.Y. Times, Oct.
28, 1973, § 4, at 10, col. 3.
465 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 93.360, 94.360 (1970). See Riedling v. Harrod, 298 Ky.
232, 182 S.W.2d 770 (1944).
466 Fifth Ave. Ass'n, Inc. v. Lindsay, 73 Misc. 2d 111,341 N.Y.S. 473 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
344 N.Y.S.2d 633 (App. Div. 1973).
467 N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1973, § 4, at 10, col. 3. But see Crampton v. City of Royal
Oak, 362 Mich. 503, 529, 108 N.W.2d 16, 28 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
468 L. MUMFORD, supra note 124, at 44-45. Cautious experimentation may be the way
to alleviate these fears. In Manhattan, a "five-block stretch of Nassau Street,-a narrow
thoroughfare that winds through the financial district . . . has been closed to vehicular
traffic on weekdays between 11:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M. since the spring of 1969. The
closing has met with almost unanimous approval of the merchants .... " N.Y. Times,
Nov. 4, 1973, at 46, col. 1. A proposal to make the closing permanent and complete has
won approval" of the merchants to the extent that they were willing to contribute $5000
of the $20,000 fee for a study of the feasibility of the proposal. A similar project for
Fulton St. in Brooklyn has also met with a favorable response from the abutting mer-
chants. Id.
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Minneapolis, New York, Paris, Reading, Rome, Stockholm and
Tokyo were discussed in detail," observations showed that local
shopkeepers were on the whole initially skeptic [sic].
'469
The significance of this opposition may be quickly reduced
as merchants become increasingly familiar with traffic restriction
programs. Indeed, in New York, the Fifth Avenue Association
later repented, testifying in hearings in favor of the Madison
Avenue mall. Groups representing the taxi industry, however,
managed to sustain the opposition to the project. While the
projects discussed at the OECD symposium aroused initial op-
position, merchants generally acquiesced within a few months.
Merchants in many cities have discovered that traffic restriction
can lead to more business for shops abutting the affected
street.47 0
3. Problems of Reversion and Compensation
If a vacation occurs, the street usually reverts in fee simple
to the abutting landowners. This result derives from the general
rule in the United States that the abutting landowner will be held
469 OECD, supra note 126, at 77.
470 As early as the 1920's all vehicular traffic was banned from Limbecker Strasse in
Essen. The move was so popular that business volume in relation to street area was at
that time among the highest in Europe. See HUD BRIEF, supra note 80, at 14. See also
STREETS FOR PEOPLE, supra note 288, at 10.
More recently pedestrianization has spread to other streets in Essen with equally
happy results. Shortly after Tokyo banned vehicular traffic from 122 of the busiest
downtown streets, affected merchants reported retail sales up 50%. Von Eckardt, People,
Yes; Cars, No, SAT. REv., Oct. 3, 1970, at 62. In a survey of 574 shops, 21% reported an
increase in sales, 60% no change, and 19% a decrease. Of the merchants interviewed,
74% favored the scheme. See HUD BRIEF, supra, at 4. After three and a half years of ex-
perience with a traffic-free street, London street merchants in Norwich are enthusiastic
about the plan. See Von Eckardt, supra, at 62. In several German cities businessmen in
streets adjacent to traffic-free streets asked to have their streets included in the traffic-
free zone. See Kiihnemann & Witherspoon, supra note 288, at 67. Similarly several Ger-
man cities reported increased demand for floor space in the part of department stores
and banks near traffic-free areas. See id. 68.
The most recent success in the application of this policy has been the closing of
Oxford Street, the "biggest shopping center in England," to all traffic except taxis and
buses. Sidewalks were widened, trees planted, and benches installed. In a survey taken in
May, 1972, six months after the plan went into operation, 85% of area residents were in
favor of the plan and, more important, area shopkeepers reversed their role from oppos-
ition to support. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1973, at 6, col. 1. A later survey published in
December, 1973, indicated that "shop managers in Oxford Street [considered] the
scheme . . . a success for the majority of shops." GREATER LONDON COUNCIL INTELLI-
GENCE UNIT Q. BULL., Dec., 1973, at 18.
One of the largest projects of this kind in the United States is the Nicollet Mall in
Minneapolis. Eight blocks of Nicollet Avenue iere closed to private traffic and the street
resurfaced to provide for a 24-foot curving "transitway" for buses and sidewalks of up to
36 feet in width paralleling it. Retail business on Nicollet Avenue has increased 14% since
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to own the fee in the public way in front of his property to the
center thereof, subject to the public easement. 471 Historically,
most streets came into being as a result of dedications or takings;
the presumption is that the dedication or taking was limited to
the public's need at the time, conveying an easement of passage
rather than a fee.472 The fee remained with the abutting land-
owner. Occasionally, the fee to the streets is held by the munici-
pality. In some cases, the title to the streets never leaves the
sovereign which granted fees to abutting properties. In New
York, for example, the grants of the Dutch Government have
been held to have exempted title to the beds of public ways from
the grants. 473 Similarly, when streets have originated through
platting statutes which vested title to the street in the municipal-
ity, vacation would leave the fee in the municipality. 474 Finally,
the mall opened and "the mall has generated some $49 million in new construction and
rehabilitation." It should be noted that data are difficult to come by because of a natural
reluctance of businessmen to give out sales information. See Kiihnemann & Wither-
spoon, supra, at 67.
471 Skeritt Invest. Co. v. City of Englewood, 79 Colo. 645, 248 P. 6 (1926); Town of
Hustisford v. Knuth, 190 Wis. 495, 209 N.W. 687 (1926); IDAHO CODE § 50-311 (1967);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-91-2 (Smith-Hurd 1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-506 (1964);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 659, 1004 (1959).
472 A common law dedication created an easement. See Neil v. Independent Realty
Co., 317 Mo. 1235, 298 S.W. 363 (1927); Waterloo Condensed Milk Co. v. Voges, 316 111.
477, 147 N.E. 373 (1925). Statutory dedications vary in effect depending on the statute.
In Illinois, for example, they create a determinable fee. See St. Clair County Housing
Auth. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 387 Ill. 180, 56 N.E.2d 357 (1944).
On taking an easement only, see, e.g., Northern Ind. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Merchants
Improvement Ass'n, 87 Ind. App. 74, 160 N.E. 50 (1928).
473 See DeWitt v. Elmira Tranfer Ry., 134 N.Y. 495, 32 N.E. 42 (1892); Cohen,
Abandonment of Highways and the Effects Upon the Rights of the Public and Property Owners, 23
N.Y. STATE B. Ass'N BULL. 57, 58 (1951). See also Pooler v. Sammet, 130 App. Div. 650,
115 N.Y.S. 578 (1909).
A possibility is that the fee in the street was dedicated to the city for use as a street
and that upon its abandonment, it will revert to the heirs of the dedicator. See Neil v.
Independent Realty Co., 317 Mo. 1235, 298 S.W. 363 (1927). When the abutting owner is
not the successor in interest to the original owner, the fee may revert to the original
owner and not the abutter. See Oberhelman v. Allen, 7 Ohio App. 251 (1915). A theory
of reversion to the abutting owners following a vacation is the doctrine of accretion. The
theory is that although the public gives up its easement upon vacation, the private
easements of the abutting owners remain. To preserve the easements, or, more correctly,
the right of ingress and egress, it is necessary that the vacated street become part of the
abutting lots. See Hamilton G. & C. Traction Co. v. Parish, 67 Ohio St. 181, 190, 65 N.E.
1011, 1013 (1902).
The assumption implicit in the common law rule that each of the abutting owners
had contributed equally to the street is also rebuttable. See, e.g., Watrous v. Southworth, 5
Conn. 305 (1824).
474 See, e.g., Town of Kenwood Park v. Leonard, 177 Iowa 337, 158 N.W. 655 (1916)
(dictum); Lindsay v. City of Omaha, 30 Neb. 512, 46 N.W. 627 (1890). But see Olin v.
Denver & R.G.R. Co., 25 Colo. 177, 53 P. 454 (1898); Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 I1. 19, 132
N.E. 280 (1921); Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah 127, 104 P. 111 (1909).
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the holder of the fee to streets whose origin lay in statutory
dedication may be determined by the statute.
Thus a critical factor to be considered in implementing a
traffic restriction plan is the history of the streets under exami-
nation. Given a choice between the vacation of a street wherein
the fee clearly lies with the municipality as opposed to one whose
history is unclear, the former should be the site of the vacation.
The distinction, probably imperceptible to the non-lawyer, could
involve substantial sums of money. If the fee to the street reverts
to the abutters, the planners may lose control of it and may be
forced to buy it back via eminent domain in order to implement
their traffic restriction plan.
47 5
Compensating abutters of a vacated street may also become
an issue. In some cases the standard is provided for by statute.476
Where it is not, the better and more logical rule would deny
compensation on the ground that a vacation is not a taking.
Vacation generally involves the removal of the public easement
from the fee of the abutting owners and a restoration to them of
their land "freed from the servitude of the public way. ' 477 The
vacation does not affect abutters' rights to access, light, and air,
which remain in full force and effect.47 8 The better rule does
475 A less costly alternative which might maintain the vacated street as open space is a
setback requirement in the zoning code.
476 See, e.g., Nielson v. City of Chicago, 330 I1. 301, 161 N.E. 768 (1928); In re Gillen
Place, 304 N.Y. 215, 106 N.E.2d 897 (1952); In re Melon St., 182 Pa. 397, 38 A. 482
(1897). The latter case was used to interpret PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-613 (Supp. 1975)
to create a right of compensation for vacation in Condemnation Case, 430 Pa. 273, 242
A.2d 432 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 (1969). See also Hedrick v. City of Harris-
burg, 278 Pa. 274, 122 A. 281 (1923).
477 Wetherill v. Pennsylvania R.R., 195 Pa. 156, 160, 45 A. 658, 660 (1900). The laws
of Illinois go further and provide for the abutting landowners to compensate the muni-
cipal authorities in an amount "equal to the benefits which will accrue to them by reason
of the vacation." 24 ILL. ANN. STAT. § 11-91-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962). See also Harman v.
City & County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 496 P.2d 1248, 101 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1972).
478 See, e.g., Harman v. City & County of San Francisco, 7 Cal. 3d 150, 167, 496
P.2d 1248, 1259, 101 Cal. Rptr. 880, 891 (1972): "[P]rivate easement of ingress and
egress... continues even though the city by vacation terminates the public right of access
to the street." See Paul v. Wissalohican Camp Co., 104 Ohio App. 253, 257, 148 N.E.2d
248, 250 (1957): "[A] private easement in public highway is already in existence when the
highway is vacated, and continues if there is a reasonable need for it." See Central Trust
Co. v. Hennen, 90 F. 593 (6th Cir. 1898); In re Nichols, 54 N.Y. 62 (1873); Plitt v. Cox, 43
Pa. 486 (1862). The authorities may also reserve easements in vacated streets. See, e.g.,
CAL STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 8330 (West 1969) (city may reserve and except from vacation
easements for storm drains, sewers, pipelines, wires, telegraphic and telephone lines).
Contra, Libertini v. Schroeder, 149 Md. 484, 132 A. 64 (1926); Schweitzer v. Adami, 110
N.J. Eq. 193, 159 A. 529 (Ch. 1932), aff'd, 113 N.J. Eq. 46, 166 A. 124 (Ct. Err. & App.
1933). A street closing under the New York Street Closing Act of 1895 terminated both
public and private easements in the street. Barber v. Woolf, 216 N.Y. 7, 109 N.E. 868
(1915); Johnson & Co. v. Cox, 196 N.Y. 110, 89 N.E. 454 (1909).
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not, however, appear to be the general rule, which finds vacation
a compensable injury to abutters. 9
D. Special Benefits
The financial benefits that may flow from a traffic restric-
tion program to abutters and the continued deterioration of the
central business district in the absence of such programs should
gradually reverse merchant opposition. Financial benefits will
also have a positive effect.480 To the extent that a restriction
program gives rise to a claim for compensation by an abutter,
either because of taking or damage to the right of access or as
the result of vacation, the claim may be offset by the "special
benefits" conferred on the abutter by the program.
In Richley v. Bowling481 the court defined special benefits as
those that "accrue directly and solely to the owner of the lands,
from which the right is taken," as distinguished from general
benefits, which are "such as accrue to community, or the vicinity
at large. ' 482 In Richley, the state took a strip of defendant's land
for a limited access highway. An access road that provided a
means of entering and leaving the new highway was constructed
along the eastern boundary of defendant's property. The state
offered to show that an oil company was willing to purchase a
segment of defendant's property composing the "first off the
ramp" location for a price that would fully offset the damages
imposed by the taking. The testimony was not admitted. This
ruling was upheld on appeal on the ground that the access road
created a "general" as opposed to a "special" benefit.
The increase in value was, the court said, due to "the antici-
pated increase in traffic and the semi-monopolistic condition of
exit roads on a limited access highway." This was not a direct
effect but an indirect one. A direct effect would be a change that
improved the drainage, elevation, topography, or fertility of the
land itself. In addition, the benefits were not conferred "solely"
on the subject property. For example, "[e]very exit on the
479 See 11 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 363, § 30.188.
480 A classic example of a special benefit that may be conferred upon abutting land
by a restriction program is the conversion of Maiden Lane in San Francisco from "an odd
two-block-long, narrow, back-door alley" into "one of the finest shopping streets in
America." Jacobs, Downtown is for People, in EDITORS OF FORTUNE, EXPLODING METROPOLIS
161-62 (1958).
481 34 Ohio App. 2d 200, 299 N.E.2d 288 (1972).
4
1
2 Id. at 202-03, 299 N.E.2d at 291 (quoting Little Miami R.R. v. Collett, 6 Ohio St.
182, 186 (1856)).
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limited access road experiences the same change to a situs of a
preferred commercial location .... ,,483 Moreover, the access
road "benefited not only the defendants' land, but all lands bor-
dering upon it on both sides. .... ,,484 The court concluded that
the gain in commercial value was not "a special benefit with some
value to be deducted from the damages then ascertained.
485
It is worth exploring the complexities of the "special ben-
efits" rule,486 because the rule suggests a virtually cost-free so-
lution to the land use problems of a traffic restriction plan. The
United States Constitution does not prohibit deducting benefits
from the required compensation. 48 7 The jurisdictions are split
on whether, absent statutory authority authorizing deduction,
such a deduction can be made. 488 In some states nondeductibility
has been incorporated in statutes489 or the constitution. 490 Some
jurisdictions, including New York and Illinois, 491 hold that both
general and special benefits may be deducted. The earliest cases
made no distinction between general and special benefits; 492 the
refinements were made in the interest of "fairness." If all sur-
483 Id. at 204, 299 N.E.2d at 292.
484 Id. at 205, 299 N.E.2d at 292.
485 Id. The court, however, allowed consideration of the value to defendant of the
road as mitigation of specific damages that would have been awarded had the road
not been built. Without the road, there would have been no means of access to the prop-
erty. Hence the road could be considered to mitigate damage to the right of access.
486 "Upon this subject there is a great diversity of opinion and more rules, different
from and inconsistent with each other, have been laid down than upon any other point in
the law of eminent domain." 3 P. NICHOLS, supra note 416, § 8.62.
487 Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
488 Compare State Highway Comm'n v. Breisacher, 231 Mich. 317, 204 N.W. 112
(1925) and Harrold v. Good Roads Comm., 182 N.C. 577, 109 S.E. 625 (1921), with State
v. Boduck, 57 Del. 362, 200 A.2d 424 (1964).
489 See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-27-21 (1972).
490 Hamer v. State Highway Comm'n, 250 Iowa 1228, 98 N.W.2d 746 (1959); Finley
v. Board of County Comm'rs., 291 P.2d 333 (Okla. 1955). Section 19 of Article I of the
Ohio Constitution provides, inter alia, that "such compensation shall be assessed by ajury,
without deduction for benefits to any property of the owner." See Richley v. Bowling, 34
Ohio App. 2d 200, 202, 299 N.E.2d 288, 291 (1972).
491 Brand v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 645, 260 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Ct. Cl. 1965), modified on other
grounds, 26 App. Div. 2d 747, 272 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1966); In re Exterior St., 285 N.Y. 455,
35 N.E.2d 39 (1941); Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Keck, 330 Ill. 39, 161 N.E.
55 (1928); Sanitary Dist. v. Boening, 267 Ill. 118, 107 N.E. 810 (1915). New York allows
general and special benefits to "be set off against damages to the remaining part, but not
against the value of the part taken ...... Chiesa v. State, 36 N.Y.2d 21, 23, 324 N.E.2d
329, 331, 364 N.Y.S.2d 848, 849 (1974).
Alabama statutes provide for setoff of "the value of enhancement to the remaining
lands" but not of incidental benefits. ALA. CODE tit. 19, § 14 (1958). See, e.g., State v.
Goodwyn, 272 Ala. 618, 133 So. 2d 375 (1961). See generally cases collected in 3 P.
NICHOLS, supra note 416, § 8.6205, at 86 n.60.
492 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Justices, 9 Mass. 388 (1812).
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rounding landowners shared in the general benefits, it was ar-
gued, it would be unfair to require payment only from the
owner whose property was taken.493 Moreover, general benefits
were considered merely conjectural.
494
The label conjectural could apply equally to special and
general benefits and so really does not support the distinction.
But the fairness argument does support excluding general
benefits from a setoff. Otherwise the burden of public improve-
ments would be arbitrarily assigned to those whose property was
taken. On the other hand, special benefits should constitute
some kind of a setoff. It would be wrong to compensate a prop-
erty owner for a "loss" when he is actually better off financially
after the "taking or damage" than before, and when his position
is improved to a much greater degree than that of his neighbors.
A rule must be formulated to identify these situations.
The unique or sole benefit rule is exemplified by State ex.
rel. Department of Highways v. McPherson,495 in which the State
took 115.69 acres of defendant's land for the construction of an
interstate highway. The value of the land was found to be $455
per acre. On the other hand, the defendant sold dirt removed
from 48.5 acres to the road contractor at an average price of
$1200 per acre. The Louisiana Court of Appeal found that the
owner was able to sell his dirt at a sum twice his own estimate of
market value because of the highway project, and that the dif-
ference between value as found and the price for the dirt was
therefore a "special benefit" to him. The Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed because it found that six other surrounding
landowners (whose land had not been taken) also sold dirt for
the highway construction; therefore "the benefit [was] not spe-
cial to McPherson. It [was] instead general to those located near
the right of way who [had] the type of soil desired and who
[were] willing to sell. 496 The court indicated that to decide
otherwise would deny justice to McPherson.497
493 See Chiesa v. State, 36 N.Y.2d 21, 324 N.E.2d 329, 364 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1974);
Meacham v. Fitchburg R.R., 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 291 (1849).
494 See, e.g., State v. Hudson County Freeholders, 55 N.J.L. 88, 25 A. 322 (Sup. Ct.
1892), cf. Chiesa v. State, 36 N.Y.2d 21, 25, 324 N.E.2d 329, 332-33, 364 N.Y.S.2d 848,
851 (1974).
19- 241 So. 2d 543 (La. Cir. Ct. 1970), modified, 261 La. 116, 259 So. 2d 33 (1972).
496 261 La. at 136, 259 So. 2d at 40.
'97 The court also indicated that the dirt sales resulted more from the peculiar
suitability of the dirt for roadbed than from the location of the construction. Thus the
sale was an "advantage to the owner, not the property." Id. at 137, 259 So. 2d at 40.
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In addition to "uniqueness," the Richley court and others
have found a limitation on special benefits in "directness." In
effect the courts are using a proximate cause test, evaluating the
remoteness of the physical improvement from the benefit
received. 498 A physical change in the land that improves drain-
age is a relatively direct benefit and the Richley court indicated
that it would find such a benefit "special." In Farrell v. State
Highway Board,499 the court eschewed the uniqueness test which
seemed to treat the government's interest so harshly in the
Richley context. Relying solely on "directness," the Farrell court
nonetheless reached a "general benefit" conclusion on facts simi-
lar to those in Richley. An increase in traffic at an exit, the court
held, is naturally an indirect effect of a limited access highway
program and thus can never be a special benefit.
500
This view has a certain appeal. If a diversion of traffic re-
sulting in an erosion of property values is damnum absque
injuria,50 1 a nice corollary is found in the rule that an attraction
498 A recent case whose facts parallel a typical traffic restriction situation was re-
solved on a remoteness theory. United Cal. Bank v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works, I
Cal. App. 3d 1, 81 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969), involved the creation of a
downtown shopping mall in the City of Pomona. As part of the plan First Street was
closed and turned into a parking area. Several political entities were involved in the
project. The State Department of Highways was responsible for closing First Street and
turning it over to "a parking district" which would "convert it to parking purposes." The
State attempted to introduce evidence showing that the conversion of First Street into a
parking area was a special benefit to the defendant. Section 1248(3) of the Code of Civil
Procedure limited special benefits "to those arising from '. . . the construction of the
improvement proposed ... ' Id. at 9, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 412. While not denying that the
conversion could in fact amount to a special benefit, the court found that the State's role
was limited to closing First Street. "[T]he development of it thereafter for parking use
was no part of its work; hence, the development could not constitute a special benefit."
Id. The court's interpretation seems strained at best: The special benefit rule is applied to
offset valid claims for compensation, and such claims do not arise from "the construction
of the improvement" but from some "taking or damage" prior to the commencement of
construction. To consider the act giving rise to the claim for compensation and the
subsequent act conferring the special benefit as two transactions is not demanded by
either the law or the facts. The most plausible explanation is that the court seized upon
this difference because of a belief that the benefit was not the creation of parking space
but the increased patronage that might flow from the new parking facility.
499 123 Vt. 453, 19'4 A.2d 410 (1963).
500 But see State ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Hayes, 150 So. 2d 667 (La. Cir. Ct. App.
1963). The state took part of defendant's land for a new highway. The portion taken had
abutted a dedicated but ungraded street. The tract was used for a new highway, chang-
ing defendant's land use from industrial to commercial and more than tripling the value
of defendant's land from $4,800 to $16,050. The court, with remarkably little reasoning,
had no difficulty in finding a special benefit to the defendant. Whether there were other
beneficiaries similarly situated was not discussed by the court.
"01 See note 396 supra.
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:368
of traffic will not be found to be a special benefit.50 2 The attrac-
tion of symmetry may be counterbalanced, however, by a social
policy that favors individual absorption of diversion losses but a
sharing of the gains of attraction. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
has adopted a "highest and best use" test which allows the con-
demnor to recoup the compensation he otherwise would have to
pay.50 3 The court found that an upward shift in use from ag-
ricultural to commercial, not an increase in the commercial value
of land, could be used by the state as a setoff.
We can posit three landowners abutting a new access road.
The first, A, owns the property directly adjacent to the new
limited access highway and the market value of his remaining
land is found to have increased from $10 to $20 per acre. The
next landowner, B, although abutting the access road, is sepa-
rated from the highway by A's land. The value of B's remaining
land is found to have increased from $10 to $18 per acre. C's
land is next in line away from the highway and his remaining
land is found to have increased from $10 to $15 per acre. The
value of land generally is found to have increased from $10 to
$12 per acre as a result of the highway construction.
We should be reluctant, notwithstanding the "special ben-
efits" rule, to reward them doubly by giving compensation. A, B,
and C all have enjoyed great benefits. But to what extent should
their compensation be curtailed? The simplest view would be the
difference between the increase in value in their respective lands
and the general increase. For A the figure would be $8, for B $6,
for C $3 per acre. But if only the land of A had been taken, he
would be liable to lose his $8 per acre gain as an offset against
the compensation due him for his land taken. The "fairness"
principle would be violated because he would be worse off than
B solely because some of his land was taken and B's was not. The
problem may be solved by applying the sole or unique benefit
criterion. A's special benefit, therefore, is $2 per acre because
offsetting his benefits by this amount would leave him in at least
as good a position as B. But suppose land is only taken from B?
Has he enjoyed offsetting special benefits? If the rele-
vant reference is C, the answer is yes; if A the answer is no. One
502 See State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Pope, 228 Mo. App. 888, 74 S.W.2d
265 (1934).
03 See, e.g., Petkus v. State Highway Comm'n, 24 Wis. 2d 643, 130 N.W.2d 253
(1964).
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way out of this dilemma is to include as relevant references all
who have benefited above the "general level."
While case analysis offers no workable rules, counsel for the
street use planner must be constantly probing the limits of "spe-
cial benefits" to minimize the cost of implementing the plan.
Because the ultimate goal of a traffic restriction program is to
make the central business district a more attractive place to live
and work, and because reaching that goal would necessarily in-
crease CBD land values, benefits to owners whose land is partly
taken or damaged are present. The courts must constantly be
pressed to narrow the windfall profits of CBD owners by adopt-
ing less restrictive "special benefit" rules.
"Special benefits" has another usage which may help focus
the costs of a CBD traffic restriction program on those most
benefited by it. This usage is in the context of special assess-
ments. Such assessments are a traditional method of financing
localized improvements by placing a nondiscriminatory "tax" or
assessment on property owners within a zone reasonably defined
to include those who receive "special benefits. °5 0 4 The special
assessment avoids the fairness problem of the offset because it
affects all property owners benefited rather than only those
whose property has been taken. Additionally, the charge for the
special benefit is not limited to the offset for property taken or
damaged but is fully distributed to the landowners. The special
assessment technique permits costs to be assessed against a wider
group because the formulas countenanced by the courts are par-
ticularly flexible.
50 5
VIII. CONCLUSION
The existence of the urban transportation problem presup-
poses the acceptance of cities in something approximating their
present form. An analysis of the urban transportation problem
must begin, therefore, with the relationship between cities and
transportation.
504 City of Baldwin Park v. Stoskus, 8 Cal. 3d 563, 503 P.2d 1333, 105 Cal. Rptr. 325
(1972).
5'5 Benefits for assessment purposes may be ascertained by general formula. See, e.g.,
French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324 (1901); Crampton v. City of Royal
Oak, 362 Mich. 503, 108 N.W.2d 16 (1961) (presumption of validity attaches to legislative
assessments; benefits measured by both present and future potential uses of property;
burden of showing no benefit is on those assessed).
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Of the various transportation modes, the automobile is most
destructive of the city. The automobile is responsible for most of
the air pollution in cities. More importantly, the roadbed on
which the automobile runs and the parking lot upon which it
rests consume, in the eyes of many observers, an inordinate
amount of urban land. The effort then is to find an alternative
transportation mode which will provide equivalent service at a
lower social cost. While rail rapid transit offers clear advantages
over the automobile in terms of air pollution, its land use advan-
tage is purchased only at the price of a loss of flexibility in both
route and equipment. The inordinate cost of constructing new
rapid transit systems makes them the least attractive alternative
to the automobile. The more attractive public mode is the bus.
The federal urban mass transportation program is heavily
weighted in favor of rail rapid transit. Aside from the apparent
political advantages flowing from support of the latter systems as
opposed to the bus, the explanation for the federal preference
lies in the misconception that rail rapid transit will induce au-
tomobile commuters to leave their cars at home. Our analysis,
however, indicates that of all the automobile users in urban
areas, the commuter to work is the most difficult to lure from
behind the steering wheel. The strategy must then be to supple-
ment the carrot with the stick.
The stick strategy most likely to be effective in discouraging
automobile commuting is planning that would preclude private
automobile use on CBD streets. Of all the stick strategies possi-
ble, restricting street use offers the lowest cost, the greatest flexi-
bility in implementation and alteration, the most equitable im-
pact, and the highest predictable degree of success. Outweighing
and supplementing these advantages is the fact that a land plan-
ning strategy is the only solution to the urban transportation
problem that also promises a qualitative improvement in the
urban environment. Only through total reorganization of the
flow of traffic, not simply its reduction, can the CBD again be-
come a pleasant place to work, shop, and live.
Implementation of the land planning solution will require a
lawyer's skills. The land planning program involves more than
simply closing streets. The lawyer can point out when a proposal
will give rise to compensable claims and how the same end of
traffic restriction might otherwise be achieved at a lower cost. He
can alert planners to the possibility that a court might view a
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plan as a vacation and recommend steps to be taken to avoid
such a determination. In general, the lawyer should assist his
client in accomplishing the plan's objectives at the least
economic, political, and social cost.
